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An ASAT test that causes unintended damage to U.S. and ally satellites or an accident in space caused by debris could trigger a major international crisis between the United States and China. The risk is heightened by the fact that both countries have no pre–space-launch notification ar- rangements, similar to the U.S.-Russia agreement on notifications of intercontinental ballistic mis- sile (ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launches. Management of such a crisis could also be hindered by a lack of direct communication between U.S. authorities and the PLA agency that oversees Chinese military space launches.
China could also test co-orbital antisatellite systems in which an interceptor spacecraft destroys its target by exploding in close proximity, creating even more debris. For several years, Beijing has conducted a series of close proximity maneuvers with its satellites in LEO; the most recent oc- curred after a July 20, 2013, launch of three satellites on the same rocket, which have since con- ducted sudden maneuvers toward other Chinese satellites. Human or operating errors during these maneuvers could inadvertently result in a collision that produces harmful debris. While these ma- neuvers could eventually be used for civilian purposes, most U.S. officials believe these experi- ments are primarily intended to demonstrate latent ASAT capabilities.
According to U.S. officials, Iran undertakes more purposeful interference with U.S. military and commercial space systems using lasers and jammers than any other country. Although these actions have not resulted in irreparable damage to U.S. assets, this practice increases the possibility that the United States will misinterpret unintended harm caused by such interference. In the worst- case scenario, a routine lasing or jamming attack could cause unintended damage to U.S. or allied space assets—primarily due to untested and less advanced capabilities—precipitating a crisis with China, North Korea, or Iran at an acutely sensitive time, amid ongoing efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
Iran also has a long history of engaging in military intimidation. In the past two years, there have been an increasing number of near misses in the Persian Gulf between Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) tactical boats and U.S. Navy ships, and IRGC surveillance drones and navy helicopters, as well as multiple attempts by IRGC fighter jets to shoot down U.S. Predator surveil- lance drones. Since Iran already views space as a legitimate arena in which to contest U.S. military power, Tehran could use similar tactics against U.S. satellites during a major crisis, especially if it believes war is imminent—an assessment that could have self-fulfilling consequences. Should this significantly limit U.S. situational unawareness of the unfolding crisis, there would most certainly be a military response against the source of that Iranian interference. Additionally, like North Ko- rea, Iran could attempt a direct-ascent ASAT test or co-orbital ASAT test, in which it detonates a conventional explosive near a targeted satellite. Iran’s capacity to do this will likely improve if it follows through on its June 2013 announcement of plans to build a space monitoring center de- signed to track satellites above Iranian territory.
North Korea’s record of provocative military behavior makes it a plausible candidate to con- duct dangerous actions in space, possibly by leveraging a crude ASAT demonstration to extract concessions similar to how it has used nuclear and missile testing in the past. North Korea placed its first satellite in orbit in December 2012 using a rocket derived from the Taepodong II missile, which could alternatively be used to destroy an inactive satellite or maliciously target a U.S. satel- lite. Although less likely, North Korea could use the still untested road-mobile, medium-range Hwasong-13 ballistic missile. Given North Korea’s history of confrontational behavior and pro- vocative language, interference with or damage to a U.S. or allied satellite has the potential to esca- late into a crisis and elicit a response from the United States.
Based on capabilities, intent, and history of malicious or destabilizing behavior, the state most like- ly to undertake destabilizing actions is China, followed by North Korea, and Iran. Although Russia has robust counterspace capabilities, it has not recently demonstrated intent to direct malicious and destabilizing actions toward U.S. space assets. Increasingly prevalent types of interference in- clude jamming, hacking, spoofing, and lazing of space- and terrestrial-based sensors, transmitters, and data links. Additionally, interference can entail direct ascent or “co-orbit” anti-satellite tests (ASAT), and intentional or unintentional collisions that create a long-term problem of orbital space debris. An outlier scenario not covered in this report is one that U.S. officials consider unre- alistic: an electromagnetic pulse event in space. The three most plausible scenarios that warrant concern are crisis-related interference, intentional peacetime interference, and inadvertent peace- time interference.
A user needs a minimum of four satellites in view if no other source of location or timing are available, but the accuracy increases as more satellites are visible. A large number of satellites need to be incapacitated just to bring the constellation size down to the minimum; to leave a user without sufficient coverage to get useable navigation data would require losing more. Coverage depends on geographic location, time of day, and the current constellation architecture (which can be modified in the face of a loss), but Geoff Forden gives an instructive example. An 18-satellite constellation (with the missing satellites chosen to give the most impact) would drop below the four-satellite visible minimum over Beijing for roughly two hours a day.
Details are important here—different missions will require different precision, etc.—but this illustrates that degrading GPS navigation capacity by incapacitating satellites is not a small task.
Adding to the difficulty of the task is the fact that the GPS satellites move with respect to the Earth, leaving only a few within reach, such as those overhead or nearby. The attacker would have to wait for other satellites to come into range or stage the attack from locations all over the globe. A disabling attack would be difficult and time-consuming—not instantaneous—giving the U.S. ample time to react. We go into a bit more detail on these points in a past blog post.
Context is everything. Would the introduction of weapons into the space environment be as bad as modern-day Cassandras portray? The question cannot yet be answered to satisfaction because we lack the necessary experience to make an evaluation. It also cannot be answered adequately because we are not posing the question within a strategic context; there are no stakes, no political-military ends, no moral backdrop against which a judgment may be made.
When American and allied lives are jeopardized and there are bold and critical paths to take in the interest of national security, US military actions and counteractions should not be guided by concerns about what a shapeless, nameless 'international community' might think, say or do. Friends and allies will not judge what has happened in isolation from the circum- stances. Conversely, there will always be attempts by leaderships in foreign lands to influence US arms pro- curement decisions through arms control and public rhetoric - it costs so little and the potential gains are so great.
Recognizing that most space control can be done on the ground, let us also acknowledge that a significant part of space control may have to be accomplished in space. Indeed, smashing enemy ground stations may be a politically counterproductive and militarily ineffective operational approach. Given the global growth in space operations, active measures will probably be required in the future. In such an environment, strong consideration should be given to accelerating development of the US Army's ground-based Kinetic Energy Anti- Satellite (KEASAT) weapon system. It is the only such weapon system under development that may be fielded in the near term, providing a capability for responding to satellite threats in a forceful manner. KEASAT would be one more tool for effectively managing national security.
Over time, the idea that defensive and offensive combat operations in space are morally and strategically 'inferior' to Earth-bound military operations will change. Novel weapon systems may be required to protect and repair things in space and provide more effective defenses for terrestrial assets. The next administration in W ashington should consider reviving programs to develop kinetic kill weapons in space to intercept and destroy ballistic missiles in space and continue to work technologies for doing the mission with directed energy.9 Space offers the only real, technologically serious response to the proliferation oflong-range ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.
Once a policy is in place, the USA can begin to design a strategy for using American space power to enhance security. A 21st century national security strategy should feature space control, to ensure that US forces have the information they need. The navies have long kept the oceans free, primarily in a deterrent mode. The USA and its allies could do the same in space. Global deterrence may be bolstered through capabilities to project conven- tional force in or from space. There are two aspects of space warfare - controlling space in the classic sense (from Earth or in space) and striking targets on Earth from space. For reasons of strategy and geography, the USA may well be driven to develop space strike warfare assets to improve overall military prowess.