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At the same time, there are also constraints on the military utility of such systems, particularly as Russia replenishes its own space capabilities. The use of a kinetic-kill DA-ASAT against an orbital target will invariably create large amounts of orbital space debris, as was seen in the 2007 Chinese ASAT test. An aggressive use of such a capability would invariably lead to widespread condemnation, as happened after the 2007 Chinese ASAT test. The debris will pose just as much a threat to Russia’s space capabilities, including its human spaceflight program, as it does those of other countries. Thus, the military utility of DA-ASATs would have to be weighed against the potential costs, particularly relative to less destructive capabilities such as jamming or blinding. Use of a DA-ASAT would also be relatively easy to attribute to Russia.
There are two ways to lighten the burden of monitoring space stalkers. First, there is no need to monitor space objects belonging to friends and allies of the United States. Second, neither is there a need to monitor space objects from countries that do not possess a capability of carrying out multiple space-stalking attacks. Thus, Russia and China are the key countries to watch for this type of attack in the near term.
Because the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) is already monitoring the movement of all operational satellites worldwide, monitoring any adversary’s maneuvering and positioning of its space objects for multiple space-stalking attacks would be part of its responsibility. The sensors and process to alert satellite owners of potential collisions can also be used to alert the US military of potential space-stalking attacks, if JSpOC is provided with warning criteria for such imminent attacks. In addition to ground-based optical and radio telescopes and the space-based space surveillance constellation, the Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program (GSSAP) can and should play a major role in the defense against space stalkers. Two GSSAP satellites were launched successfully into a near-geosynchronous orbit in July 2014. Gen William Shelton, former commander of Air Force Space Command, told reporters that “this neighborhood watch twosome will help protect our precious assets in GEO (high-altitude orbit), plus they will be on the lookout for nefarious capability other nations may try to place in that critical orbital regime.”52 An Air Force fact sheet states,
"GSSAP satellites will operate near the geosynchronous belt and will have the capability to perform rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO). RPO allows for the space vehicle to maneuver near a resident space object of interest, enabling characterization for anomaly resolution and enhanced surveillance, while maintaining flight safety. Data from GSSAP will uniquely contribute to timely and accurate orbital predictions, enhancing our knowledge of the geo-synchronous orbit environment, and further enabling space flight safety to include satellite collision avoidance.”53
The prohibition of positioning a space-stalking threat for simultaneous attacks can and should first be applied to GEOs as described in this article. For MEOs and elliptical Earth orbits (EEO), no country would need to change its current satellite orbits to meet the guidelines in this article to deal with the space-stalker threat, as their satellites in these orbits are already well separated from those of every other country’s. As to LEO satellites, which will soon number in the thousands, close- proximity restrictions can still be established with an approach similar to that for GEOs. However, the design of the prohibition for LEOs should be discussed along with other issues including:
- how DOD’s plan for disaggregating large LEO satellites for better mission survivability will work;
- how DOD’s arrangements with commercial providers and other governments in using their space and other assets for backup will work;
- which types of LEO satellites DOD needs to protect against simultaneous attacks by multiple space stalkers;
- how transparent should be the function and capability of small satellites to the international community; and
- how several thousand small satellites launched into LEO can be made to avoid collisions and creating space debris.
Since GEOs host many critical satellites for space-faring nations, if the prohibition against threatening space stalkers were only enforced there, the chance of triggering a war in space that spreads to Earth could be reduced.
The emerging space-stalker threat being developed by China and Russia under the cover of dual-use technologies cannot be addressed by traditional measures including reconstitution, defensive operations after attack, or resilience. ese nations could nd space stalkers to be the perfect space system to present the United States with two bad choices. First, the United States could preemptively destroy the space stalkers to save the targeted satellites. However, without discussing the sensitive issue of preemption with its allies and friends in peacetime, the United States could be treated as the aggressor that started a war in space. Second, it could fight without the support of satellites. Facing these two bad choices might prevent US intervention. To avoid these poor choices, the United States should evaluate the emerging space-stalker threat and the defense and deterrence against it, including a reexamination of preemptive self-defense as the last resort. With the popular argument and sentiment against preemption, preemptive self-defense as a last resort must be clearly restricted to space stalkers under situations that are justified for its use and cannot be used as a pretext for aggression. It is time to go beyond the concerns of the space stalkers into ways to defeat and deter them. Avoiding a space Pearl Harbor is a critical issue for the Trump administration and requires thoughtful and open-minded deliberation among all interested parties domestically and internationally.
As threats from ground-based ASATs (such as traditional threats from ballistic missiles, lasers, and jammers and the newer cyber attacks8) grow, it is easy to continue focusing on these much more well-known ASATs and ignore China’s developing co-orbital ASAT—hereafter what this article refers to as space stalkers. In November 2015, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission released its annual report to Congress stating that “since 2008, China has tested increasingly complex space proximity capabilities.”9 It confirmed what it and others have been suggesting, that “China’s recent space activities indicate it is de- veloping co-orbital antisatellite systems to target US space assets. These systems consist of a satellite armed with a weapon such as an explosive charge, fragmentation device, kinetic energy weapon, laser, radio frequency weapon, jammer, or robotic arm.”10 Space objects capable of rendezvous proximity operations and particularly equipped with a robotic arm could pose a game-changing threat as these objects could be placed in orbit during peacetime. During a crisis, such as China seizing Taiwan or territorial disputes in the South China Sea, these space objects could be maneuvered to tailgate US satellites and become space stalkers. They could simultaneously attack multiple critical satellites from such a close proximity that the United States would not have time to react. The space stalkers could destroy enough critical satellites to force the United States back toward General Hyten’s warning of fighting primitive “industrial age warfare” with greatly increased collateral damage. On 29 November 2016, CNN broadcast the documentary “War in Space: The Next Battlefield,” based on interviews of more than 10 high-ranking military personnel of the entire chain of command for space warfare. ese interviews described the concerns of senior space o cials about the threat from “kamikaze and kidnapper satellites launched by Russia and China.”11
It is important to reiterate that, at this stage, the United States does not face an imminent threat to national security space missions. Capabilities demonstrations by Russia and China are just that—demonstrations, and perhaps signaling. There is no Russian or Chinese ASAT fleet deployed that could defeat US space operations in a conflict; both nations are still behind the United States in the integration of space assets into military operations, as well as in on-orbit technology development. And no other potential adversary is even close to achieving equivalent space power. Further, no strategy should be based alone on perceptions of the current threats from nations deemed potential adversaries. The geopolitical stage shifts, sometimes rapidly, and former enemies become allies or vice versa. Countries’ fortunes rise and fall, including through domestic crises, and regional balances sometimes become upended. Risks, including the risk of unchecked conflict escalation, must also be considered.
