Evidence: Most Popular
According to Henry Scott’s article on orbital debris, “[a]n increase in the quantity of space debris, even in the absence of new launches and with complete international compliance with all existing debris mitigation guidelines, is inevitable.”59 In fact, a 2006 report by NASA scientists found that beyond 2055, the debris population in LEO will increase dramatically, largely due to debris-on-debris collisions,60 such as the collision between the U.S. and Russian satellites in 2009, and the Chinese missile launch in 2007. The pollution that exists right now will have environmental reper- cussions stretching well into the future, including an inevitable increase in the amount of debris forty-some years from now. This pollution has become a gift for our grandchildren, and one that we cannot take back. One scholar stated that “[o]rbital debris in GEO is estimated to last anywhere from a million to 10 million years.”61 This means that we cannot wait for debris in the GEO to come back to Earth through natural orbital degradation, it must be actively removed at some point, or it will continue to pollute the GEO and endanger satellites, potentially creating more debris for millions of years.
In spite of the OST’s utter lack of concern for outer space as a part of the environment, the treaty still addresses major concerns of orbital debris regulation: who is responsible for orbital debris and how to prevent the creation of more orbital debris. However, the OST does not address these concerns in a manner that is in any way practicable. Declaring that the launching state and the state from which the object launches are ultimately liable sounds sufficient, but in reality, it is largely unenforceable. If the collision is between two satellites, for instance, these provisions can be useful. For example, in February 2009 a Russian satellite collided with an American satellite.84 Scientists determined that neither nation was at fault,85 so the OST was not invoked. If it had been invoked, however, at the very least what nations were involved in determining fault would have been obvious—Russia and the United States. But that collision also cre- ated over 1600 pieces of orbital debris.86 Which pieces of debris came from which satellite? How could a ragged bit of Russian metal hurtling through orbit be differentiated from a ragged bit of American metal? What if some of the debris resulting from this collision next collides with and damages a French communications satellite? The idea that each State will “own” or “be liable for” the component parts of each launched object is laughable— debris cannot always be traced back to a specific launched object. Furthermore, even if neither country was at fault, these regulations do not address who may complain for the damage done to the orbital environment itself, as opposed to a satellite, since environmental damage is only addressed regarding the terrestrial environment.
The current orbital regulations regarding liability are woefully inadequate because they established a standard of fault-based liability that does not take into account environmental damage.197 Under the proposed system, the rules for liability could follow PEPAT’s environmentally minded, practical structure. As under PEPAT, there could be three layers of responsibility in avoiding environmental damage liability: the duty to take preventative measures to avoid environmental damage, the duty to establish a contingency plan should environmentally adverse incidents occur, and the duty to take response action to environmental emergencies.198 Further, as in PEPAT, liability would exist for environmental damage, and the liability would be strict, with multiple parties held jointly and severally liable.199 This system would require measures for preventing environmental damage in the first place. Furthermore, should environmental damage occur, it would establish a system for dealing with it, both in a physical sense (as technology improves, removing orbital debris) and in an economic sense. These rules would make the economic risk of environmental damage a true impetus for actors in space to pursue environmentally sound policy.
Opponents to space arms control negotiations have, however, come out against even this very limited engagement. Amb. John R. Bolton, former US ambassador to the United Nations, has argued that “the last thing the United States needs is a space code of conduct. The ideology of arms control has already failed in the Russian ‘reset’ policy, and it is sure to fail here as well. The European Union code would interfere with our ability to develop antiballistic missile systems in space, test antisat- ellite weapons and gather intelligence.”61 Others have argued that the code of conduct for space will restrict how space forces are used by the US military.62 Members of the Senate Armed Services Committee have expressed reservations in the code, claiming it would limit US actions in space and thereby harm national security, even after assurances by the administration that the code is voluntary and nonbinding.63 In fact, it explicitly avoids addressing any issues of space security and deals only with civilian spaceflight operations safety.
