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The traditional view of space power as a symbol of international prestige is another force driving nations to keep pace with American technology. In their book The Prestige Trap, Roger B. Handberg and Joan Johnson-Freese study what motivated the American, European, and Japanese space programs. They specifically address the question of why these nations made serious resource commitments to exploiting a medium that promised little in the way of immediate return. The answer, in all three cases, was primarily prestige and national pride (with a dash of scientific curiosity). While acknowledging that these early space efforts were often civilian in character, the authors note that "civilian space policy has clear links to the military-industrial policies within most societies. The technologies and technical skills involved in civilian space endeavors in many cases have clear and ready applications to military technology . . . the boundary is thin and easily breached." On either side of this boundary, US strategists should expect their international competitors to keep pace with American developments.
One may ask, just because the United States unilaterally refrains from developing antisatellite weapons or space-based lasers, why do we assume that other countries will pause right alongside Washington? After all, not all innovations in war stem from provocation. While weapons developed and deployed by rival states surely influence decision making, it is unlikely that states procure weapons systems primarily to achieve a balance in arsenals. Some states certainly may strive to have what we have, but they also will strive to acquire and master those weapons that meet their unique security requirements. Washington's very reliance on satellites for security, moreover, would appear to be a more plausible motivation behind any hostile state's desire to acquire satellite countermeasures. While China might wish to integrate ASATs into its arsenal to offset Washington's deployment of ASATs as part of a deterrence strategy ("you hit one of mine, I'll hit one of yours"), Beijing is likely to be more inclined to acquire satellite countermeasures independently of what Washington does in order to degrade U.S. space advantages, which may be used to support Taiwan.
Second, Pakistan might target third-party satellites used by the Indian Army. Potential targets would include commercial imaging and communications satellites, as well as the GPS or European Galileo system if Indian forces were allowed to utilize those services during an offensive. Such attacks would have unanticipated affects on the United States. In one war game, the United States faced what one participant called "ugly choices" about commercial satellites being used by potential opponents. Participants discovered that they were unable to determine who might be affected by a decision to shoot down a commercial satellite. This, according to one participant, "vastly complicates the national security landscape."
Until very recently, US satellites have tended to be fairly large, very capable, and very expensive. These satellites pre - sent an opponent with lucrative targets, where the loss of even one would often constitute a dramatic loss in capability. This is particularly true for current generation reconnaissance satellites since these are very capable, relatively few in number, and very vulnerable owing to their need to be in LEOs. Fortunately, deploying defensive space weapons is only one way to protect these assets. One option for mitigating this vulnerability is to deploy large numbers of less capable satellites. These satellites could pro - vide the same capability as a larger satellite by working in concert. For a satellite communication (SATCOM) system, each satellite would carry part of the load. If needed, the satellites could be placed fairly close together in orbit and their deployment geometry could be optimized to balance survivability with the need to emulate a much more capable sat - ellite. Alternatively, the United States could move away from placing communication satellites in geosynchronous orbit and transition to a large constellation of satellites in lower orbits. The commercial sector is now using such an approach to provide global cellular telephone capability.
An additional point about passive defense bears considera - tion. While nuclear weapons are not a primary focus of this study, rapid reconstitution may be the best way to overcome the effects of a high-altitude nuclear detonation. While the international political repercussions may prevent most potential adversaries from using nuclear weapons even in space, there are those who may not be dissuaded. If one of these nations develops and uses nuclear ASATs, space-based defensive weapons may be of little use. The ability to quickly reconstitute space-based assets may well be the only practical solution.
The Russians already continue to maintain their forces on high rates of alert -- something that the United States has apparently been encouraging to reduce Russian fears about U.S. missile defenses. The follow-on Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) agreement contained provisions for eliminating missiles with multiple warheads (which are usually kept on higher rates of alert), but the administration of President George W. Bush abandoned that restriction in the Moscow Treaty and Russia may resort to multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) to maintain a larger nuclear force. Russian President Vladimir Putin has called the prospects of space weapons "particularly alarming," while the commander of Russian Space Forces implied that Russia would respond to U.S. deployments of space weapons.
As a long-time space power, the Russian Federation is highly concerned about maintaining the integrity of both its military and commercial space capabilities. However, that concern emanates less from worries about external threats to its assets, and more from the fact that the Russian space programme has deteriorated due to lack of funding. In June 2001, Yuri Koptev, head of Russian space agency Rosaviakosmos, told the parliament that age and lack of funds were serious issues, with sixtyeight of the Russian Federation's ninety orbiting satellites near or at the end of their operational lives. He further stated that many of the country's forty-three military satellites were simply too old to be considered reliable, and criticized the Russian Federation's meagre space budget of US$193 million as only half of what the agency needs. Indeed, in May 2001, the Russian Federation for a short time lost its photo-reconnaissance capabilities, taking its last two satellites out of orbit (although a replacement 'Kobalt' satellite was launched in June 2001). The Russian Federation's Glonass satellite navigation system (similar to the American GPS network) also is deteriorating; in March 2001, Koptev told parliament that only thirteen of the twenty-four satellites required for the network to fully function were working.
While NATO no longer sees Russia as much of a threat, the same cannot be said of the converse. Despite the warm talk, Russian leaders remain wary of NATO expansion, particularly the effect expansion may have on the Baltic port of Kaliningrad. Although part of Russia, Kaliningrad is separated from the rest of Russia by Lithuania and Poland. Russia has already complained about its decreasing lack of access to the port, particularly the uncooperative attitude of the Lithuanian government. News reports suggest that an edgy Russia may have moved tactical nuclear weapons into the enclave. If the Lithuanian government were to close access to Kaliningrad in a fit of pique, this would trigger a major crisis between NATO and Russia.
Notwithstanding the argument by some observers that the parallels between space and "the maritime and air environments could hardly be clearer," however, there do appear to be difficulties. Long before the Royal Navy came to rule the waves during the 19th century, English shipping had been repeatedly subjected to piracy as well as commerce raiding by the navies of other nations. Why? First and foremost because of the economic wealth associated with the growth of maritime commerce that followed the discovery of the New World. Drake and Hawkins originally made their names raiding Spanish galleons bringing gold and other treasure back to Spain from the Americas. By contrast, over four decades into the space age, no nation has tried to seize or mount destructive attacks against the operational satellites of another, including the two Cold War adversaries. Although both accidental and intentional interference with the functioning of satellites has occurred, attacks aimed at destroying satellites have not. While ASAT systems have been tested and fielded in the past, US capabilities are currently limited to a US Army developmental program for a kinetickill vehicle launched by a Minuteman missile, and one cannot help but wonder about the readiness of the Russian nonnuclear ASAT system inherited from the Soviet era. Again, one must wonder why this happens to be so. And the most straightforward answer is that orbital assets have yet to acquire the economic import of Spanish treasure galleons.