Evidence: Recently Added
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union developed a range of counterspace capabilities as part of its strategic competition with the United States. Many of these capabilities were developed for specific military utility, such as destroying critical American military satellites, or to counter perceived threats, such as the Reagan Administration’s Strategic Defense Initiative. Some of them underwent significant on-orbit testing and were considered operationally deployed. However, the Soviet Union also signed bilateral arms control agreements with the United States that put limits on the use of counterspace capabilities against certain satellites. Many of these programs were scrapped or mothballed in the early 1990s as the Cold War ended and funding dried up.
There is strong evidence that Russia has embarked on a set of programs over the last decade to regain some of its Cold War-era counterspace capability. In some cases, the evidence suggests legacy capabilities are being brought out of mothballs, and in other cases the evidence points to new, modern versions being developed. In all cases, Russia has a strong technical legacy to draw upon. Under Putin, Russia also has renewed political will to obtain counterspace capabilities for much the same reasons as China: to bolster its regional power and limit the ability of the United States to impede on Russia’s freedom of action.
Unlike China, there is also significant evidence that Russia is actively employing counterspace capabilities in current military conflicts. There are multiple, credible reports of Russia using jamming and other electronic warfare measures in the conflict in eastern Ukraine, and indications that these capabilities are tightly integrated into their military operations.
Chinese writers make the oft-repeated statement that “whoever controls space will control the Earth” and that outer space is the new high ground of military operations. They assert that the center of gravity in military operations has transitioned from the sea to the air and is now transitioning to space.80 According to a textbook published by the Chinese military’s top think tank, the Academy of Military Sciences (AMS), “Whoever is the strongman of military space will be the ruler of the battlefield; whoever has the advantage of space has the power of the initiative; having ‘space’ support enables victory, lacking “space” ensures defeat.”81 The authors of the influential Science of Military Strategy, also published by AMS, similarly conclude that space is the new high ground and that without space superiority one is at a disadvantage in all other domains.82
Chinese military writings overall place a heavy emphasis on gaining the initiative at the outset of a conflict, including during the deployment stage. Looking at the 1991 Gulf War, and the initial invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, Chinese military analysts assess that the PLA cannot allow the U.S. military to become fully prepared lest they cede victory. According to the authors of Study of Space Operations, China will “do all it can at the strategic level to avoid firing the first shot,”83 but recommend that China should “strive to attack first at the campaign and tactical levels in order to maintain the space battlefield initiative.”84 They also argue that fighting a quick war is one of the “special characteristics of space operations” and that a military should “conceal the concentration of its forces and make a decisive large-scale first strike.”85
Official Chinese public statements on space warfare and space weapons have remained consistent: “China always adheres to the principle of the use of outer space for peaceful purposes and opposes the weaponization of or an arms race in outer space.”69 However, since 2015, other official writings suggest China’s position on space warfare and space weapons has become more nuanced. China’s 2015 defense white paper, China’s Military Strategy, for the first-time designated outer space as a military domain and linked developments in the international security situation to defending China’s interests in space. The defense white paper states that “Outer space has become a commanding height in international strategic competition. Countries concerned are developing their space forces and instruments, and the first signs of weaponization of outer space have appeared.” As a result, “China will keep abreast of the dynamics of outer space, deal with security threats and challenges in that domain, and secure its space assets to serve its national economic and social development, and maintain outer space security.”70 In particular, the white paper states that “threats from such new security domains as outer space and cyberspace will be dealt with to maintain the common security of the world community.” In 2015, defense of China’s interests in space was made legally binding in China’s National Security Law.71
At the same time, there are also constraints on the military utility of such systems, particularly as China improves its own space capabilities. The use of a kinetic-kill DA-ASAT against an orbital target will invariably create large amounts of orbital space debris, as was seen in the 2007 test. Aggressive use of such a capability would invariably lead to widespread condemnation, as happened after the 2007 test and appears to have shaped Chinese testing practices since. Moreover, as China invests in and deploys its own military satellites and space capabilities, the long-lasting debris from the use of DA-ASATs will be increasingly likely to threaten their own capabilities. Use of a DA-ASAT would also be relatively easy to attribute to China. Thus, the military utility of DA-ASATs would have to be weighed against the potential costs, particularly relative to less destructive capabilities such as jamming or blinding.
