Evidence: Most Popular
In June 2016, Xinhua, the official press agency of China, reported that onboard the inaugural launch of a new generation carrier rocket Long March-7 was an “Aolong-1” spacecraft, which was a demonstrator of space debris cleaning.13 It re-entered the atmosphere on 27 August 2016 after completing a short-duration demonstration mission.14 Spaceflight 101.com reported “according to Chinese space officials, Aolong-1 is only the first in a series of satellites tasked with the collection of space debris as the country develops the technology needed to retrieve small debris up to [the size of an] entire spacecraft to be safely brought to a destructive re-entry.”15 The European Union also has a program to demonstrate the removal of space debris and aims to remove the defunct 8-ton remote-sensing satellite Envisat from LEO around 2023.16 In essence these developments and others by major spacefaring nations mean that the space will be weaponized by early 2020, even if we do not count demonstrators as weapons.
China has at least one, and possibly as many as three, programs underway to develop DA-ASAT capabilities, either as dedicated counterspace systems or as midcourse missile defense systems that could provide counterspace capabilities. China has engaged in multiple, progressive tests of these capabilities since 2005, indicating a serious organizational effort. Chinese DA-ASAT capability against LEO targets is likely mature and may be operationally fielded on mobile launchers within the next few years. Chinese DA-ASAT capability against deep space targets (MEO and GEO) is likely still in the experimental or development phase, and there is not sufficient evidence to conclude whether it will become an operational capability in the near future.
While the known on-orbit activities of the SJ-12, SJ-15, and SJ-17 did not include explicit testing of offensive capabilities or aggressive maneuvers, it is possible that the technologies they tested could be used for offensive purposes in the future. One potential offensive use would be to get a radio-frequency jammer close to a satellite, thereby greatly amplifying its ability to interfere with the satellite’s communications. While possible, to date there is no direct public evidence of such systems being tested on orbit, although there have been multiple research articles published in Chinese journals discussing and evaluating the concept.38
The onboard tracking and guidance systems used for rendezvous could be used to try and physically collide with another satellite to damage or destroy it. However, the approach would have to involve much higher relative velocities than what the Chinese RPO satellites have demonstrated to date, and potentially involving higher velocities and longer closing distances than what these satellites are capable of. Furthermore, the deliberate maneuvering to create a conjunction with the target satellite would be detectable with existing processes already in place to detect accidental close approaches. Warning time of such a close approach would likely be at least hours (for LEO) or days (for GEO), unless the attacking satellite was already in a very similar orbit.
The evidence strongly indicates that China has a sustained effort to develop a broad range of counterspace capabilities. China has conducted multiple tests of technologies for close approach and rendezvous in both low-earth orbit (LEO) and geosynchronous orbit (GEO) that could lead to a co-orbital ASAT capability. However, as of yet, the public evidence indicates they have not conducted an actual destructive intercept of a target, and there is no proof that these RPO technologies are definitively being developed for counterspace use as opposed to intelligence gathering or other purposes.
In the first space age, attribution was less important and less complex than in the second space age. For many years, actions that interfered with space systems were viewed as attacks by the opposing superpower, so attribution was assumed. Today, however, attribution cannot be assumed. Just as in the nuclear domain, the increasing number of actors engaged in space means that it is not just one adversary with which U.S. military planners must concern themselves, but rather a host of state and, in some cases, non-state actors that have increasingly capable space and counterspace capabilities.123 As U.S. strategists develop more tailored deterrence strategies, they will have to be sure that the United States can attribute aggressor actions in order to respond e ectively and credibly. U.S. leaders will also have to demonstrate their ability to attribute attacks, lest an aggressor believe that it could avoid retaliation by relying on ambiguity. In so doing, U.S. leaders may want to demonstrate that the U.S. edge in attribution (based on its substantial investment in space surveillance and situational awareness capabilities) provides an asymmetric advantage that could permit escalation dominance over an adversary that is less well-equipped to quickly and reliably attribute hostile actions.
Yet, the U.S. military’s reliance on space is growing and questions remain about the viability of the U.S. deterrent posture. General John Hyten, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, has warned that the loss of U.S. space capabilities would send the U.S. military “back to World War Two... back to industrial age warfare.”107 Similarly, General Robert Kehler, former Commander of Air Force Space Command, has explained, “[t]he space capabilities we provide today are embedded in all of our combat opera- tions. We cannot fight the way America fights without space capabilities. Space has become a con- tested environment, and we know that in any conflict our adversaries will try to deny us use of those space capabilities.”108 Combining the growing U.S. reliance on space and the increasingly contested nature of the domain, Bruce MacDonald worries that “U.S. space capabilities are critical enablers for joint forces, but they may become an American Achilles heel unless steps are taken to o set growing vulnerabilities in its space architecture.”109 How can the United States adopt a deterrence strategy for space that adapts to these new realities?
