Evidence: Most Popular
Even if China were able to execute such an ASAT operation, would it be willing to weather the collateral consequences? Destroying a US satellite might produce debris fields that invariably affect other satellites. The debris field created by the 2007 ASAT test is now generally seen as the most prolific and severe fragmentation event in five decades of space operations.18 Additionally, any major US military operation would involve satellites from coalition partners, neutral nations, and private companies. Would China shoot at satellites from neutral na- tions like Japan, India, or European nations leasing out their capabilities to the United States? In the wake of the 2007 ASAT test, China faced sustained international pressure to explain its actions. Not only did the United States issue its own démarche to the Chinese foreign ministry, it successfully convinced the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Japan, and the Republic of Korea to issue similar démarches. France and Germany made their independent protests to Chinese actions.19 Attacking a third-party satellite during a US-China conflict might impel these ac- tors to side with the United States—an outcome China would certainly want to avoid. The array of factors discussed in this section raises reason- able doubts about Chinese potential to launch an operationally relevant ASAT mission to degrade US military operations.
The total number of space launches to orbits higher than LEO by China in 2012 was nine; there were also nine in 2011, eight in 2010, two in 2009 (with one failure), and four in 2008. In the last five years the two quickest back-to-back launches to orbits higher than LEO occurred with a gap of 15 days. However, the average time between launches is close to a month and a half.17 This launch record suggests that launching doz- ens of ASATs almost simultaneously as required to cripple US military operations is almost impossible for China. Additionally, China has to date used only one space launch facility for higher-than-LEO launches, the Xichang Space Launch Center, which has only three launch pads. Achieving a number of simultaneous launches using just this one launch site questions the feasibility of China being able to successfully execute an ASAT attack without becoming subject to counterattack. Unlike the ICBMs which can be quickly fired, liquid-fueled space launch vehicles take time to fuel, and these preparations are very visible. If the United States anticipates and observes the preparation for an ASAT attack, it could destroy the launch vehicles during preparation.
There are other challenges for China in successfully executing an ASAT attack against US satellites. Any operationally relevant ASAT operation will require the destruction of more than one satellite. In the case of ISR imagery satellites, for example, shooting down one would have very little impact upon net US satellite-enabled surveillance capabilities. In real-world scenarios, a chain of ISR satellites orbiting over a location of interest at various times are used to gain information on an adversary. Take for instance US operations in the 1991 Gulf War. An assortment of US military, allied, and private ISR satellites like Landsat, SPOT, Okean, Resurs-F, Resurs-O, Lacrosse, KH-11, KH-12, White Cloud, RORSAT, EORSAT, Almaz, and others were used.14 In all probability, a US-China engagement in the Taiwan Straits would involve as many or more satellites. It would be exceedingly difficult for China to continue destroying such a number of satellites over a period of time without subjecting its launch infrastructure to counterattack.
Framing that question in terms of the weaponization of space or an arms race in space is likely not a useful path towards finding an answer to this problem. Those debates typically revolve around the placement of weapons in outer space and thus exclude the ASAT weapons launched from the ground, air, or sea that make up the vast majority of the systems described above. The core issue is not the placement of weapons in space but rather the proliferation of ASAT capabilities in general, regardless of whether they are space-based, ground-based, air-based, or sea-based. As more and more countries begin to rely on space capabilities for national security, the development and testing of ASAT capabilities is more likely to undermine political and strategic stability. The actual use of ASAT capabilities against space systems is also increasingly likely to spark or escalate conflict on Earth. All of this could jeopardize the long-term sustainability, safety and security of space for all and humanity’s ability to utilize space for its many benefits, both known and unknown.
In contrast to the United States and China, Russia has largely preferred the co-orbital type of ASAT systems with its own weapons development and testing dating back to the 1960s. The first ASAT weapons system developed by Russia was a co-orbital ASAT weapon system called the Istrebitel Sputnikov (IS) or “satellite destroyer.” The IS system consisted of a kill vehicle and a launch vehicle based on the R-36 ICBM (designated the SS-9 Scarp by U.S. intelligence) and later on the Tsyklon-2 SLV (designated SL-11 by the U.S.). After being placed into orbit, the kill vehicle would maneuver to intercept the target satellite and detonate onboard explosives, generating a significant amount of shrapnel that could damage or destroy the target. Development began in the early 1960s and the system was tested in orbit multiple times between 1962 and 1982. Beginning in 1980, the tests involved an upgraded version known as IS-M that could target satellites at altitudes as high as 2,000 km. The target for all of these tests was a special armored satellite with onboard sensors to record hits that could reportedly survive multiple attacks. Table 8 presents a summary of these tests, the target for the test (if there was one), and the amount of orbital debris cataloged by the U.S. military’s tracking network of each grouping of interceptors and target.
