Evidence: Recently Added
RF jamming is an effective means of negating certain space capabilities. The most significant and prevalent, thus far, is using EW to degrade the accuracy of GPS-guided systems in tactical scenarios. Given this high reliance of modern militaries on GNSS, and GPS in particular, Russia is likely to yield significant military utility from being able to actively prevent, or even undermine confidence in, the ability of adversaries to use GNSS in a future conflict.
EW can be used to suppress or degrade space capabilities by means of uplink jamming of communications satellites. It is an attractive option for counterspace because of its flexibility: it can be temporarily applied, its effects on a satellite are completely reversible, it generates no onorbit debris, and it may be narrowly targeted, which could affect only one of a satellite’s many capabilities (e.g. specific frequencies or transponders). EW is an extremely useful military counterspace capability and is expected to gain even more prominence in the future, in step with increasing autonomy of military systems and increasing reliance on satellite systems.
Russia places a high priority on integrating electronic warfare (EW) into military operations and has been investing heavily in modernizing this capability. Most of the upgrades have focused on multifunction tactical systems whose counterspace capability is limited to jamming of user terminals within tactical ranges. Russia has a multitude of systems that can jam GPS receivers within a local area, potentially interfering with the guidance systems of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), guided missiles, and precision guided munitions, but has no publicly known capability to interfere with the GPS satellites themselves using radiofrequency (RF) interference. The Russian Army fields several types of mobile EW systems, some of which can jam specific satellite communications user terminals within tactical ranges. Russia can likely jam communications satellites uplinks over a wide area from fixed ground stations. Russia has operational experience in the use of counterspace EW capabilities from recent military campaigns.
There are scenarios in which a hostile state or a terrorist organization might build or acquire a nuclear warhead that it would launch and detonate above the United States, releasing an electro-magnetic pulse. This raises concerns that an above-atmosphere detonation would paralyze national information, energy, communications, and transportation infrastructure. An EMP pulse might carry out this havoc not only on earth, but also within satellite systems. Given orbital mechanics, U.S. satellites have to circle the globe, so that an EMP released anywhere in the world might affect U.S. military, civil, or private space systems. A key conclusion of the EMP commission report was that, “A determined adversary can achieve an EMP attack capability without having a high level of [technical] sophistication.”162
An electromagnetic pulse generated by a high altitude nuclear explosion, the effects of which we do not fully understand, could have a devastating impact on the entire country if the weapon had a yield in the megaton range or was an enhanced EMP design.163 Its destructive consequences could reverberate around the world. There is strong evidence to support the belief that electro-magnetic pulses produced by a nuclear weapon would interact with the atmosphere and earth’s magnetic field, propagating on a line of sight to the horizons, potentially covering hundreds of miles at the speed of light.164
Experts who have looked at this question have concluded that an EMP from a nuclear detonation, which would produce enhanced radiation effects, may generate immediate and long-term damaging effects on many satellites.165 By some estimates, the radiation vulnerability of satellites from a nuclear attack is a medium to low risk (much of this depends on whether the satellite is hardened against such an attack), while the vulnerability to EMP attack of general purpose forces and critical infrastructure is much higher.166 Nevertheless, the potential threat to space systems is very real, and the collateral damage to satellites has been measured and studied following more than a dozen high altitude nuclear detonations that took place between 1958 and 1963. In the wake of just one of those tests, Starfish Prime, in July 1962, at least eight satellites (U.S., Canadian, and British) suffered damage.167
The risk of not taking this threat seriously is simply too great to ignore, especially given what we have learned can happen to electronics in the wake of a natural EMP that results from massive solar flares.168 Any state (or non-state actor) with access to missile lift technology and nuclear weapons miniaturized to sit atop the missile, would have a capability to inflict radiation damage to a host of unprotected satellites in low earth orbit, including commercial satellites that support a wide array of military communications needs. The Russians have reported that their “brain-drain” helped the North Koreans develop EMP weapons, which may be launched using a Scud missile from a freighter off the U.S. coast or the new sea-launched ballistic missile.169
The detonation of a single nuclear weapon over the United States, depending on the location, yield, design, and height of the burst, could literally wreck critical infrastructure, most of which is unhardened, and indirectly kill U.S. citizens. Looking at a worst case scenario, the resulting electromagnetic shock could shut down or severely disrupt regional electrical power grids and force sections of the nation to rely on 19th century technologies.170 The interdependent telecommunications, transportation, food production, banking and financial infrastructures and emergency services could be significantly damaged. This situation could jeopardize the very viability and political underpinnings of the nation and leave the country exposed to follow-on or new threats and attacks.
