Evidence: Most Popular
In addition to the CFE, there are numerous organizations advocating their own systems to provide space object data and COLA information. The Center of Space Standards and Innovation produces a daily “Top 10” satellites with the highest probability of a close approach,77 while companies, such as Space Exploration Engineering will develop the most efficient orbit for a satellite and COLA maneuver recommendations.78 Other than their expertise in analyzing and processing data, their products and services are not unique.
However, most base their processes on the CFE catalogue and data provided by satellite operators, emphasizing DoD’s dominant role in providing global SSA data. Despite the good information and services provided, the international community may have concerns on its continued reliance as the primary source of space object data, especially during times of conflict. These same concerns would arise if another state, consortium or commercial entity was providing the data.
The ongoing debate involving the Global Positioning System (GPS) is an excellent example applicable to the discussion.79 GPS provides free, highly accurate, global navigation services. Considering the enormous amount of resources required to develop similar systems, why is ESA building Galileo and Russia reconstituting GLONASS? The answer revolves around two primary issues: trust and dependability. Since the U.S. owns and operates GPS, it controls availability and access. States, who may disagree with the U.S. in the future, want to ensure services. In other words, they do not completely trust the U.S. and are concerned GPS may be degraded in the future.
The limited number of radars, telescopes, lasers, ISOs, and satellite operators that can collect SSA data need only to be optimized. Every day, SSA systems track, identify and/or discover space objects, often times observing the same items with minimal coordination, interaction, or data exchanges. By reducing or eliminating tracking redundancy, the low density systems can refine data on known objects and identify new ones. For example, integrating operator data from the 134 satellites the Air Force supports82 and the additional 38 spacecraft the ILRS tracks, the U.S. SSN could reduce collection requirements on these objects.83 Furthermore, the data gained from the ILRS and operators could make up for the lack of extensive Southern Hemisphere observation capabilities.84 As a result, potential SSA efficiencies gained by leveraging systems and process would be tremendous.
The I-SPIC improves SSA with an increased understanding of and ability to predict future space object activities. As an internationally sanctioned organization, it enables an unprecedented level of coordination and cooperation between operators for maneuvers, disposals, and launches. The current slow and unresponsive process of state-to-state communications, ad hoc operations, and informal agreements drives inefficiencies resulting in shorter spacecraft missions. Increased space object knowledge will reduce orbit prediction errors and variables. The result of combining better data and increased operator coordination is a reduction in COLA maneuvers and associated analysis effort, thereby lowering operations costs and extending spacecraft service life.85
Increased SSA also assists the ability to identify potentially hostile actions in space. China’s demonstrated anti-satellite weapons, lasing an U.S. spacecraft86 and destroying a satellite, brings into focus the need to identify hostile intent in space. As offensive space capabilities multiply, many states will approach satellite anomalies as hostile actions first and then as a spacecraft problem.87 The improved understanding of what is in space provides better tracking, and analysis of objects, enabling a more rapid identification of actions that are out of the ordinary and potentially hostile. Furthermore, integrating information from and encouraging coordination of operators into the I-SPIC results in a forum of open discussion of spacecraft activities and if necessary the direct query as to intent. The ability to help determine hostile intent is a direct product created by the I-SPIC’s inherent space environment transparency.
Considering the proliferation of launch-capabilities and the ability of virtually any organization to operate a satellite, provided adequate funding, the need for transparency of space becomes increasingly critical. Unless a state is willing to take preemptive actions and prevent the launch of a spacecraft or disable it in orbit, there will be more objects in space, some of which may have offensive capabilities. Similar to arms control efforts on Earth, transparency is the foundation for verifying compliance and ensuring security.88 Just as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties provided on-site inspections and national technical means overflight to create transparency and a better understanding of U.S.-Soviet/Russian nuclear platforms, the I-SPIC can serve a similar purpose for space, without new legal regimes, by integrating SSA systems providing a more complete space picture.89
Whether for a commercial advantage or national security, locations of some spacecraft are sensitive and not easily shared. However, the global nature of objects in space results in the discovery of most large objects such as satellites. Even with the added secrecy of not disseminating orbit data, organizations such as the Union of Concerned Scientists74 or the ISO publish information that is not part of the satellite catalogue. The data is already available for many satellites, regardless if the owner approves or not. States need not submit data on their secret programs, but recognize the information already exists, albeit at a lower fidelity. The I- SPIC does not require exact locations of every space object, provided the owner understands the responsibilities to avoid collisions is theirs.
