Evidence: Most Popular
The first objective is to inhibit the development of at least one type of ASAT technology. The concept here rests upon the “test-ban theory of arms control”: countries will be reluctant to rely upon weapons that have not been thoroughly tested, so the most effective mechanism for inhibiting the next spin in an arms race is to deprive them of the opportunity to assure themselves that the new evolving prototypes will, in fact, operate as intended. In this view, blocking future qualitative improvements in a weapon may be even more important than capping the sheer numbers of those de- vices, and a test ban can be the key governor against innovations.126
This theory is not iron-clad; states sometimes do invest in weapons that have not survived the crucible of rigorous testing.127 But prudence strongly guides them in the opposite direction: a cautious budget office will be reluctant to devote scarce resources to procurement of unproven systems, and conservative military and civilian leaders will hesitate to rely upon arms of unproven effect. The history of weapons development is littered with illus- trations of conspicuous and expensive failures resulting from decisions to forego customarily exhaustive testing, especially where new technology is pushing the envelope of prior experience.128
In addition to helping retard the proliferation of ASAT capabilities, this test-ban regime could, over time, reduce the confidence of countries that have already completed their testing of debris-creating ASAT systems. That is, even a proven military strength can atrophy if it is not regularly exercised,129 and space weapons would be no exception. The U.S. and Soviet legacy kinetic-energy interceptor systems that were deemed operational in the 1980s, for example, largely deteriorated through desuetude in the subse- quent decades, and their more recent ASAT enterprises had to start more or less from scratch.130
In sum, the contemporary and emerging dangers are multifaceted. First, and most obviously, any substantial use in combat of anti-satellite weapons would be catastrophic: the damage to military capabilities and to the civilian economy could be both vast and irreparable. Even the peacetime testing or demonstration of an evolving ASAT musculature could generate an untenable quantity of debris, ruining all states’ aspirations for effective, economical use of space. Moreover, an international arms race in developing competing mechanisms for asserting space control could deter optimal patterns of peaceful exploitation of space, and even the current amplifying rhetoric about weaponization of space may make some wary potential space actors hesitate about investing in new space capabilities.
That growing (or, now, full-grown) U.S. investment in satellites, and the understanding that “a day without space” would be a very bad day, indeed, have perversely reinforced the strong incentives for potential enemies to pur- sue counter-space capabilities. There is a measure of reciprocity in this relationship, as China, Russia, and others also deploy their own satellites, treading the same path toward reliance, dependence, and vulnerability. The same pressures and incentives that have driven the United States to place valuable assets into space will doubtless inspire others to make some similar choices. But for at least the next decade, and perhaps beyond, a major asymmetry remains: the United States is much more highly invested in space, both in the sheer number of military and civilian satellites and in the diver- sity and ubiquity of their uses.9
There is no public evidence that Iran has developed, or is developing, a dedicated DA-ASAT capability. However, Iran does have a robust ballistic missile program, including a demonstrated satellite launch vehicle, which could theoretically be used as a DA-ASAT rocket. It would still need to be combined with several other technologies that Iran has not yet tested either.
Iran has several short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, either in operational status or in development, with estimated ranges from 150 km to more than 2,000 km. The longer ranged missiles could theoretically be used as the basis for a DA-ASAT rocket, with a potential ceiling of half their ballistic range. There is no evidence Iran has ever tested its ballistic missiles in this role, nor that it has a program to develop this capability.
There are some who claim Iran is developing the ability to create crude electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons by putting nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles on ships. Such weapons, they claim, could be used to conduct surprise attacks on national power grids, or as an indiscriminate ASAT weapon.297 However, many other experts discount the ability to use a primitive nuclear device in this way,298 and state that this is a scare tactic designed to promote missile defense.299
The views and initiatives of the Russian political and military leadership are a result of more than just the perceived vulnerability of U.S. space-enabled capabilities and operations. Russian military thinkers see modern warfare as a struggle over information dominance and net-centric operations that can often take place in domains without clear boundaries and contiguous operating areas. To meet the challenge posed by the space-aspect of modern warfare, Russia is pursuing lofty goals of incorporating electronic warfare capabilities throughout its military to both protect its own spaceenabled capabilities and degrade or deny those capabilities to its adversary. In space, Russia is seeking to mitigate the superiority of U.S. space assets by fielding a number of ground, air, and space-based offensive capabilities. Although technical challenges remain, the Russian leadership has indicated that Russia will continue to seek parity with the United States in space.
