Evidence: Alphabetical
- U.S. practice appears to be to allow adversaries to develop counter space capabilities as long as they do not directly threaten U.S. assets.
- U.S. acquisition schedule and replacement rate for critical satellites indicates significant amount of redundancy already built into system
- U.S. dominance of outer space would eventually be seen as less destabilizing and aggressive than the conventional forces it would displace
- U.S. weaponization of space could create self-fulfilling prophecies with China, Russia, and India
- U.S. Security would benefit from collaborative approach to space surveillance but will be undermined if nothing is done
- U.S. space export controls decrease U.S. space leadership and allow other countries to fill the vacuum
- U.S. Adversaries seek to challenge its military dominance by attacking GPS directly
- U.S. Dependence on satnav assets may create a use or lose dynamic that encourages first strikes
- U.S. needs to consider export control reform to ensure the health of the space industrial base
- U.S. military no longer needs to provide and maintain space surveillance network, other non military actors should step in
- U.S. should declassify orbital existence and location of key national security space assets
- U.S. has very little ground to criticize China's actions in space given its history of comparable acts
- U.S. should take leadership on developing a truly multilateral space Code of Conduct
- U.S. could defend its satellites from China by reducing orbital speeds, effectively moving satellites hundreds of kilometers out of China's range
- U.S. could offer a guarantee of information flow to remove any military advantage from destroying satellites
- U.S space surveillance network infrastructure appears to be straining to keep up
- U.S. export controls have failed to slow foreign space development with the exception of GPS technology though it may be to early to tell
- U.S. is losing its technological lead in space technology as other countries catch up and space industrial base atrophied
- US should develop global strategy to protect space in same way it policies the oceans with its Navy
- U.S. should base its space strategy on sound strategic decisions, not the norms of the international community
- U.S. has strong interest in promoting the responsible use of space
- U.S. should take lead in developing an international standard for space debris mitigation certification among space operators
- U.S. should reject space arms control and codes of conduct in favor of bilateral agreements with countries
- Unlikely that Chinese campaign against U.S. space assets would succeed before their launch capability was degraded
- U.S. tactical commanders more reliant on airborne platforms than ISR space assets, disabling them would give no sustained military advantage
- U.S. should improve its capacity to detect attacks against space assets and move their satellites out of harms way
- Unilateral action is critical to resolve space debris problem because of urgency of the issue and slowness of international community to act
- U.S. unilateral efforts to implement a debris removal system are best hope for resolving space debris crisis
- U.S. should take Chinas counter space threat seriously and invest accordingly
- U.S. has already conducted dozens of anti-satellite weapons tests, not to mention its extensive research into dual use ballistic missile defense technologies
- U.S. still actively pursuing anti-satellite weapons capability
- U.S. space surveillance capabilities could easily verify an ASAT testing ban
- U.S. Joint Space Operations Center regularly provides warnings to other countries about potential space debris collisions.
- U.S. should prepare contingency plans to mitigate attacks from adversaries against commercial providers military is relying on
- Unilateral codes of conduct are widespread but lack enforcement and cooperation necessary for success
- U.S. deployment of offensive space weapons would increase tensions and spark an all-out space arms race