Regardless of agreements among the launching states, the registering state “will have jurisdiction and control over space objects it launched,” and is responsible for “every tangible thing on the rocket, including payload, but also paint, bolts, and every other component part, all the way to the microscopic level.”52 It would stand to reason the registering state should track their space objects and notify satellite operators of potential threats. This is not the case for several reasons. First, few states maintain a SSA capability and there is no existing mechanism integrating available systems to provide an accurate space picture. Second, although a state may be responsible for space objects, it is not liable for damages unless the debris created was “from an act of gross negligence ... or omission done with the intent to cause damage.”53 If determining negligence or omission was not tough enough, case law adds to the difficulty. In the only decided case involving space liability, Canada successfully sued the Soviet Union for damages resulting from “the Cosmos 954 satellite, and the deposit on Canadian territory of hazardous radioactive debris.”54 Although Russia was held accountable, its deorbiting operations were not out of the ordinary and arguably not the result of gross negligence, omission or intent to do damage. In another case, no action was taken when a French communications satellite was struck by an Ariane rocket stage, severing the primary stabilization boom and reducing its operational life.55 However, damage caused by debris from China’s deliberate destruction of a weather satellite by an anti-satellite weapon on 11 January 2007 may result in legal action if a future collision occurs and is proven.56 Despite treaties establishing broad parameters for satellite operations, there are no legal teeth minimizing debris creation or collision avoidance notification.
Identifying a potential collision and then taking actions to avoid it are two separate challenges. There is neither a central SSA integration capability nor processes for an early warning system identifying potential collisions available to most operators. As a result, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s Orbital Information Group provided public data up until 2004.34 This service is continued by the U.S. Air Force’s (USAF) Commercial and Foreign Entity (CFE) Program website35 as the primary source for space object location information. Including over 10,000 items, the catalogue has significant limitations for day-to-day satellite operations since it does not predict close approaches or potential collisions of most items.36 Limited SSN resources and the large number of objects in space results in data observations of low priority items37 that may be days or weeks old. The quality of the data can result in widely varying predictions of close approach times and distances, increasing the predictive error “bubble” around objects and driving suboptimal decisions.
Some satellite operators have developed relationships and informal agreements with other operators to exchange accurate orbit and maneuver information in an attempt to reduce inaccuracies and improve safety. Unfortunately, this situation is the exception, since several governments do not coordinate operations, highlighting the need for a process or SSA clearing house. A second hurdle discouraging information exchanges hinges on liability issues. It has been 50 years since Sputnik was launched, yet the realm of space law and policy is still evolving with tremendous ambiguity.
Currently, governments or consortiums operate the most capable ground based space surveillance systems. Unfortunately due to competing requirements, the majority of these systems are not dedicated SSN assets. Many are considered collateral and contributing sensors with additional mission requirements.23 Comprised of tracking, detection and imaging radars, optical telescopes, and passive receivers, space surveillance systems have varying levels of sensitivity and availability. Furthermore, due to the great distances involved, extremely small field of view for some sensors, weather, and daylight and moonlight restrictions, their ability to identify objects is severely limited. For instance, the Goldstone Bistatic Radar Complex can detect LEO items as small as 2 mm at very low altitudes and 1 cm at 4000 km. However, the system’s availability is 100 – 200 hours annually with a narrow 0.02 degree field of view. Although there are some sensors that can detect GEO objects as small as 20 cm, 1 m is a more reasonable size.24 In contrast to the integrated U.S. and Russian SSNs, the European Space Agency (ESA) reports their systems are effective but not linked, relying on U.S. data to acquire 94 percent of their objects.25
Change must also stretch beyond the Department of Defense, to the regulations that govern what our space industry is allowed to export. Presently, many items generally available on the global market for space commerce are prohibited from being sold by U.S. companies without government approval. Our current export policy puts us in a double bind. We are hurting our own space suppliers in the international market and are not really impeding states of concern from acquiring sensitive space technologies. To redress the current state of affairs, the administration is undertaking export control reform. The foundation of the new regime is to consolidate responsibility for export control into a single licensing agency, a single tiered list of controlled items, a single coordination center for enforcement, and a single, unified IT infrastructure. We recognize that controlling sensitive space exports remains a concern. So we are building ‘‘higher fences’’ around our most sensitive technologies, while de-listing those items whose export does not threaten our security.
The global spread of space technology in the last 20 years, and the related restructuring of our own space industry, is a development we can no longer ignore. The companies who manufacture our space systems are the source of innovation that has helped us maintain our leadership in space for more than half a century. To ensure their continued viability in the global market, we must change how we regulate the export of technology and how we buy space systems.