Evidence: Alphabetical
- Tight budgets mean space weaponization will tradeoff with modernization efforts
- Threat to U.S. space assets no longer speculative - multiple examples of attacks on space assets worldwide
- To minimize collateral damage, the U.S. could jam the ground-based recievers of satellite date rather than the satellite itself
- The Common Aerospace Vehicle (CAV) would allow global strategic strike from space
- Technology advancements have made past arms control efforts irrelevant
- Tongasat incident shows attacks on satellites within means of even relatively underdeveloped nations
- Through technology transfer, many countries could compete in space arms race
- Technology diffusion will quickly erode any technological monopoly
- Threat from residual ASAT systems is limited
- Technological Means to Jam or Blind Satellites Already Widespread
- Testing of space-based missile defense would increase the risk of accidental nuclear war by undermining Russian confidence in there ballistic missile early warning systems
- Testing of space based missile defense will be viewed as a strategic threat by Russia and China
- Terrorists could use remotely sensed imagery to plan attacks
- Technical objections to space weapons usually fall away over tIme
- Taiwan Situation Illustrates Limits to U.S. Ability to Dissuade China
- Top space control priority for the U.S. should be to expand space situational awareness
- Threat to U.S. space assets can no longer be viewed as speculative
- The Soviets abandoned anti-satellite weapon tests during the Cold War because they had already conducted enough to prove the system successful
- Technical fixes and rules unlikely to suffice without new agreements
- Three-Part Definition of "Space Weapons"
- Transparent nature of outer space helps preserve norm of military space restraint
- Too much uncertainty around High-Powered Microwave attacks to make them practical
- Too late to stop an arms race in space
- Two plausible scenarios where countries could cheat on space arms control
- Trying to accelerate development of military space programs is doomed to fail
- Twelve days of silence after China's ASAT test refutes idea that test was meant to encourage arms control discussions
- Terrorist use of HPM or EMP weapons is still highly unrealistic
- Type and number of space actors is growing rapidly
- Threat of space warfare will inevitably increase as our use of and dependence on space assets increases
- Two basic kinds of ASATs: kinetic or directed energy
- Technical barriers do not explain current lack of ASAT usage - ASAT capabilities are within reach of dozens of nations
- The EU Code of Conduct does not provide enough specificity on what levels of self defense in space are allowed
- To hit U.S. imagery satellites, China would have to move its launchers to highly visible remote areas
- Technological capability for crude ASATS already widespread
- Tether debris removal method has shown promise for alleviating space debris problem
- Three distinct national security risks from space debris