Unfortunately, the holdover influence of the sanctuary perspective into longstanding efforts to achieve space arms control has added considerably to the politicization of the problem, both in the United States and at the United Nations.5 Thus, one important reason that international efforts to achieve comprehensive space arms control have not succeeded is because, at their apex, they have prioritized the chimerical pursuit of sanctuary over consider- ations of both strategy and the requirements of American national security.6 Even today, efforts to eliminate weapons in outer space continue, despite the fact that advances in the technological capabilities of space systems, and the proliferation of that technology to other countries around the world, long ago forced the United States to develop a formal space doctrine in order to guard its own interests in space.7
Like many other modern military systems, satellites are also vulnerable to cyber attacks. Cyber attacks can be used to intercept data, corrupt data, or seize control of systems for malicious purposes. Unlike electronic attacks, which interfere with the transmission of radio frequency signals, cyber attacks target the data itself and the systems that use this data. Any data interface in the system is a potential intrusion point, including the antennas on both the satellites and ground stations as well as the landlines connecting ground stations to terrestrial networks. The effects of a cyber attack on space systems can range from loss of data to widespread disruptions and can potentially lead to the permanent loss of a satellite. If an adversary could seize control of a satellite through a cyber attack, it could shut down all communications and destroy the satellite by expending its propellant supply or damaging its electronics. Moreover, it may be di icult for controllers to know what caused a satellite to lose control, since accidental malfunctions occur from time to time. Attribution for a cyber attack can be difficult, if not impossible, because attackers can use a variety of methods to conceal their identity, such as using hijacked servers to launch an attack.
In 2009, it was revealed that insurgents in Iraq were using commercially available software to intercept and decode video over satellite communication links from U.S. surveillance aircraft. This was possible because some U.S. aircraft did not have the equipment needed to encrypt video feeds, and it enabled the insurgents to see what the U.S. military was seeing in near real-time.56 The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission has also cited examples in the past in which cyber attacks were used against the command and control systems of U.S. government satellites. According to the Commission’s 2011 report, one of the more successful attacks was targeted at NASA’s Terra EOS satellite in 2008.57 On two instances in June and October of that year, hackers reportedly gained control of the satellite for 2 minutes and 9 minutes, respectively, although they did not execute any commands.58
The technology needed to jam many types of satellite signals is commercially available and relatively inexpensive. For example, U.S. forces experienced jamming in Iraq well after the fall of the Iraqi government, with at least five instances of hostile jamming of commercial SATCOM links documented.52 Jamming can also be difficult to detect or distinguish from accidental interference, making attribution and awareness more difficult. In 2015, General John Hyten, the commander of Air Force Space Command, noted that the U.S. military was jamming its own communications satellites an average of 23 times per month.53
Spoofing is a form of electronic attack in which the attacker mimics a legitimate radio frequency signal to trick a target into locking onto a fake signal. An attacker can “spoof” the downlink from a satellite, causing users to lock onto a bogus signal and then use that signal to inject false data. An attacker can also spoof the command and control uplink signal to a satellite and take control of the satellite for nefarious purposes. The best protections against this type of spoofing are encryption of the signal, because an attacker will need to crack the encryption to produce a signal that appears to be legitimate, and highly directional antennas that block out signals from other directions.
In 2011, Iran claimed to have downed a U.S. remotely piloted aircraft by using some combination of jamming and GPS spoofing.54 Subsequent research has shown that even encrypted military GPS signals can be spoofed by a device that records the encrypted signal and rebroadcasts it with a slight delay, a process known as “meaconing.”55 This does not require cracking the GPS encryption, because the rebroadcast signal is merely a time-delayed copy of the original signal. By gradually adjusting the amount of time delay inserted, an autopilot system using GPS for navigation can be tricked into thinking it is flying straight and level, when in fact it is climbing, descending, or turning.
A high-powered microwave (HPM) weapon can be used to disrupt a satellite’s electronics and potentially cause permanent damage at higher power levels. A “front-door” HPM attack uses a satellite’s own antennas as an entry path, while a “back-door” attack attempts to enter through small seams or gaps around electrical connections and shielding. A front-door attack is more straightforward to carry out, provided the HPM is positioned within the field of view of the antenna that it is using as a pathway, but it can be thwarted if the satellite uses circuits designed to detect and block surges of energy entering through the antenna. In contrast, a back-door attack is more challenging because it must exploit design or manufacturing flaws, but it can be conducted from any angle relative to the satellite. Both front-door and back-door HPM attacks can be difiicult to attribute to an attacker, and like a laser weapon, the attacker may not know if the attack has been successful.47