Evidence: Most Popular
Dolman’s first binary is “Western Action versus Eastern Timing.” He argues, “The Western strategist too often seeks to force changes through positive steps,” whereas “the Eastern strategist bides time until the moment to strike is ripe.” He restricts his theoretical assumption, without expla- nation, to the space domain, arguing a lack of transparency and engage- ment by the Chinese (East) will heighten the security dilemma for the United States (West).47 Arguing that this assumption is helpful, there is no explanation as to why this particular ideological impasse will lead to a Sino-US space war where others have not. There is no discussion of the fact that space itself is transparent and with the right sensors it is difficult to conceal nefarious activities, thus reducing the severity of the security dilemma—particularly for the United States which operates the most robust and geographically distributed space surveillance network in the world. There is no analogy as to how today’s lack of transparency is different than the lack of transparency in the space domain displayed by the United States and Soviet Union during all but a few years of the Cold War. Most importantly, there is no explanation as to the political ends either the United States or China might seek to achieve via a war in space. But again: this is the convenience of the inevitability postulate— we need not trouble ourselves with such complexities if war is inevitable.
Concerning the reaction of other states to US space hegemony, Dolman indicates, “if the United States were to weaponize space, it is not at all sure that any other state or group of states would find it rational to counter in kind. . . . As long as the United States does not employ its power arbitrarily, the situation would be accommodated initially and grudgingly accepted over time” (emphasis added).57 He further argues that space hegemony could, in fact, usher in “a new space regime, one that en- courages space commerce and development.”58 Dolman describes these on-orbit space weapons as having the “capacity to deny, ground-, sea-, and air-based antisatellite weapons from space” and offering an “omni- present threat of precise, measured, and unstoppable retaliation.”59
Assuming such space weapons are technologically feasible, what are other states doing while the United States flight-tests and fields these constellations of undefeatable space weapons? Are we to assume they are patiently awaiting the completion of an “unstoppable” constellation of space weapons? If not, how shall the United States defend against potential terrestrial armed responses—which would arguably be coun- tenanced under either Article 51 of the UN charter or the doctrine of preemption—when our combined arms budget has been sacrificed in pursuit of space hegemony? Employing Dolman’s own power politics thesis, isn’t he precipitating the very war he is attempting to prevent by displacing the extant balance of power and so thoroughly threatening the sovereignty of other states?
America will maintain the capacity to influence decisions and events beyond its borders, with military force if neces- sary. It will not be bound by treaties that deny such ability. For the most part, America uses its hegemonic power to maintain global stability, ensure free commerce, lessen human suffering, and oppose aggression. The operational de- ployment of space weapons would in- crease these capacities by providing for nearly instantaneous force projection worldwide. This force would be precise, unstoppable, and deadly. At the same time, the United States must forego some of its ability to intervene directly in other states because its capacity to do so will have been diminished in the budg- etary trade-offs required.
Seizing the initiative and securing low-Earth orbit now, while the United States and its allies are unchallenged in space, would do much to stabilize the international system and prevent an arms race in space. If peace desiring states could come to an international agreement in which a multinational space force would be capable of main- taining effective order in space, partici- pate in the reduction of debris in orbit, promote commerce, and did so in a way that was perceived as tough, non- arbitrary, and efficient, such an action would serve to discourage competing states from fielding opposing systems. Should they use this advantage to police the heavens (assuming the entire cost), and allow unhindered peaceful use of space by any and all nations for eco- nomic and scientific development, over time their control of low-Earth orbit could be viewed as a global asset and a public good.
As leader of the international community, the United States finds itself in the unenviable position that it must make decisions for the good of all. On the issue of space weaponization, there appears no one best option. No matter the choice selected, there are those who will benefit and those who will suffer. The tragedy of American power is that it must make a choice, and the worst choice is to do nothing.
