Evidence: Alphabetical
- A Code of Conduct would reduce miscalculation risks from dangerous or provocative maneuvers
- A Code of Conduct would do more to Preserve a Nation's Ability to Operate in Space than Limit It
- Adversaries can Defeat Dominant Player in a Medium through Stealth, Surprise, and by Varying Tempo
- Alarming Scenarios about U.S. Space Weapons are Political Theater, Unfounded in Fact
- Arms control would contribute nothing to reducing threat to U.S. space assets and security
- ASAT weapons are part of China's strategy to deter U.S. involvement in Taiwan conflict
- A Code of Conduct could help Constrain China's ASAT Tests
- Attacks on Space Assets Increasing because Conditions that Led to Restraint During Cold War no Longer Exist
- Ambiguity over definition of a space weapon makes arms control impractical
- Advanced military space systems can take decades to develop and deploy
- Attackers have advantage in missile defense cost calculations
- Airborne laser useful only against less-advanced liquid fuel ICBMs
- Adding Simple Layer of Coating on Missiles would Dramatically Increase Defenses against Lasers
- Aegis/SM-3 Missile used in US 193 Exercise is not a Viable Space Weapon
- Any treaty limitations on missile defense should recognize possibility that technology, especially of rogue states, could outpace agreement
- Although Technically Possible, Political Constraints may Prevent U.S. from Attacking Neutral Space Systems
- Achieving Qualitative Breakthrough in Space Imaging Capabilities would Require Unrealistic Intelligence Infrastructure and Vast Constellations of Satellites
- An Attacker would only have to Disable some of the GPS Constellation to Degrade its Effectiveness
- A Space Arms Control Treaty is Best Way for U.S. and China to break out of Security Dillema
- ASAT Issue could be a Key Test for Sino-American Relations
- Amateurs have been able to locate stealth satellites before
- An European Union Space Surveillance System would Boost Cooperative Security
- Anti-Satellite Weapon Testing could Create Impenetrable Debris Belt
- Asteroid Detection Efforts have already Identified 843 Potential Hazardous Asteroids -- Time to Plan Mitigation Measures is Now
- A strategy of deterrence through avoidance is most viable way to protect space assets
- Asian space powers have not developed cooperative relationships
- Asian space powers not seeking to cooperate with each other
- Adversaries could use cyber warfare to cause satellite collisions without fear of retribution
- Attempts to restrict ASATs unlikely to succeed as long as nations believe they have strategic value
- A space surveillance data fusion center would align US policy objectives with international community
- An international space surveillance fusion center could become self-funding through support and partnership with commercial interests
- An asymmetric response to space weapons deployment is not same as a space arms race
- Allies unlikely to abandon U.S. because of its stance on space weapons
- Any treaty banning anti satellite weapons tests should allow for debris remediation operations
- Assertive unilateralism of 2006 U.S. national space policy is sparking a global space arms race
- An arms race in space is inevitable, U.S. dominance now is best strategy to reduce larger space power conflict later