Evidence: Recently Added
Although not verified through other sources, the Hong Kong Sing Tao Daily newspaper quoted unnamed Chinese resources in reporting that China is developing a space-based anti-satellite system. According to the report, the concept is to deploy very small "parasitic" satellites called nano-satellites that would attach themselves to satellites and re-main inactive during normal times. Upon activation, these parasitic satellites would destroy the satellite or disrupt its operations. Although the existence of a Chinese parasitic satellite program is uncertain, the existence of micro-satellite programs for data transmission, earth sensing and other programs is well documented. Whether the technology will translate into Chinese ASAT capabilities is not known. The Secretary of Defense is also concerned that China already may have, or is acquiring, the technology for developing laser radars to track and image satellites. This technology would be of great assistance in targeting orbiting satellites. China also already may have the capability to damage the optical sensors on US systems as they pass over China, and may be developing high-power microwave (HPM) technology to be used against satellites. Additionally, there is speculation China may be researching the use of steel balls to kill a satellite or the use of powder, paint and dust to render a space-based laser ineffective. If developed, these applications also could have an effect on other satellite sensors or solar panels. An additional possibility not mentioned in the literature is use of a nuclear ASAT. China already has such a capability within its ICBM force.
Yet we have little experience in reality to ground this freely wielded and rather academic assumption. By definition, anything that causes instability in armed relationships is to be avoided. But would "shots" in space, any more than shots on the ground, be that cause? When we look at what incites war, history instructs us that what matter most are the character and motivation of the states involved, along with the general balance of power (i.e., are we in the world of 1914, 1945, or 2001?). Fluctuations in national arsenals, be they based on earth or in space, do not determine, but rather more accurately are a reflection of, the course of politics among nations. In other words, it matters not so much that there are nuclear weapons, but rather whether Saddam Hussein or Tony Blair controls them and in what security context. The same may be said for space weapons.
Moreover, it is quite possible that if a potential enemy did want to develop the ability to attack U.S. space systems, it would choose to do so in wayssuch as investing in ground-based ASAT lasers or computer network attack capabilitiesthat would not involve weaponizing space, and against which the logical defensive countermeasures would not involve placing U.S. weapons in orbit either. For military as well as commercial satellites, bodyguard weapons in space would offer protection only from certain sorts of attacks, while the terrestrial links in satellite systems would remain inviting targets. Again it is the transition to larger networks of smaller satellites that will do the most to reduce vulnerability, perhaps together with supplementing satellite platforms for some military functions with new types of terrestrial systems, such as high endurance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs),[36] and improving terrestrial weapons with which to attack ground-based ASATs and satellite launch and control facilities. Conversely, if the United States decides that it must have the ability to deny an enemy the use of its satellites, it is quite possible that the most attractive means for doing this will prove to involve non-space weapons and, to an even greater extent, tools that are not weapons in the conventional sense at all.
If this analysis is correct, then the analogy between the development of navies in response to guerre de course and the emergence of space-based military capabilities in response to prospective attacks on satellites breaks downs in important ways. Sinking a nation's ship on the high seas, whether a military or commercial vessel, has long been viewed as an act of war. Article VIII of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty states that any party "on whose registry an object launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and over any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial body." In 1996, the United States declared as national policy that the space systems of any nation are "national property with the right of passage through and operations in space without interference." Nevertheless, damaging or destroying satellites does not seem to have quite the same status as damaging or sinking a nation's ships and killing its crew. Satellites may have owners and operators, but, in contrast to sailors, they do not have mothers. Granted, the destruction of a KH-11 or comparable satellite at a key juncture in a crisis with a major regional power would be taken very seriously by American leaders. Whether this act would inevitability lead to war, however, is far from clear.
Until very recently, US satellites have tended to be fairly large, very capable, and very expensive. These satellites pre - sent an opponent with lucrative targets, where the loss of even one would often constitute a dramatic loss in capability. This is particularly true for current generation reconnaissance satellites since these are very capable, relatively few in number, and very vulnerable owing to their need to be in LEOs. Fortunately, deploying defensive space weapons is only one way to protect these assets. One option for mitigating this vulnerability is to deploy large numbers of less capable satellites. These satellites could pro - vide the same capability as a larger satellite by working in concert. For a satellite communication (SATCOM) system, each satellite would carry part of the load. If needed, the satellites could be placed fairly close together in orbit and their deployment geometry could be optimized to balance survivability with the need to emulate a much more capable sat - ellite. Alternatively, the United States could move away from placing communication satellites in geosynchronous orbit and transition to a large constellation of satellites in lower orbits. The commercial sector is now using such an approach to provide global cellular telephone capability.
As is familiar to any serious student of previous international treaties dealing with technological questions, treaties usually persist long after the technological assumptions or specific crises behind them have become obsolete. Thus the reinterpretation of ambiguous wording based on unanticipated technical developments can lead to the existence of a set of "shadow treaties" which diverge from the original in different directions depending on the interpretations and intentions of the different parties involved. Because of the rapidity of revolutionary change in space activities, treaties can age extremely quickly and can become ambiguous and asymmetrically restrictive within only a decade or two. In addition, current in-force treaties affecting space activities reflect the prevailing situation at the time of their development, a bipolar and antagonistic international climate. Major metamorphosis has already begun towards a multi-polar environment with shifting and often obscure interests. How well the old treaties 'fit' -- or can be made to appear to 'fit' -- the new and very different situation is bound to baffle space planners for decades to come.
According to the latest DOD report on Chinese military capabilities, the People's Republic of China (PRC) views the need for counterspace capabilities as inevitable. The PRC, according to Theresa Hitchens, is the only other country in the world that is engaged in a political-military debate on the value of space weaponization. Part of what makes China the most likely near term competitor for the United States is the extreme uncertainty that surrounds the Chinese space program. According to the DOD's 2004 report on Chinese military capabilities, the PRC realizes that the US is so dependent on space and, thus, it remains interested in counterspace capabilities that can deny or degrade America's ability to react to a PRC-Taiwan conflict. Paradoxically, the mystique of Chinese intentions makes space derived intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) one of the few ways that the US can assess the progress of PRC space weapons. China recognizes this paradox and has taken steps to bolster its counterspace capabilities. A July 2000 article by Yang Hucheng, a Chinese defense analyst, supports this assertion. Hucheng suggests "for countries that can never win a war with the United States by using the method of tanks and planes, attacking the U.S. space system may be an irresistible and most tempting choice. Part of the reason is that the Pentagon is greatly dependent on space for its military action."