It is unlikely that China currently possesses an operational DA-ASAT capability against high altitude satellites in MEO or GEO orbits. Only one test, in May 2013, is known to have targeted higher altitudes, and given the unique nature of such a system, it would likely require multiple tests to become militarily useful. In addition, the primary target in MEO for such a system, the American military’s Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation constellation, consists of more than 30 satellites distributed across multiple orbital planes. Many of the GPS satellites would need to be destroyed to have an appreciable impact on the GPS system, and their higher altitude (20,000 km) would provide at least an hour of warning time after launch. Other potential targets in the GEO belt, such as U.S. missile early warning, data relay, or electronic intelligence satellites, are much fewer in number and less distributed, making the capabilities easier to eliminate. However, their even higher altitude (36,000 km) would mean an even longer warning times of several hours after launch. The ability of the DA-ASAT kill vehicle to adjust for any changes in the target’s trajectory over that time is unknown, and unlikely at present.
Iran’s current counterspace capabilities likely have very limited military utility. Iran’s current efforts appear focused on electronic warfare and cyber attacks, and not on kinetic counterspace capabilities. Its current satellites are very short-lived, and without sophisticated rendezvous and proximity technology or C2 capabilities, it is extremely unlikely Iran could command a co-orbital ASAT to deliberately collide with another satellite with any degree of certainty. The best it could hope for would be to increase the possibility of a risk of collision to a degree that might force its adversary to alter the trajectory of their satellite. Iran is not known to possess the technology for a kinetic-kill vehicle that would be capable of a DA-ASAT attack. If Iran is able to produce a working nuclear weapon, can miniaturize it, develops a ballistic missile or SLV that can carry it, and can mate the two, it is possible to conduct a crude EMP attack against LEO satellites. However, it would be extremely difficult to direct such an attack against specific satellites, and most U.S. military satellites are hardened against radiation and EMP effects. Such an attack would also have indiscriminate effects against many other non-military satellites in LEO.317
The economic value of human space activities has been steadily on the rise for years now, and there is every indication that it will continue to do so. A recent study by Bank of America Merrill Lynch reported that the current space market is valued at roughly US$ 350 billion, and will continue to grow to reach roughly US$ 2.7 trillion within the next three decades.2 Much of this increase will be driven by commercial actors involved in telecommunications and Earth observation, and new non- traditional activities such as orbital manufacturing and private habitats will also likely play a part in developing the space economy. Many of these activities will take place in low Earth orbit (LEO), an area from 160km to approximately 2,000km above the Earth’s surface. For example, the new “mega-constellations”, which are fleets of small satellites numbering in the thousands, are aiming to provide satellite broadband services to the world from LEO.3
There are three reasons the United States should not attempt to ban debris removal and servicing spacecraft to deal with space stalking threat. First, ADR spacecraft are necessary in the emerging era to prevent the space debris population from increasing and hindering the peaceful uses of space. Also, as space technologies continue to become more capable and less expensive, it is highly advantageous to have some satellite ser- vices performed in space. Second, as noted earlier, China will likely de- ploy both ADR and OOS spacecraft in the early 2020s and Russia is likely to follow suit in the 2020s. Even if the United States wanted to delay ADR and OOS deployment for the benefit of preventing space stalker threat, it could not dissuade China and Russia from such a de- ployment. Third, and most importantly, there is a way to both deter and defend against space stalkers and still be able to benefit from the pres- ence of ADR and OOS spacecraft.
In the emerging space proximity-operations era, space weapons will be technically synonymous with ADR and OOS. The difference is in the intent of whether such spacecraft are used for peaceful or ASAT pur- poses. Our space defense and deterrence cannot count on adversaries to always have peaceful intent. Also, in the emerging era, traditional space arms control will not be able to prevent weapons in space. Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty states that “State Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction.”18 While it is critical to ban weapons of mass destruction in space, subsequent treaties and transparency and confidence-building measures have done little to control or ban the placement of conventional weapons in space. Treaty proposals under consideration by the United Nations are mainly those proposed by Russia and China.
In addition to debris removal, countries are pursuing on-orbit servicing. For example, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Robotic Servicing of Geosynchronous Satellites R&D program aims to provide services including high-resolution inspection; correction of some types of mechanical anomalies, such as solar array and antenna deployment malfunctions; relocation and other orbital maneuvers; in- stallation of attachable payloads to enable upgrades or new capabilities; and refueling to extend the service life of satellites.17
The United States and China will likely complete their developmental and demonstration OOS programs and provide services such as refueling also in the early 2020s. Once any country has such a spacecraft in orbit, there is no reason to deny other countries following suit for com- mercial and/or national security purposes. Since OOS spacecraft will have rendezvous and robotic capabilities even more advanced than those for ADR, they become even more threatening as space stalkers. In effect, weaponization of space will happen by default in the early 2020s and beyond and will be unavoidable and irreversible.