Evidence: Alphabetical
- Verification of a space arms control agreement will require on-site inspections and high-level of transparency
- Verification of a space arms control agreement is technologically feasible
- Vulnerability of space weapons demands faster response times, increasing incentives for first-strikes
- Vulnerability of space weapons makes them destabilizing
- Verification concerns for space arms control are not insurmountable
- V-2 Example shows Importance of Determining Whether Weapons are Needed before Deploying
- Very Few 'Un-Friendly' Space Targets that would Justify Development of ASAT Capability
- Verification and enforcement of space arms control agreements would be problematic
- Verification to prevent cheating next to impossible in space arms control regime
- Verification of an ASAT testing ban will only become more difficult as tests improve ASAT capabilities
- Verification of a treaty banning anti satellite weapon testing would be simple to achieve
- Value in collaborative space situational awareness comes from dissuading bad actors and detecting natural and intentional threats