Such opposition to exploring cooperative measures with China is short-sighted and flawed. To dissuade and deter China from employing an ASAT attack, the United States will need to employ all its assets, in- cluding diplomacy, to communicate to China the US ability to operate effectively in the face of an ASAT attack operation. Military-technical solutions might provide some relief; however, it is important to engage and address legitimate Chinese concerns about US weapons programs. Central to the threat of Chinese ASAT capabilities is China’s perceived incongruence in capability between US and PLA forces. While it may not be politically possible to address all Chinese concerns, engaging and addressing some of them is the sensible way to build a stable and coop- erative regime in space.
Any coherent plan to dissuade and deter China from employing an ASAT attack will have to also include negotiations and arms control agreements. While a comprehensive arms control agreement in space may suffer verification issues,51 even a limited agreement will endow the principals with several benefits. An arms control agreement may not completely prevent the covert development of Chinese capabilities, but it will significantly reduce the confidence of the Chinese military in an ASAT weapon system that an otherwise meticulously designed testing program would give it.
An arms control agreement or even the negotiating process over such an agreement will convince any potential adversary, including China, of important thresholds. These processes can provide a valuable forum to develop ground rules for space operations, including during peri- ods of war. For example, US military satellites that provide missile early warning have a tactical utility, but more importantly, they also serve to maintain the stability of nuclear deterrence between the United States and China. Rules should be explored to eliminate any consideration of targeting these satellite systems. While serving as the US deputy as- sistant secretary of state for space and defense policy in 2012, Frank A. Rose claimed that “there has [sic] been a number of Chinese defense intellectuals arguing that shooting down American nuclear early warn- ing satellites is de-escalatory. We want to have a discussion with them so that they understand that this is not the case.”52 That discussion will not occur unless there is direct contact and an inclination to engage in reaching middle ground. Engaging in negotiations over space security and demonstrating leadership with such measures will help characterize the United States as a responsible actor and render it with the authority to respond with force when an attack is made on its or allied space assets. The latest National Security Space Strategy has indicated that the United States would use force in response to offensive operations against it in a manner consistent with long-standing principles of international law, treaties to which the United States is a party, and the inherent right of self-defense.53 The international community should be convinced of the justice to punish a space aggressor and to support the United States in its use of lethal force to do so. Engaging in discussions to establish ground rules during times of peace will help to provide such support.54
The United States should also study and improve its ability to use measures like satellite sensor shielding and collision avoidance ma- neuvers for satellites. These would dilute an adversary’s ASAT opera- tion and increase the apparent uncertainty of the consequences of an ASAT attack.46 Monitoring mechanisms—both technical and nontechnical—that provide long warning times and the ability to definitively identify an attacker in real time should also be a priority. The US Air Force has started to invest in such capabilities on a small scale. Gen William Shelton, head of Air Force Space Command, announced on 21 February 2014 the upcoming launch of the geosynchronous space situ- ational awareness (SSA) system designed to “have a clear, unobstructed and distinct vantage point for viewing resident space objects.”47 Such systems will help in attributing an ASAT attack. Similarly, the ground- based Rapid Attack, Identification, Detection, and Reporting System (RAIDRS) is a valuable US asset to identify, characterize, and geolocate attacks against US satellites.48
It is the strategic portion of naval communications that is largely de- pendent on SATCOM. HF and UHF radio links can perform some of the strategic naval communication, however, SATCOM accounts for the bulk of it. Therefore, the component of the NTS that China would be aiming to disrupt with its ASATs is strategic communications that would connect the National Command Authority (NCA) with the for- ward-deployed battle group. This poses a unique problem. Normally, China should prefer to disrupt and disable the communication capabili- ties of the forward-deployed naval battle group near Taiwan and then negotiate with the US NCA to have it withdrawn or stand down. How- ever, it can only accomplish the opposite. By using ASATs, China would cut off the forward-deployed battle group from its NCA and still might not significantly disable or disrupt the battle group’s ability to execute its naval mission. China could hope that such an attack might force the battle group to stand down. However, it must also have to contend with the possibility that the battle group commander might act more rashly in the absence of direct guidance from the NCA, particularly if combat maneuvers have been initiated. Would China be willing to take such risk? Arguably, the risk might not be worth the potential escalation it might trigger.