Further, the biggest current threats to US space operations arguably come from debris and overcrowding in usable orbits, both problems that will get worse before they get better, especially as the small-satellite revolution grows. Neither of these problems can be solved unilaterally by the United States, nor with military power. However, a sober understanding of the possible evolution of the risk/threat environment is critical, in order to guide strategy on how to shape the future space environment.
The point is that diplomacy also requires the United States to take proactive measures, rather than simply reacting to others. As a positive example, the Obama administration has been vocal in its public diplomacy regarding debris-creating ASATs, criticizing any moves in that direction, by China in particular, as well as vowing to refrain from use of such weapons. Hyten told reporters at a December 2015 breakfast at the Capitol Hill Club that he is “concerned about any potential threat that would create debris in space,” particularly Russia and China’s construction of “kinetic energy antisatellite weapons.” He said, “It creates an environment that will be there for decades, if not centuries. And you can’t get rid of it. So I don’t want to go down that path, and Russia and China are going down that path.”48
However, there is much more that could be done. If the United States does not want to see the advent of debris-creating ASATs, then Washington should seriously consider proposing a ban on testing and use of such weapons. If a ban focused on testing and use of any technologies that deliberately created long-lasting space debris, the current argument over the definition of a weapon could be avoided—although there would obviously need to be negotiation of the exact parameters of activities to be banned. Still, a ban on testing and use would be a veri able alternative to the treaty proposal by Moscow and Beijing on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, and the Use or Threat of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT), which has garnered support outside of the West despite many shortcomings. The prevention of debris-creating weapons use would be rmly in US interests, as well as in the interests of all spacefaring nations. A ban on testing and use would also go a long way toward reestablishing in the international community the notion of the United States as holding the moral high ground in space.
Until 2013, US national security space policy pursued “strategic restraint” in a multi-tiered manner, through diplomatic channels at the multilateral and bilateral levels, public diplomacy that eschewed saber rattling, and discrete budgetary investment in dual-use space technologies, with an emphasis on those that provided better space situational awareness (SSA, the ability to see and understand the orbital environment).
However, the consensus on this approach began to unravel in May 2013, when China launched what it claimed was a science mission that nearly reached geostationary orbit (GEO, some 36,000 kilometers above the Earth). US satellite operators formerly considered this important orbital altitude a sanctuary, free from major threats. The Chinese test, coming on the heels of both Russia and China testing maneuverable satellites in low Earth orbit—a capability that, until recently, had been demonstrated only by the United States—led to something of a “quiet panic” within the US national space security community. This renewed threat perception, and the renewed fear about the “inevitability” of space war, was elevated all the way to President Obama (which is somewhat rare in the space strategy world), triggering a summer 2014 National Security Council-led Strategic Portfolio Review.
Russia is almost certainly capable of some limited direct-ascent ASAT operations, but likely not yet on a sufficient scale or at sufficient altitude to pose a critical threat to U.S. space assets. Core Russian direct-ascent ASAT capabilities are not yet operational, and those currently in development are not planned to have the capability to threaten targets beyond LEO. Russia appears highly motivated to continue development efforts even where military utility is questionable, due at least in part to bureaucratic pressures.
The Russian DA-ASAT capabilities currently consist of three primary programs which have direct or indirect counterspace capabilities:
- Nudol: a rapidly maturing ground-launched ballistic missile designed to be capable of intercepting targets in LEO;
- Kontakt: an air-launched interceptor designed to be used against targets in LEO orbits, on a several-year development timeline; and
- S-500: a next-generation exoatmospheric ballistic missile defense system, still several years from deployment, that may have capabilities against targets in low LEO orbits.
All three have their roots in Soviet-era programs but have been revived or reconstituted in recent years.
While the known on-orbit activities of Cosmos 2499, Cosmos 2501, Cosmos 2504, or Cosmos 2521 did not include explicit testing of offensive capabilities or aggressive maneuvers, it is possible that the technologies they tested could be used offensively or aggressive in the future. One potential offensive use would be to get a radio-frequency jammer close to a satellite, thereby greatly amplifying its ability to interfere with the satellite’s communications. While possible, to date there is no direct public evidence of such systems being tested on orbit by Russia.
The onboard tracking and guidance systems used for rendezvous could be used to try and physically collide with another satellite to damage or destroy it. However, the approach would have to involve much higher relative velocities than Russian RPO satellites have demonstrated to date, and potentially involving higher velocities and distances than what these satellites are capable of. Furthermore, the deliberate maneuvering to create a conjunction with the target satellite would be detectable with existing processes already in place to detect accidental close approaches. Warning time of such a close approach would likely be at least hours (for LEO) or days (for GEO), unless the attacking satellite was already in a very similar orbit.