Evidence: Alphabetical
- U.S. Pursuing "Softer-Kill" Counterspace Options to Avoid Complications of Kinetic ASATs
- U.S. already has proven satellite jamming technology
- U.S. can't use ASATs against an Adversary because few Adversaries have anything Worth Targeting
- Unlikely that China conducted ASAT test to bring U.S. to negotiations
- U.S. should call for a moratorium on anti-satellite weapons testing
- U.S. and China unlikely to compete in a space arms race for several reasons
- U.S. Restraint in Space Weapons Development would Encourage other Nations to Fill Vacuum
- U.S. has no Strategic Interests in Unilaterally Disarming its Space Weapon Efforts
- U.S. economy and military power dependent on access to space assets
- U.S. has limited non-nuclear options for prompt global strikes against high-value targets
- U.S. has Several Promximity Satellite Projects Currently
- U.S. needs to develop a strategy to deal with assymetric threat to its space dominance
- U.S. space policy has remained consistent with international law for last 50 years
- U.S. Air Force Space Command already shares weather, intelligence, and missile warning data
- U.S. should pursue a mix of active and passive defense measures to protect space assets
- U.S. space assets will inevitably be targeted as an asymmetric way of challenging U.S. military power
- U.S. has developed methods to jam telemetry, tracking, and control signals for satellites
- U.S. knew about Chinese anti-satellite test preparations but had no incentive to protest
- U.S. space-based global strike could increase adversaries incentives to "use or lose" WMDs
- U.S. should pursue strategy of being second to engage in warfare from outer space
- U.S. needs to improve its spacelift capabilities for successful responsive space strategy
- U.S. Cannot Act Through Unilateral Military Power Alone
- U.S. can employ technical defensive measures to protect satellites
- U.S. should push for a "rules of the road" agreement as a confidence-building measure
- U.S. not limiting itself to non-destructive anti-satellite weapons
- U.S. dominant in space at pivotal point for future management of outer space
- U.S. should share space situational awareness with allies to pre-empt competitors
- U.S. should emphasize national security and economic concerns over space arms control objectives
- U.S. Space Assets are Threatened by a Range of State and Non-State Actors
- U.S. lacks the means (i.e. space weapons) to back up its space deterrence policy
- U.S. does not have a Clear Declaratory Policy to Deter Attacks on U.S. Satellites
- U.S. Interests Prevent it from Negotiating more Effectively with China on the ASAT Issue
- U.S. Needs to Increase Costs of ASAT Tests to China to Dissuade Them
- U.S. should focus on passive measures before offensive counterspace measures
- Unintentional radio frequency interference incidents have declined
- U.S. and China conducting research on ionosphere modification as a satellite jamming technique