Evidence: Recently Added
Developing states like India and Pakistan could develop two types of ASATs by 2010. First, both states could create modified missile defense systems to intercept satellites. All missile defense interceptors have an inherent capability to intercept satellites in LEO. India already has an active program to develop its own indigenous missile defenses and has expressed interest in purchasing the U.S. Patriot PAC-3 and Russian S-300 short-range missile defense systems. Second, both states might develop so-called "killer satellites" based on civilian microsatellite technology. The Indian Space Research Organization is already supporting the development of a 60 kg technology demonstration microsatellite, called ANUSAT, to be launched in 2005.
Among the extraordinary powers that the United States now enjoys is the power to shape the agenda for the use of space in the twenty-first century. If Washington seeks to extend its military dominance by flight-testing and deploying space weaponry, other capitals would surely follow suit. They would not do so in as sophisticated or as expensive a manner, but they will compete as best they can. If, on the other hand, the United States refrains from embarking on a course to weaponize space, there are no guarantees that others will exercise similar restraint. Potential adversaries will, however, have less incentive to do so, since Washington can compete effectively in space warfare, even if it does not benefit from it. Neither would weaker states, since the use of ASATs would complicate, but not alter, U.S. terrestrial military dominance. Weak states are more likely to carry out sneak attacks against the United States in our cities, our ports, and wherever the American flag is flown abroad, than to engage in space warfare.
For attacking hardened or deeply buried targets, the long rods would not outperform existing missiles equipped with conventional penetrating warheads. That's because the physics of high-velocity impacts limits the penetration depth; basically, too much energy at impact causes the projectile to distribute its energy laterally rather than vertically. Tests done since the 1960s by Sandia National Laboratories, in Albuquerque, N.M., confirm that for even the hardest rod materials, maximum penetration is achieved at a velocity of about 1 to 1.5 km/s. Above that speed, the rod tip liquefies, and penetration depth becomes essentially independent of impact speed. Therefore, for maximum penetration, the long rods would need to be slowed to about 1 km/s, thereby delivering only one-ninth the destructive energy per gram of a conventional explosive--or about 1.5 percent of the potential energy the rod had in LEO. The wasted energy would be immense, and the effort, cost, and complexity of such an orbital system would be entirely out of proportion to the results. For soft targets on the surface, such as aircraft, ships, or even tanks, the United States already has many quicker, simpler alternatives to space-based kinetic energy systems such as long rods. Explosives delivered by long-range cruise missile, ICBM, or submarine-launched ballistic missile are all more attractive options.
It is not surprising, therefore, that risks associated with weaponizing low-Earth orbit do not sit well with many members of Congress, who want to see U.S. military, scientific, and commercial leadership in space protected. According to defense analyst Theresa Hitchens, U.S. satellite providers are already nervous about possible future U.S. government decisions to try to shut off foreign access to U.S. communications satellites in times of crisis and to shoot down U.S. and foreign satellites providing such access. They fear that this may lead foreign customers to develop their own satellite industries to ensure the availability of spares, thus stimulating competition and cutting into existing U.S. market share.
The sixth component of space assets’ diplomatic power is the ability to shape behavior and exert influence through presence. As defined in the Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia, “Forward presence activities demonstrate our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis response capability while promoting United States influence and access.” Put another way, presence is the proximity of space assets to a location, such that international actors change their behavior or are deterred based solely on the location of space assets. The ability to influence other states due to the presence of space assets, or any military force, is based on the impact of those forces on other states’ decision making, not on the distance of our forces to a given geographic location, nor on the ability of other states to physically see our forces. Although the joint definition does not include space assets, it is clear that space assets can achieve some of the same effects as forward deployed terrestrial forces—although the fact that space assets cannot physically punish another state, a capability possessed by terrestrial forces, is an important distinction. To be sure, the ability to punish with terrestrial forces may have a stronger impact on an adversary’s decision calculus, but this does not preclude the ability of space assets to also affect that decision calculus through their presence. Space assets do provide some advantages over terrestrial forces, however, such as their tremendous field of view which allows them to exert presence over a wider area than terrestrial forces.
The United States blocked the formation of such a committee, but the Canadians have not been alone in their desire to pursue the formation of such a committee in the pursuit of multilateral treaties. In 1995, the Chinese government published a white paper on arms control and disarmament. In the paper, they clearly stated, "China opposes the arms race in outer space." They went further in discussing the history of their opposition. Since 1984, the paper went on, China has time and again proposed to the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament resolutions to prevent an arms race in outer space. China maintains that outer space "belongs to all mankind and should be used for peaceful purposes. No country should develop any kind of weapon to be used in outer space: outer space should be kept "weapon free."
As a long-time space power, the Russian Federation is highly concerned about maintaining the integrity of both its military and commercial space capabilities. However, that concern emanates less from worries about external threats to its assets, and more from the fact that the Russian space programme has deteriorated due to lack of funding. In June 2001, Yuri Koptev, head of Russian space agency Rosaviakosmos, told the parliament that age and lack of funds were serious issues, with sixtyeight of the Russian Federation's ninety orbiting satellites near or at the end of their operational lives. He further stated that many of the country's forty-three military satellites were simply too old to be considered reliable, and criticized the Russian Federation's meagre space budget of US$193 million as only half of what the agency needs. Indeed, in May 2001, the Russian Federation for a short time lost its photo-reconnaissance capabilities, taking its last two satellites out of orbit (although a replacement 'Kobalt' satellite was launched in June 2001). The Russian Federation's Glonass satellite navigation system (similar to the American GPS network) also is deteriorating; in March 2001, Koptev told parliament that only thirteen of the twenty-four satellites required for the network to fully function were working.
Any analysis of Japanese ambitions to weaponize space must ultimately consider Japan's constitutional prohibition against offensive military capabilities. Since 1945, Japan has severely constrained its defense expenditures in deference to public support for that prohibition and the military security already provided by US forces. Japan's national sentiment fosters budget woes for the Japanese Defense Agency. Plans for a missile warning satellite were scrapped in favor of the short-term solution of buying US airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft instead. On a related note, Japan recently declined to participate in a joint venture to develop an operational theater missile defense. Taken together, this evidence indicates that Japan is in no way inclined to weaponize space either.
India is a state that may pursue ASAT capabilities, if other states do so first. The chief of the Indian Air Force, S. Krishnaswamy, recently remarked that: "Any country on the fringe of space technology like India has to work towards such a command as advanced countries are already moving towards laser weapons platforms in space and killer satellites." Pakistan has a much smaller industrial base, but has long attempted to match Indian deployments -- particularly in military matters. Pakistan is likely to emulate Indian ASAT efforts, given the enmity between the two countries and the relative advantage that India derives from the use of space for military operations.