Finally, it is important to point out that not all missile defense systems have latent ASAT capabilities. Missile defense systems are generally broken down into three types based on which phase of ballistic missile flight they target. Boost phase systems target ballistic missile during their boost phase, which generally only lasts for the first few minutes of flight. Terminal phase systems target the warheads from ballistic missiles during or after their atmospheric re-entry which is only the last few minutes of flight. Midcourse missile defense systems target ballistic missiles or their payloads during flight after boost and before re-entry. It is these midcourse missile defense systems that are very similar in capability to ASAT systems as they are designed to target objects moving through space in the same altitude regime as LEO satellites. Most boost phase missile defense systems, such as theoretical concept for drones armed with missiles, and terminal phase systems, such as the U.S. Army’s deployed Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems, do not have significant ASAT capabilities.
At the time the United States argued (and has since continued to argue) that this was not an ASAT test and the SM-3 interceptor is not an ASAT weapons system. It stated that the software for the missile used in the test (and two other backup missiles) was modified to allow the missile to track and intercept a satellite and that after the intercept the software was returned to normal. However, this claim is not verifiable through external means. Thus, because the Aegis system has clearly demonstrated the capability to intercept and destroy a satellite and there is no way to verify whether a particular Aegis ship has SM-3s with modified missiles on it or not, potential adversaries likely assume that any Aegis BMD vessel could be a potential mobile ASAT threat.
The caveat to this conclusion is that the version of the SM-3 missile currently deployed has a limited engagement range. Burnt Frost utilized the Block IA version of the SM-3 with the third stage disabled. The U.S. government has not explicitly stated what the ceiling of the SM-3 Block 1A is, but outside analysts have estimated that an SM-3 utilizing all three rocket stages could have a ceiling of approximately 600 kilometers (373 mi). There are only limited numbers of operational satellites orbiting below 700 kilometers (434 miles), which means the current version of the SM-3 has limited value as an ASAT weapon and can only reach the lower portions of LEO.
However, the Missile Defense Agency is currently developing the Block IIA version in collaboration with Japan which will have significantly greater delta-v and thus a higher ceiling, possibly between 1,450 kilometers (900 miles) and 2,350 kilometers (1460 miles). Those ranges encompass virtually all the operational satellites in LEO, including nearly 100 Chinese and Russian satellites. Block IIA is expected to begin testing in 2015 and be operationally deployed in 2018 aboard ships with Aegis BMD version 5.1 and also the Aegis Ashore sites in Poland and Romania. Figure 14 shows a comparison of the various versions of the SM-3 missile.
To summarize, there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion that China is developing two different ASAT weapons systems derived from road-mobile ballistic missiles. The first system, designated SC-19 by U.S. intelligence and possibly KT-409 by China, was tested five times as summarized in Table 1. The first three tests were likely conducted from the northwest pad at Xichang that was constructed sometime between April and November 2005. According to a classified 2010 State Department cable leaked by Wikileaks, the fourth test was conducted from the Korla Missile Test Complex. The third test in 2007 destroyed the FY-1C satellite while the fourth and fifth tests involved successful interception of ballistic targets launched by other ground-based missiles. The end of testing at Xichang could indicate that the RDT&E portion of development for this system is complete, although there is no direct, publicly available evidence supporting that hypothesis.
Some advocate that there are no alternatives to the basing of weapons in space or, ultimately, conflict in space. In effect, space is no different from the mediums of air, land, and sea. Space is merely another environment in which human activity occurs. The deployment of weapons and use of force, if required, will inevitably occur in space, as it has in all other areas of human activity. Those who believe both the weaponization of space and the use of force in space are inevitable, argue that not to pursue the development and deployment of space-based weapons will simply surrender the initiative in the outer space environment to a potential adversary.91
The 'inevitability' argument has been subjected to a variety of criticisms. It has been noted, for example, that inevitability has not been relied upon as a rationale for not pursuing nuclear non-proliferation or restrictions on the development and stockpil- ing of other weapons of mass destruction.92 States have also avoided placing weapons in space on an operational basis for more than forty years despite having the technology to do so. This is a situation that is hard to reconcile with the notion that space weaponization is inevitable. Even if one accepts that weap- ons in space, and their use, are inevitable, this cannot be used as a justification for inaction. Inevitable events can be positive or negative. A positive inevitability needs to be pursued with the objective of hastening its arrival, whereas a negative inevitability needs to be forestalled for as long a period as possible. If space weapons and their use are inevitable, then it must be determined whether or not this inevitability will have the positive result of enhancing national and global security or the negative effect of undermining it. If it is determined that the positive effects of space weapons outweigh the negative consequences, then weapons in space should be pursued. However, if the negative outweighs the positive, every effort should be made to delay the inevitability just as we do with the ultimate inevitable event in life, death.93
Those questioning the security benefits of space based weapons also note that other states will not sit by and watch as one state, or a small group of states, seeks to dominate the outer space environment from a military perspective. States not involved would view the move towards the military uses of space for more than simply force enhancement purposes as a threat to their national security interests. It is argued that states finding them- selves in this position will respond by initiating or accelerating their own programs aimed at the development of space weapons and ground based systems capable of striking targets in space.88 These states would, in turn, rely on the precedent set by the initial deployment of space-based weapons for defensive and peaceful purposes, to justify a decision on their part to place weapons in space. This inevitable increase in the number of space-based weapons, and states controlling them, will increase the risk of accidents and provide further motivation to resort to an early or pre-emptive use of space weapons in times of crisis.