Evidence: Alphabetical
- Other states unlikely to be influenced by U.S. decision not to deploy space weapons
- Other countries are rapidly eroding U.S. lead in space technology
- Other nations motivated by national prestige to match U.S. advances in military space
- Orbits of space assets are easy to observe and predict
- Offensive counterspace technology is spreading throughout the world
- Outer Space Treaty does not prohibit space weapons
- On-board decoys could defend satellites from attack
- Other countries will respond to space weapons by pursuing their own or by developing WMDs
- Once one nation achieves ability to shoot down space launch vehicles, it can dominate outer space
- Other Countries may Simply be Unable to Compete with U.S. Technological and Military Dominance
- Once started, space weaponization would be irreversible because of impossibility of verifying any limitations
- Only U.S. currently has capability to integrate space systems on the battlefield
- Other countries oppose U.S. space weaponization to check U.S. hegemony
- Outcome of the debate over space weaponization still up for grabs
- Other nations unlikely to engage U.S. in space arms race
- Offensive space-strike weapons would be a threat to entire planet
- Overall costs of space weapons outweigh the benefits
- Only European Union could construct a space surveillance network to compete with the U.S.
- On-Site Inspections and Consultations could Supplement but not Replace National Technical Means in ASAT Testing Arms Control Treaty
- Online Debate on Space Weaponization Lacks Nuance Necessary when Discussing Complex International Issues
- Opportunities for Successful Strategic Decapitation Strike Unlikely
- Outer space needs minimum set of international norms or "Rules of the Road"
- Other countries are not willing to accept U.S. space dominance
- Other nations likely to be receptive to shared space surveillance coalition
- Outer space domain is currently both uncontested and uncontrolled
- Other countries are modeling U.S secret over satellite positions to the detriment of space security
- Orbital location of secret space assets already publicly known and continually tracked
- Other states likely to see U.S. drive for space dominance as an imperialist and threatening move
- On balance, the best choice for U.S. is to control outer space to avoid the inevitable conflict when another peer competitor emerges
- Other states unlikely to allow U.S. to dominate outer space, setting off great power war Dolman intends to avoid
- Outer space becoming increasingly congested with more participants, launches, space debris, and radio signals
- Over time, political and strategic costs of conducting kinetic attacks in space will be preferable to ground based attacks
- Operation Burnt Frost established that Aegis BMD cruisers have operational ASAT capability and U.S. missile defense efforts are extending its range
- Only missile defense systems that attack the missile during mid course phase have significant dual use potential as ASAT weapons
- Outer space treaty fails to address space debris because of difficulty of attributing debris to one particular nation
- Orbital debris degrades capabilities of earth based astronomy