To be sure, a space weapons program would be very expensive—tens if not hun- dreds of billions of dollars. But this money will not come from funds set aside for schools or roads or humanitarian assistance. Federal budgets are not so fungible. Peace dividends fail to materialize. The money for space weapons would come from existing and projected defense expen- ditures, and this means fewer tanks and soldiers, ships and sailors, aircraft and air- men. Herein is the trade-off in creating what would amount to a space-heavy military force structure. The state would con- tinue to maintain its capacity to intervene in affairs abroad, with violence if deemed necessary, but now with precise and meas- ured doses of very accurate, very deadly violence anywhere on the earth, in a very, very short time. But it would not be bulk violence. This is still the purview of traditional land, sea, and air forces. The state would trade the capacity to intervene quickly and precisely for the ability to do so massively, with lots of collateral damage.
Ramifications for the most critical current function of America’s armed forces are profound—pacification, occupation, and control of foreign territory. With the downsizing of traditional weapons to ac- commodate heightened space expendi- tures, the ability of the U.S. to do all three will wane significantly. At a time when many are calling for increased capability to pacify and police foreign lands, space weapons proponents must advocate reduction of these capabilities in favor of a system that will have no direct potential to do so. It will be a hard sell.
Arguments in the first category spill the most ink in opposition, but are relatively easy to dispose of, especially the more radical variants. History is littered with prophesies of technical and scientific inadequacy, such as Lord Kelvin’s famous retort, “Heavier-than-air flying machines are impossible.” Kelvin, a leading physicist and then president of the Royal Society, made this boast in 1895 and no less a personage than Thomas Edison concurred. The pos- sibility of spaceflight prompted even more gloomy pessimism. A New York Times edi- torial in 1921 (an opinion it has since re- tracted), excoriated Robert Goddard for his silly notions of rocket-propelled space exploration. “Goddard does not know the relation between action and reaction and the need to have something better than a vacuum against which to react. He seems to lack the basic knowledge ladled out daily in high schools.” Compounding its error in judgment, in 1936, the Times stated flatly, “A rocket will never be able to leave the Earth’s atmosphere.”
We have learned much, it would seem, or else bluntly negative scientific opinion on space weapons has been weeded out over time. Less encompassing arguments are now the standard. As the debate moved away from the impossibility of weapons and wars in space to more subtle and scientifically sus- tainable arguments that a particular space weapon is not feasible, mountains of scien- tific evidence are piled high in an effort, one by one, simply to bury the concept. But these limitations on specific systems are less due to theoretical analysis than to assumptions about future funding, political context, and avail- able technology. The real objection, too often hidden from view, is that a particular weapons system or capability cannot be developed and deployed within the planned budget, or within narrowly specified means. When one relaxes those assumptions, opposition on technical grounds falls away.
The devil may very well be in the details, but if one’s stance opposing an entire class of weapons is premised upon analyses that show particular weapons will not work, what happens when a fresh concept or new technology cannot be narrowly disproved? What hap- pens when technology X, the unexpected (perhaps unforeseeable) scientific breakthrough that changes all notions of current capabilities, inevitably arrives? Have we thought out the details enough that we can say categorically that no technology will al- low for a viable space weapons capability? If so, then the argument is pat; no counter is possible. But, if there are technologies or conditions that could allow for the successful weaponization of space, then ought we not argue the policy details first, lest we be swept away by a course of action that merely chases the technology wherever it may go?
There are currently a number of rules- of-the-road agreements proposed, fore- most among them sponsored by the Euro- pean Union, China, and the U.S.-based Stimson Center, that offer compelling logic for establishing a framework for co- operation in space by limiting specific activities or capabilities. Unless these agree- ments are brokered fairly among and ac- cepted by all space-faring states, however, and they don’t include unverifiable and unenforceable bans on weapons, an important and extremely beneficial international accord may be missed.
Common to all the suggested ap- proaches is for signatories to avoid adding debris to the increasingly cluttered common orbits in near-earth space. This is an eminently agreeable issue, as debris in space limits all users, regardless of who is respon- sible for it. No space-faring or space-reliant state should see disadvantage in limiting kinetic destruction of satellites, nuclear detonations in space, or other such mutually undesirable effects. Where these approaches are less workable is in their efforts to con- comitantly limit the deployment and use of weapons in space. Due to the risk entailed should any state violate the rule, and the very real problem of defining just what constitutes a space weapon, unless some mechanism for proper enforcement in space is encumbered, these much needed treaties are problematic.