Having observed the U.S. way of war during the past several decades, the Russian political and military leadership have come to see the military aspect of space as essential to modern warfare and winning current and future conflicts. While it is true that the Russian military sees the U.S. reliance on space-based assets as a vulnerability to be exploited, Russian thinking about conflict in space and space in conflict is much more a reflection of the evolution of modern warfare and the struggle to achieve information dominance during military operations.207 To that end, the Russian military is aggressively pursuing capabilities to degrade or destroy adversary space-based assets as well as negate the advantage of space-based capabilities in theaters of conflict. At the same time, the Russian military is expanding its own presence in space and its ability to use spacebased capabilities to enhance the performance of its forces in conflict. Given Russian views of the nature of warfare and its perceptions of the threat environment facing the Russian Federation, Russian investment in the space domain is certain to continue.
Directed energy weapons offer similar potential military utility to electronic warfare weapons. They can be used to nullify specific military space capabilities, and often be able to do so without causing long-term damage or large amounts of space debris. In some situations, use of DEW could be seen as less escalatory than a kinetic attack on a satellite, potentially creating a way to disable military space capabilities without being considered an armed attack.
However, DEW counterspace capabilities do have significant drawbacks. DEW technologies that can do physical damage have proven difficult to perfect, and also pose operational challenges with limited fuel capacity, firing times, and range. Additionally, it can be very difficult to determine the threshold between temporary dazzling or blinding and causing long-term damage, particularly since it may depend on the internal design and protective mechanisms of the target satellite that are not externally visible. Moreover, it can be difficult for an attacker to determine whether or not a non-destructive DEW attack actually worked.
During the 1980s, the USSR began a development program to mount a high-power laser on a modified IL-76 transport aircraft (known as the Beriev A-60). The laser was installed in the cargo bay, with a turret opening on the top of the aircraft. The aircraft was used to test the laser system that was later used in the Skif-DM spacecraft, lost in a failed launch in 1987. The test aircraft was reportedly lost in a fire during the late 1980s. A second aircraft was modified for continued testing. In 2009, the aircraft laser reportedly conducted a successful test of illuminating a satellite in orbit. Work on the project was halted in 2011, due to lack of funding.196
In 2012, the Ministry of Defense announced the revival of the program.197 In April 2017, Almaz- Antey general designer Pavel Sozinov announced that the company had been ordered by Russian leadership to “develop weapons that could interfere electronically with or achieve ‘direct functional destruction of those elements deployed in orbit.’”198 The new system, called “Falcon Echelon,” will be equipped with the 1LK222 laser system, apparently a different system than the original Carbon Dioxide laser type from the 1980s. The new laser will reportedly be fitted aboard a “brand-new, as-yet-unnamed” aircraft, according to recent Russian media reports.199
Damage to a satellite’s image sensor, or associated electronics, could be caused when the laser power is of sufficient intensity. Damage to optics would involve a higher power than dazzling. However, the threshold between dazzling and damage is almost impossible to predict; thus, whenever a dazzling attempt is made there may be a risk of damage. This is because the ground area obscured (corresponding to the portion of the sensor dazzled) increases with increasing laser power. At the high end, where a large portion of the array becomes saturated, some of the sensor elements may become subject to sufficient intensity to cause permanent damage. Under some conditions, damage to a portion of the sensor array could be incurred using a continuous wave with a power level as low 40 W. This power level would likely only affect a few pixels in the array, but it would be permanent damage nonetheless. A more likely power level to use for a weapons application where significant damage to the sensor was intended would be in the KW range.193
In the case of damage to optical sensors, the satellite will not otherwise be damaged. It can continue to be controlled and operate and the other non-imaging payloads will continue to function.
Laser dazzling is more appropriately considered a countermeasure than a weapon, since the effect is not permanent. The dazzling phenomenon consists of directing a relatively low power laser beam into the optics of an imaging satellite. The laser light will impinge on the sensors detector array - usually a charge-coupled device (CCD) or a complementary metal-oxide semiconductor (CMOS) - and overwhelm the natural collection of photons. As a result, a number of the pixels of an image will be saturated, thus obscuring a portion of the image scene. The effects may persist in the sensor and associated electronics would be temporary in nature. For example, in a CCD array, it might take several successive readouts of the array in order to completely clear the electric charge that was induced by the laser. Therefore, the effect may impact a number of images, following the laser incident. However, this effect is considered to be temporary in nature since it will eventually clear on its own with no operator intervention. Laser dazzling could be used as a countermeasure in order to protect specific ground facilities from being imaged by optical means. The laser source would need to be located near the target it is intended to protect.191