Evidence: Alphabetical
- Pakistan could target third-party satellites used by the Indian Army
- Pentagon expects China to preemptively strike U.S. space assets
- Protection through redundancy offers an alternative to space-based weapons
- Planned Missile Defense Systems would Give U.S. Latent Anti-Satellite Weapons Capability
- Past efforts to develop force-projection space weapons failed because conventional weapons offered same capability
- Planned Missile Defense Systems have an Inherent ASAT capability
- Previous Russian ASAT System is no Longer Functional
- Political Costs too High for China to Develop Anti-Satellite Weapons
- Proliferation of satellite imagery puts U.S. forces at risk from terrorists
- Pearl Harbor scenarios are unrealistic scare tactics
- Past 60 years of escalating military space activity have not been destabilizing, no reason to expect weaponization would be either
- Possible for Space Weapons to be Both Ineffective and Destabilizing at the Same Time
- Pre-emptive strikes on early warning assets invites nuclear escalation
- Previous U.S. Administrations have Found Space Arms Control Unworkable
- Previous space arms control negotiations have failed over inability to define "space weapons
- Perception of U.S. vulnerability is motivating Chinese military space efforts
- Pakistan supports international effort to prevent an arms race in outer space
- Prowler satellite intercepts signals by maneuvering closer to the target satellite
- Proponents Argue Space Weapons Needed to Deter Attacks against Valuable Space Assets
- Prohibitive costs and technical barriers make space-based strike weapons unlikely
- Previous space weapon proposals were stifled because of their risk to the collective space environment
- Political Constraints may Prevent U.S. from Trying to Disrupt Commercial Satellites Providing Information to Adversaries
- Poor ground infrastructure and command and control prevents Russia from fully exploiting imagery and signals intelligence satellites
- Political leaders lack technical training to adequately evaluate military space programs
- Pre-emptive defensive maneuvers against ASATs would defeat the purpose of intelligence gathering satellites
- Protecting satellites should take precedence over preserving freedom of action in space
- Proposed definition for "space weapons" that includes earth-based space weapons and focuses on intended function
- Proliferation of space launch and ballistic missile technologies necessitates greater transparency to avoid miscalculation
- Past evolution of space technology is determining development of space weapons
- Prompt global strike capability could push adversaries to escalate or make mistakes
- Promoting space cooperation between Asian allies is one way to balance against China's assertiveness
- Predictions of space arms races often overestimate resource availability
- Prohibition on anti-satellite weapons tests would dissuade development and could easily be verified
- PPWT ambiguity on definition of space weapons could imperil key U.S. assets like GPS
- Prestige and not military agression is key motive behind Chinese military and civilian space program
- Possible to discern significant details about China's ASAT from analyzing space debris