U.S. export controls have not slowed the development of competitive space capabilities around the globe. Chinese, European, Indian, and Russian launch programs have all advanced unabated by U.S. export controls. The explosion of COMSATs and the pro- liferation of know-how to develop and build these staples of the commercial space market have not been measurably affected. In fact, the move from Commerce to State to regulate exports appears to have accomplished little more than erode U.S. global COMSAT market share.
U.S. PNT technology is one exception so far; all indications are that the U.S. enjoys a lead over foreign competitive systems. It is not clear to what degree export controls have played in main- taining this lead given the turbulent funding and programmatic histories of GLONASS, Compass, and Galileo. With the recent commitments to fund and field these systems and the growth in international collaboration on these systems, the proof of export control efficacy will be in maintaining the U.S. lead as these efforts begin or are renewed in earnest.
Earth observation systems, both radar and optical, have experi- enced tremendous growth internationally in the last decade. By all indications this growth is unimpeded by U.S. export controls. Com- pelling evidence of the sophistication of foreign imaging systems is the recent formation of a European constellation of Earth obser- vation satellites. Through a series of a bilateral arrangements, the German SAR-Lupe and Italian COSMO-SkyMed radar systems have been integrated with the French Helios II electro-optical sys- tem to form the core of a European strategic reconnaissance constellation. These bilateral agreements facilitate the exchange of data and tasking across an integrated constellation through the interlinking of these systems’ ground segments.90
The commitment toward independence from the U.S. in space is a common thread across segments. The space launch vehicle component data provides direct evidence of this trend, while the Atlas V uses foreign components, i.e., first stage engine, virtually all foreign commercial launchers, e.g., the French=European Ariane 5, the Japanese H-2A, and the Russian Proton and Soyuz, use no U.S. components.86 Explicit comments from Russian, Chi- nese, and European leaders regarding the fielding of PNT systems that are not beholden to the U.S. further substantiates this trend. The large numbers and commercial significance of the COMSAT market provide straightforward, albeit less direct support. Finally, in the space imaging segment, political and financial commitments from European leaders have made it clear independence is sought here too. For example, the COSMO-SkyMed system is designed to provide an Italian contribution ‘‘to the European strategic inde- pendence’’ from U.S. space capabilities.87 The independence pur- sued is not solely in the area of on-orbit capability, but in industrial capacity as well.88
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) working group on the U.S. space industry found the number of states with their own reconnaissance=Earth observation satellites has doubled since 1999. France, India, Israel, Russia, and Korea all possess commercial imaging satellites of 1 m resolution or better. Canada, ESA, Germany, Italy, and Japan possess civil radar imaging satel- lites, in the next several years Argentina and India will join the list.67 Since 2006, China has launched two military radar imaging satellites. According to data presented by Noblis Inc, a not-for- profit science, technology, and strategy organization, by 2012 there are predicted to be thirteen SAR satellites flying, excluding any U.S. assets.68 Figure 2 illustrates the rapid emergence and interna- tionalization of Earth observation satellites around the globe. The forecast growth in foreign Earth observing satellite capacity appears to be explosive.
The current classification policy also has a negative impact on the safety of space activities. Recently, the U.S. military began a program to launch non-military payloads along with their classified payloads to help provide opportunities for academic and scientific entities to place small satellites in orbit without needing to pay expensive launch costs. Because of the classification policy, the orbital information for these additional payloads is protected so as to not provide clues about the orbit of the classified payload. This makes it difficult for scientists or students to communicate with these satellites to retrieve data, especially if the satellite stops broadcasting due to a malfunction. It also increases the number of objects in space for which there is no public positional information, which can present navigation hazards in congested orbits. In addition to the 180 or so active classified U.S. satellites, the positional information for another nearly 300 non-classified objects (secondary payloads, debris, or rocket bodies) is being withheld because they were part of the same launch as one of the classified satellites. The lack of positional information on these objects makes it very difficult for the many satellite owner- operators who lack access to their own SSA systems to detect and avoid possible collisions with them.