Evidence: Alphabetical
- Asymmetric attacks by weaker states against U.S. space assets unlikely to change strategic equation
- Accuracy and dependability of US SSA data limited by insular nature of military control
- Air Force should devolve comprehensive space surveillance focus to a non military entity allowing it to focus on purely military threats
- Attacks on U.S. intelligence satellites could provoke a first strike response
- Anti-satellite weapons less likely to be able to attack satellites in geo stationary orbits
- An attempt to achieve space dominance will be countered by a space arms race, further increasing the risks of miscalculation and war
- Analysis of open source intelligence shows that China has appeared to have developed two different mobile ASAT systems
- Active space debris removal necessary to prevent space debris cascades
- Active removal of large debris could help stabilize space debris population below critical levels
- Adversaries can threaten commercial providers U.S. military assets rely on to disrupt U.S. access
- Achieving compliance with existing space debris guidelines could slow growth of space debris but even countries like the US have been reluctant to enforce guidelines
- A Chinese attack on U.S. LEO assets would be telegraphed in advance, giving U.S. time to counter
- An ICOC to address space debris is fastest and most politically viable solution for galvanizing international action to space debris crisis
- An ICOC has several advantages over a formal binding agreement to address space debris issues
- An ICOC offers best prospects for preserving U.S. national security interests while addressing the space debris crisis
- Adversaries likely to use denial of service attacks against U.S. space assets to avoid attribution
- A limited ban on ASATs would not address broader security concerns and would reduce motivation to pursue a broader agreement
- Aggressive Russian and Chinese proximity operations have forced U.S. to rethink its policy of strategic restraint in outer space
- An agreement restricting proximity operation in geosynchronous orbit would reduce risks of conflict escalation
- Adversaries of the U.S. are increasingly getting access to ISR satellites
- ASAT development since Cold War has focused on dual-use technology like missile defense systems and on-orbit servicing
- A single high-altitude EMP attack could cripple U.S. infrastructure
- A single high-altitude EMP attack could cripple U.S. infrastructure
- Avoiding space debris is another critical benefit of a ban on ASAT testing
- ASAT arms control would inevitably ban necessary repair and cleanup satellite technology due to the dual-use problem
- ASAT arms control measures will undermine American competitiveness and security in outer space
- An internationally recognized Code of Conduct for outer space would be preferable to ASAT arms control