These airborne systems certainly do not make ISR satellites irrelevant. Satellites still perform some battle roles along with aerial platforms. However, when analysts claim that US forces would be lost without ISR satellites during a military engagement, there seems to be an incongruity between reality and perception. Commanders rely heavily on airborne assets during battlefield operations. For example, during the 1991 Op- eration Desert Storm, Gen Chuck Horner, commander of the coalition air forces, pulled in and used every airborne platform, including the high-flying TR-1/U-2R aircraft, the RF-4C for tactical information, the RC-135 Rivet Joint to monitor electronic emissions, the Boeing E-3B/C AWACS, the EC-130E Airborne Battle Command and Control Center (ABCCC) for combat management, the E-8A JSTARS to find ground targets, and Navy F-14s equipped with TARPS (tactical air reconnais- sance pod system).
This trend has persisted. Recent US military operations continue to extensively employ airborne ISR systems. In the 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom, for example, coalition air forces employed 80 aircraft (includ- ing the RC-135, C-130, E-2, E-3, E-8, EC-130, EP-3, and U-2) that flew nearly 1,000 ISR sorties during the initial weeks, collecting 42,000 battlefield images and more than 3,000 hours of full-motion video.38 The airborne systems also provided 2,400 hours of SIGINT coverage and 1,700 hours of moving-target-indicator data.39 In fact, the MC- 12W Liberty aircraft was developed during Operation Iraqi Freedom specifically to intensify data collection, including real-time, full-motion video and SIGINT to support battlefield decisions of military troop leaders.40
What would China gain from 95 minutes of GPS degradation in a tactical military operation? US ships and aircraft have accurate inertial navigation systems that would still permit them to operate in the region. As for the ability to use GPS-guided bombs, table 2 below shows that the percentage use of these munitions was around 25 percent in recent US operations. The United States could shift to laser-guided bombs that follow a narrow beam of pulsed energy trained on the target and are more precise than GPS-guided bombs. They also have a capability to attack moving targets like ships that GPS-guided bombs do not.23 In fact, between Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, the DoD decreased its use of GPS-guided bombs by about 13 percent and increased the use of laser-guided bombs by about 10 percent.24
The US military could also shift to conventional nonprecision mu- nitions if unable to use GPS-guided bombs. Although this may cause some problems for the United States, it would likewise affect China. Uncertainty in what is being targeted and where weapons will fall can have a significant psychological effect on an enemy. For example, in- terviews of Iraqi soldiers captured during the Gulf War revealed that their greatest fear was being attacked with B-52s, each dropping 38,250 pounds of conventional nonprecision munitions. The shock, noise, and disruption of a large-scale, wide-area air attack can have a paralyzing and demoralizing effect out of proportion to the amount of physical destruc- tion achieved.25 It may not be in China’s interest to attack GPS satellites and force the United States to revert to a wide-area bombing campaign.
The effect of this hypothetical ASAT attack is not consistent through- out the region. Although the average GPS signal degradation in the modeled China-Taiwan region lasts for 95 minutes, locations near the edges of the modeled region are not affected as much. For example, the Chinese Eastern Fleet located in Dinghai suffers GPS signal degradation for only 65 minutes, and the Chinese Southern Fleet located in Zhan Jiang suffers signal degradation for only 15 minutes. This implies that if China wants to hinder US operations in the Taiwan Straits region and at the same time limit the ability of US naval forces to attack its eastern and southern fleet locations where most of the Chinese ships and logisti- cal capabilities reside, it would have to destroy more than six satellites. Also, since the GPS degradation displays a periodic pattern after the attack (see fig. 2), occurring at the same time every 24 hours, US forces would be able to adapt to the effects of the attack.
In reality, however, attacking even six GPS satellites simultaneously would be a daunting military operation for China. As discussed in the pre- vious section, Chinese ICBMs are not capable of reaching the operating altitude of GPS satellites. Given this limitation, China would have to use its liquid-fueled space launch vehicles for attacking GPS satellites, which in turn has its own disadvantages as articulated earlier.21 Even if China managed to execute the attack scenario outlined above, the actual benefits seem limited. The most that would be gained is 95 minutes of signal deg- radation, after which the redundancy of the GPS satellite constellation makes up for the effects of the attack and US armed forces will be able to operate GPS assets at normal accuracy.22