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The pressures on the space frontier are enormous -- from both an economic and a military perspective. Looked at in isolation, each of these pressures is severe enough to create conflict. In combination, they create the risk that future space conflicts could result in war -- either on earth, in space, or both. On the economic front, conflict has already occurred because of crowding in GEO orbits and through saturation of the available radio spectrum. On the military front, conflict has been avoided because the United States, in recent years, has retained an effective monopoly on the use of space during conflict. Conflicts involving the commercial use of space will continue to increase as crowding increases. There are limited unoccupied slots at GEO and a limited spectrum remaining to be allocated. On the military side, one cannot imagine the United States allowing an enemy to either threaten U.S. space capabilities or use space systems to their advantage, putting the U.S. at risk. Conflict involving space systems could be a significant part of the next major theater war involving the United States.
Perhaps more importantly, the risk of Pakistani ASAT attacks would create the same escalatory incentives for India that the United States faces in the second scenario. U.S. war games suggest that future conflicts in South Asia may not be very stable. A contractor who has conduct more than two dozen war games for the Pentagon and other military-planning centers told the Wall Street Journal that the India-Pakistan scenarios usually escalate to the use of nuclear weapons "within the first 12 'days' of the war game." "It's a scary scenario," said one participant. Anti-satellite weapons would reinforce the strong escalatory dynamic that many war games have revealed. For example, war games that quickly escalate to nuclear use are often restarted to allow the Indian side to reconsider some of the moves that lead to Pakistani escalation. The Indian side, however, generally learns the opposite lesson and attempts a "lighting strike" to destroy the Pakistani nuclear stockpile. When asked if the Indian Armed Force could really execute a preemptive strategy, one participant noted, "Probably not, but they believe they could."
The weaponization of space, particularly with respect to the flight-testing of antisatellite weapons, would greatly compound existing concerns over safe passage. In the event of a resumption of ASAT tests, the Pentagon would attempt to mitigate space debris, as it does with respect to missile defense tests, but the effectiveness of such efforts is questionable. Moreover, other states that test ASATs may not be as conscientious about debris creation. The actual use of ASATs would compound these dangers exponentially. Space warfare would not only constitute a threat to targeted satellites, it would also create debris fields that would threaten satellites operating in low earth orbit, including NTM, space transportation systems such as the U.S. space shuttle, and the International Space Station. The damage resulting from warfare that includes ASAT use could be more long lasting in space than on Earth.
Orbital debris mitigation and space traffic management require multilateral solutions. Earth is surrounded by litter -- perhaps 9,000 objects larger than ten centimeters in diameter, and an estimated 100,000 pieces of orbital debris larger than a marble. As Joel Primack has written, "[S]pace does not clear after an explosion near our planet. The fragments continue circling the Earth, their orbits crossing those of other objects. Paint chips, lost bolts, pieces of exploded rockets -- all have already become tiny satellites, traveling at about 27,000 kilometers per hour, 10 times faster than a high-powered rifle bullet. A marble traveling at such speed would hit with the energy of a one-ton safe dropped from a three-story building. Anything it strikes will be destroyed and only increase the debris." The weaponization of space is an environmental as well as a national security issue. The environmental degradation of space created by space-faring nations constitutes a danger to space exploration, the space shuttle, and other peaceful uses of space. Space litter also poses difficulties for the military uses of space.
Space weapons are destabilizing for other reasons, as well. Space warfare is unlikely to be confined to space, since the platforms that would be primary targets for attack support terrestrial military operations. Civil societies have worked diligently to affirm laws of war to limit dangers to noncombatants. The dictates of international law that warfare be pursued in a discriminating and proportional fashion -- guidelines that are reinforced by the "revolution in military affairs" pursued by the United States -- are undercut by space warfare, since satellites subject to attack provide essential services to noncombatants as well as to armies, navies, and air forces. Their destruction is likely to make orbital swaths unusable for commercial and military purposes because, even if extreme care is taken by the stronger party to employ non-destructive techniques of satellite warfare, the weaker foe is unlikely to abide by such niceties. Moreover, the destruction of satellites by whatever means is likely to trigger vigorous, but less precise military actions by the armies, navies and air forces adversely affected.
The United States continues to deploy intercontinental nuclear forces having the power to utterly devastate foreign lands. Yet few maintain the this force-in-being is "provocative," and many, especially in the arms-control community will argue vigorously that the mutal assured destruction capability is actually stabilizing. Indeed, the United States continues to carry on routinely with its international relationships in a multitude of forums despite fielding and exercising with forces capable of atomizing its enemies. The logic of deterrence and the disciplined, responsible display and use of U.S. military power is accepted internationally and even praised and courted by allies - except as a U.S. power might be manifested in space. Or so it is often protrayed.
In space, as with terrestrial missile defenses, it is far more challenging to mount a successful defense than to penetrate a soft target. Because of their threatening nature and their vulnerability, weapons designed for space warfare, whether on the ground or in orbit, would become extremely high-value targets. To prevent a precarious and dangerous mix of satellites interspersed with ASATs, the United States would seek to prevent space mines and other attacking devices either from being launched or from being parked in orbit. Alternatively, if the United States does not prevent the deployment of foreign ASATs in space, it must be prepared to wage war by shooting first and asking questions later. Military operations in space would thus be placed on continual hair-trigger alert because successful dominance in space would not be possible without the capacity for preemptive strikes or preventive measures. Having first crossed key thresholds relating to the flight-testing and deployment of space weaponry, would the United States arrogate to itself the right during peace time to carry out preemptive strikes to prevent others from following suit? And having rejected arms control arrangements prohibiting the flight-testing and deployment of space weaponry, would the United States seek to impose or dictate these constraints solely on others, and by force of arms?
Because achieving a particular orbit requires such enormous effort, significantly changing established orbits is not generally practical. As a result, it is hard to concentrate the efforts of a constellation of satellites in space and time. As defenses, space weapons are static in the same way that terrestrial fortifications are. Space-based defenses are inherently subject to saturation by a terrestrial opponent that is able to concentrate an attack against them in space and time. This limitation may be an advantage if a limited defense against a limited threat is needed that is observably incapable of destabilizing a deterrence relationship with another, larger threat.