Evidence: Recently Added
According to the latest DOD report on Chinese military capabilities, the People's Republic of China (PRC) views the need for counterspace capabilities as inevitable. The PRC, according to Theresa Hitchens, is the only other country in the world that is engaged in a political-military debate on the value of space weaponization. Part of what makes China the most likely near term competitor for the United States is the extreme uncertainty that surrounds the Chinese space program. According to the DOD's 2004 report on Chinese military capabilities, the PRC realizes that the US is so dependent on space and, thus, it remains interested in counterspace capabilities that can deny or degrade America's ability to react to a PRC-Taiwan conflict. Paradoxically, the mystique of Chinese intentions makes space derived intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) one of the few ways that the US can assess the progress of PRC space weapons. China recognizes this paradox and has taken steps to bolster its counterspace capabilities. A July 2000 article by Yang Hucheng, a Chinese defense analyst, supports this assertion. Hucheng suggests "for countries that can never win a war with the United States by using the method of tanks and planes, attacking the U.S. space system may be an irresistible and most tempting choice. Part of the reason is that the Pentagon is greatly dependent on space for its military action."
In other words, it is not at all self-evident that a sudden loss of a communications satellite, for example, would precipitate a wider-scale war or make warfare termination impossible. In the context of U.S.-Russian relations, communications systems to command authorities and forces are redundant. Urgent communications may be routed through land lines or the airwaves. Other means are also available to perform special reconnaissance missions for monitoring a crisis or compliance with an armistice. While improvements are needed, our ability to know what transpires in space is growing -- so we are not always in the dark.
These are all reasonable arguments, but to conclude from them that space weaponization is inevitable, rather than merely possible or even likely, is unwarranted, for several reasons. There is no question that space systems are a key center of gravity (or perhaps several) for U.S. military capabilities. An enemy that attacked them might be able to impair U.S. military operations very seriously, and this ranks high among threats that concern U.S. strategists. It need not follow from this that the enemies of the United States will do so, or invest in the weapons required to do so, however. The U.S. armed forces possess many important vulnerabilities that adversaries have often, even consistently, opted not to attack in past conflicts. To cite but one widely-discussed example, during Operation Allied Force in 1999, Serbia apparently did not attempt to mount special forces attacks against key NATO airbases in Italy or to use manportable missiles to shoot down aircraft operating from them during take-off or landing, although such an action could have profoundly disrupted the Alliance's bombing campaign
Notwithstanding the argument by some observers that the parallels between space and "the maritime and air environments could hardly be clearer," however, there do appear to be difficulties. Long before the Royal Navy came to rule the waves during the 19th century, English shipping had been repeatedly subjected to piracy as well as commerce raiding by the navies of other nations. Why? First and foremost because of the economic wealth associated with the growth of maritime commerce that followed the discovery of the New World. Drake and Hawkins originally made their names raiding Spanish galleons bringing gold and other treasure back to Spain from the Americas. By contrast, over four decades into the space age, no nation has tried to seize or mount destructive attacks against the operational satellites of another, including the two Cold War adversaries. Although both accidental and intentional interference with the functioning of satellites has occurred, attacks aimed at destroying satellites have not. While ASAT systems have been tested and fielded in the past, US capabilities are currently limited to a US Army developmental program for a kinetickill vehicle launched by a Minuteman missile, and one cannot help but wonder about the readiness of the Russian nonnuclear ASAT system inherited from the Soviet era. Again, one must wonder why this happens to be so. And the most straightforward answer is that orbital assets have yet to acquire the economic import of Spanish treasure galleons.
It is important to note that the Chinese don't even have to actually acquire ASATs for this nightmare scenario to happen. The Pentagon's assessments of Chinese ASATs are based largely on circumstantial evidence -- a Hong Kong newspaper report here; a commercial purchase by a Chinese company there. In fact, the Pentagon admits that "specific Chinese programs for a laser ASAT system have not been identified" and that press reports of a so-called "parasitic" microsatellite "cannot be confirmed." Such gaps in U.S. knowledge are dangerous, given the natural tendency of defense planners to assume the worst. Although Blue claimed that it had acted on "unambiguous warning" of a threat to space assets, the mere fact that the Chinese might already have such system -- or could improvise a crude ASAT in a pinch -- would create a strong incentive to use U.S. space systems before they were lost. It is not too far fetched to imagine the president, faced with a crisis over Taiwan, deciding -- as he did with Iraq -- that "we cannot wait for the final proof -- the smoking gun -- that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud."
An additional step that can be taken to assure access to space is to develop a responsive space-lift capability. The abil - ity to prepare and launch a satellite within days could quickly replenish combat losses. This approach would be most costeffective for small, cheap satellites but would also be effective for larger satellites, particularly if an enemy had only a limited number of ASAT weapons. Spares that are stored on the ground until needed would offer more than just the ability to replenish combat losses quickly. Since they would be accessible while in storage, ground spares could be upgraded so that they incorporate the latest technology when they are eventually launched. The Defense Support Program made use of this concept in the 1980s, when unneeded spare satellites were upgraded to become more capable replacements. Designing spare satellites to allow for upgrades would capitalize on their availability during storage, an attribute that makes such a strategy even more attractive than attempting to actively de - fend obsolescing hardware in orbit.
Space-based weapons, like all space systems, are predictable and fragile, but they represent significant combat power if used before they are destroyed --leading to a strong incentive to use these weapons preemptively, to "use them or lose them." The problem is further complicated by the difficulty in knowing what is occurring in space. As the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization pointed out: "Hostile actions against space systems can reasonably be confused with natural phenomena. Space debris or solar activity can ?explain? the loss of a space system and mask unfriendly actions or the potential thereof. Such ambiguity and uncertainty could be fatal to the successful management of a crisis or resolution of a conflict. They could lead to forbearance when action is needed or to hasty action when more or better information would have given rise to a broader and more effective set of responsive options." This lag in situational awareness can increase the effectiveness of attacks. That is, striking first is likely to mean inflicting disproportionate losses on the enemy; waiting increases the chances of suffering disproportionate losses oneself.