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These are all reasonable arguments, but to conclude from them that space weaponization is inevitable, rather than merely possible or even likely, is unwarranted, for several reasons. There is no question that space systems are a key center of gravity (or perhaps several) for U.S. military capabilities. An enemy that attacked them might be able to impair U.S. military operations very seriously, and this ranks high among threats that concern U.S. strategists. It need not follow from this that the enemies of the United States will do so, or invest in the weapons required to do so, however. The U.S. armed forces possess many important vulnerabilities that adversaries have often, even consistently, opted not to attack in past conflicts. To cite but one widely-discussed example, during Operation Allied Force in 1999, Serbia apparently did not attempt to mount special forces attacks against key NATO airbases in Italy or to use manportable missiles to shoot down aircraft operating from them during take-off or landing, although such an action could have profoundly disrupted the Alliance's bombing campaign
Notwithstanding the argument by some observers that the parallels between space and "the maritime and air environments could hardly be clearer," however, there do appear to be difficulties. Long before the Royal Navy came to rule the waves during the 19th century, English shipping had been repeatedly subjected to piracy as well as commerce raiding by the navies of other nations. Why? First and foremost because of the economic wealth associated with the growth of maritime commerce that followed the discovery of the New World. Drake and Hawkins originally made their names raiding Spanish galleons bringing gold and other treasure back to Spain from the Americas. By contrast, over four decades into the space age, no nation has tried to seize or mount destructive attacks against the operational satellites of another, including the two Cold War adversaries. Although both accidental and intentional interference with the functioning of satellites has occurred, attacks aimed at destroying satellites have not. While ASAT systems have been tested and fielded in the past, US capabilities are currently limited to a US Army developmental program for a kinetickill vehicle launched by a Minuteman missile, and one cannot help but wonder about the readiness of the Russian nonnuclear ASAT system inherited from the Soviet era. Again, one must wonder why this happens to be so. And the most straightforward answer is that orbital assets have yet to acquire the economic import of Spanish treasure galleons.
It is important to note that the Chinese don't even have to actually acquire ASATs for this nightmare scenario to happen. The Pentagon's assessments of Chinese ASATs are based largely on circumstantial evidence -- a Hong Kong newspaper report here; a commercial purchase by a Chinese company there. In fact, the Pentagon admits that "specific Chinese programs for a laser ASAT system have not been identified" and that press reports of a so-called "parasitic" microsatellite "cannot be confirmed." Such gaps in U.S. knowledge are dangerous, given the natural tendency of defense planners to assume the worst. Although Blue claimed that it had acted on "unambiguous warning" of a threat to space assets, the mere fact that the Chinese might already have such system -- or could improvise a crude ASAT in a pinch -- would create a strong incentive to use U.S. space systems before they were lost. It is not too far fetched to imagine the president, faced with a crisis over Taiwan, deciding -- as he did with Iraq -- that "we cannot wait for the final proof -- the smoking gun -- that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud."
An additional step that can be taken to assure access to space is to develop a responsive space-lift capability. The abil - ity to prepare and launch a satellite within days could quickly replenish combat losses. This approach would be most costeffective for small, cheap satellites but would also be effective for larger satellites, particularly if an enemy had only a limited number of ASAT weapons. Spares that are stored on the ground until needed would offer more than just the ability to replenish combat losses quickly. Since they would be accessible while in storage, ground spares could be upgraded so that they incorporate the latest technology when they are eventually launched. The Defense Support Program made use of this concept in the 1980s, when unneeded spare satellites were upgraded to become more capable replacements. Designing spare satellites to allow for upgrades would capitalize on their availability during storage, an attribute that makes such a strategy even more attractive than attempting to actively de - fend obsolescing hardware in orbit.
Space-based weapons, like all space systems, are predictable and fragile, but they represent significant combat power if used before they are destroyed --leading to a strong incentive to use these weapons preemptively, to "use them or lose them." The problem is further complicated by the difficulty in knowing what is occurring in space. As the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization pointed out: "Hostile actions against space systems can reasonably be confused with natural phenomena. Space debris or solar activity can ?explain? the loss of a space system and mask unfriendly actions or the potential thereof. Such ambiguity and uncertainty could be fatal to the successful management of a crisis or resolution of a conflict. They could lead to forbearance when action is needed or to hasty action when more or better information would have given rise to a broader and more effective set of responsive options." This lag in situational awareness can increase the effectiveness of attacks. That is, striking first is likely to mean inflicting disproportionate losses on the enemy; waiting increases the chances of suffering disproportionate losses oneself.
Today China's space program does not constitute a global threat, nor is it likely to become such a threat in the foreseeable future. The PRC has a moderately strong space program that will improve as part of China's overall economic development. Beijing is looking into technologies that will increase the PRC's space capabilities as well as put adversaries' use of space at risk. Some day, China may be able to create major global problems for the US and others. However, without global land, sea, or air capabilities, the military impact of China's space programs is likely to be limited to defense of China's homeland and support of regional activities undoubtedly pointed at Taiwan, the Spratly Islands, Tibet, and other areas of similar proximity and sensitivity to China. In a conflict, China also could assist nations allied against the US by providing launch support, ASAT activities, ISR data, and similar services.
Recent criticisms surrounding the MIRACL test and the U.S. National Missile Defense program were well orchestrated and vociferous, but numerically shallow when put up against the larger body of international opinion. In fact, voices will inevitably rise, from all corners of the globe, to condemn U.S. military decisions and actions. Political assault is the price the United States pays for having global interests and power. There will always be attempts by foreign leaders and vocal minorities to influence U.S. procurement decisions through arms control and public condemnation. It costs little, and the potential gains are great. Would a vigorous military space program alienate foreign governments to the point at which Washington could never again assemble a coalition similar to the one that defeated Saddam Hussein in 1991? This is doubtful. Leading up to the onset of war, the Iraqi leader's actions, not President Bush's initiatives, dominated foreign policy discussions abroad. Indeed, many Arab countries joined the coalition, despite America's stout support for the much-hated Israel. Any significant anti-American rhetoric was quickly overshadowed by the singular goal of turning back naked aggression.