Evidence: Most Popular
If the United States develops and deploys space-based weapons for controlling space, self-interest dictates that other countries will follow suit. As with other technology, the great - est costs are normally incurred in the initial research and development (R&D) required to evolve a concept into a weapon. Once a new weapon has been deployed it is much easier, and less expensive, to observe the operational system, determine how it must operate, and then duplicate it. By doing this initial R&D, the United States will be paving the way for other nations to follow. The result may well be that assets which are now safe -- because no other nation has a pressing need to develop weapons to attack them -- will become vulnerable to attack because other nations will feel com - pelled to emulate the United States and deploy space-based weapons of their own.
Those nations capable of producing an ASAT system at least equivalent to Program 437 and its Thor-class booster [HAND] include Russia, North Korea (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or DPRK), Iran, India, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and Libya. Russia has the most mature development and production capability of the group and has produced ASAT weapons in the past. However, given that the space capabilities of Russia are more widely known, a focus on nations other than Russia is of more interest here. Several possible launch vehicles are available on the open market from one or more of the states listed above. Conversely, a nation may attempt to use its own technical resources and production capacity to build a booster. Some countries, notably North Korea, India, and China, have established domestic missile production capabilities.
The lopsided exchange ratios are magnified by another disadvantage to defense. Since the attacker selects the mod of attack, satellites must be defended against all choices available to the attacker. Many satellite defenses, however, compete with one another. For example, defeating a co-orbital interceptor requires hardening a satellite and adding fuel. This will add size, making the satellite a larger target for direct ascent weapons that are too fast and destructive to be defeated by hardening or maneuverability. Miniaturizing satellites and distributing functions across a network requires that the constrellation fly in formation, compromising maneuverability.
Perhaps even more importantly, there must be an understanding that space is the wrong arena to be accommodating and willing to let nonparticipants have an important role in the development of law and policy. The impediments caused by once innocent passage in space treaties described previously are proof of the pace of change. Enthusiasm for today's, or even tomorrow's, solutions must be tempered with the knowledge that tomorrow's wrong choice was the one that seemed so obviously correct yesterday. Yet decisions cannot be avoided, and a slow, cautious approach may be as wrong a policy of space activity as may be a headlong rush. Like the language and policies of space treaties, prescriptions for action are likely to soon become so outmoded as to be of little other than historical value in just a decade or so. Also, they are all too often prescriptions exclusively for government, which neglect the fact that though government must necessarily be part the environment that supports national space power, it is no longer the sole actor nor, perhaps, even the most important.
The sixth component of space assets’ diplomatic power is the ability to shape behavior and exert influence through presence. As defined in the Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia, “Forward presence activities demonstrate our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis response capability while promoting United States influence and access.” Put another way, presence is the proximity of space assets to a location, such that international actors change their behavior or are deterred based solely on the location of space assets. The ability to influence other states due to the presence of space assets, or any military force, is based on the impact of those forces on other states’ decision making, not on the distance of our forces to a given geographic location, nor on the ability of other states to physically see our forces. Although the joint definition does not include space assets, it is clear that space assets can achieve some of the same effects as forward deployed terrestrial forces—although the fact that space assets cannot physically punish another state, a capability possessed by terrestrial forces, is an important distinction. To be sure, the ability to punish with terrestrial forces may have a stronger impact on an adversary’s decision calculus, but this does not preclude the ability of space assets to also affect that decision calculus through their presence. Space assets do provide some advantages over terrestrial forces, however, such as their tremendous field of view which allows them to exert presence over a wider area than terrestrial forces.
Several satellite fragmentation and debris collision events took place in 2005. By October, five cases of satellite fragmentation had been recorded and two new accidental collisions identified. On 17 January, a US rocket body collided with a fragment from a Chinese launch vehicle that exploded in 2000. Two Russian motors also broke-up in 2005 the first, on 23 April, was a Russian Proton launch vehicle launched as part of the Kosmos 2224 Mission in 1992. The second breakup occurred on 1 June and was associated with the Russian Kosmos 2392 mission launched in mid-2002. As many as 40 objects were initially detected from the second fragmentation, five of which were catalogued by the SSN. On 30 June, that same motor experienced another fragmentation and 50 fragments were initially catalogued. On 21 June, a Russian meteorological observation system generated one small piece of debris. And on 22 June, a Russian Kosmos 3M rocket body released a single piece of debris. The event is believed to have been caused by a collision between the rocket body and a small piece of orbital debris or a meteoroid.
Placing space mines in the immediate vicinity of high-value American satellites would likely be a major component of an opponent's strategy. These weapons could be fairly lightweight and possess considerable range. For example, a directional fragmentation warhead similar to that of a Claymore mine could project 100,000 one-grampellets in a pattern that would cover a 100 x 100 meter area with 10 pellets per square meter at a range of 1 kilometer. One approach to the space mine is to "design a very small stealth weapon that is moved into position over a long period of time" and in secrecy. However, while a stealthy space mine has definite advantages, it is not clear that an unobserved approach is required. In a fully weaponized space environment, U.S. space-based lasers and mirrors, each capable of attacking satellites thousands of kilometers away, threaten distant satellites as much as would a space mine in close proximity. In any case, until space mines actually damaged or interfered with their victims, it would be difficult to challenge their legitimacy. To attack or disable them as a potential threat would set a precedent for preemptive strikes against U.S. space-based weapons, if not all its satellites.
Space systems will not survive if they are targeted. Military systems in space, like all others, follow well-established, fixed orbits (orbital transfers are energy- and cost-prohibitive). This leaves space systems exposed and vulnerable. As predominantly unmanned systems, they also require data link to a controller, leaving them vulnerable to interference in the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum. For instance, a nuclear explosion in spacewith force and radiation not attenuated by the atmospherecould negate the use of vast numbers of orbits. Or direct-ascent ASATs, constructed from modified cold war ICBMs, could disperse something as simple as sand in LEO, leaving anything passing through it (17,000 MPH @ 200 km) severely damaged or destroyed. Many futuristic war games are conducted throughout DOD each year, and the play of space systems has increased. One conclusion persists: the fight for space is first and fast, and many space systems do not survive. As space access matures, the survivability issue will become obvious. Nations will not rely on space systems for crisis situationsthey will rely on terrestrial systems (perhaps redundant with more efficient but more vulnerable space counterparts). Hence, the value of space weapons to deny those space systems will be moot.