The detonation of a single nuclear weapon over the United States, depending on the location, yield, design, and height of the burst, could literally wreck critical infrastructure, most of which is unhardened, and indirectly kill U.S. citizens. Looking at a worst case scenario, the resulting electromagnetic shock could shut down or severely disrupt regional electrical power grids and force sections of the nation to rely on 19th century technologies.170 The interdependent telecommunications, transportation, food production, banking and financial infrastructures and emergency services could be significantly damaged. This situation could jeopardize the very viability and political underpinnings of the nation and leave the country exposed to follow-on or new threats and attacks.
Therefore, it is impossible to overestimate the role of space in modern life; the benefits from satellites are multiple and diverse and will surely continue to expand in the coming years. But there is also a dark side to this phenomenally successful exploitation. That is, as countries pour more functions into satellites, they have simultaneously reduced some of their capacities for performing some of those operations in the “old fashioned” way; the alternative routines have atrophied. Collectively, we have declined to sustain all of the now-redundant, less-efficient systems of land lines, postal services, and paper maps; in the same vein, it now seems quaintly anachronistic to train naval officers and civilian ship captains to discern their position via sextant, when all-weather GPS devices are so much quicker and more accurate.6
Over time, therefore, the modern “use” of satellites has evolved into a “reliance” upon them, which has graduated into a “dependence,” and even- tually generated a “vulnerability.” Potential adversaries, aware of the technology patterns of the United States (and other), have come to appreciate the suggestion that satellites may now be the Achilles heel of the American civilian economy and its mighty military apparatus. If deft ASAT operations could deprive the United States of its space services, an attacker might be able to swiftly obtain a crippling advantage.7
On the civilian side, satellites enable many of the communications (phone, text, email, internet, television) and banking operations (credit card purchases, ATMs) that have become the primary modes of social interaction and the lifeblood of the world’s economy. For industrial purposes, networked supervisory control and data acquisition (“SCADA”) systems en- able operators to coordinate peripheral manufacturing and other operations, and the emerging internet of things will similarly revolutionize consumer behavior. Global Positioning System (“GPS”) satellites guide and track cars, airplanes, and, soon, drones that will deliver household packages. Earth- monitoring spacecraft enable farmers to supervise their crops, foresters to direct firefighters, and flood control authorities to anticipate river flows. Satellites help save lives by supporting disaster relief and search and rescue missions. In each of these functions, the invisible, speed-of-light, and inexpensive links must be ubiquitous and 100% reliable—any gaps in coverage or transitory outages provoke exasperation and confusion, as people seem to notice the service mechanisms only when they are interrupted.2
Finally, the current Indian debate does not address the elephant in the room: how KE-ASAT weapons use even on a limited scale could exacerbate the existing problem of space debris and threaten massive collateral damage to the critical space infrastructure of all states that deploy or use satellites. In other words, the attacking party would not just be attacking its enemy, but end up threatening the assets of allies, friends and neutral third parties and become an international pariah. Worse, its actions would put at risk the viability of its own critical infrastructure in space. Indeed, the cumulative data of space security incidents collected over the last decade show that debris-related conjunction screenings for satellites and jamming incidents topped the list of threats.13 In this article, we highlight the link between KE-ASAT weapons and the problem of space debris. We present data to show that space debris and not KE-ASAT weapons pose the single greatest threat to the safe operations of most space assets. This is particularly true in LEO where the majority of global and Indian satellites orbit. We also distinguish between different types of space debris and analyze the technical reasons for the threat it poses to critical infrastructure in space.
In this context, there is a growing possibility that on-going developments in ABM technologies, backed by significant financial commitments, will once again segue into ASAT testing and the creation of more long-lived debris. As already noted above, China has continued testing its ABM system, even at altitudes in space where ballistic missiles do not travel. The United States has interpreted these actions as a threat36 and has increased efforts to develop its ABM systems as well—including the same system used to destroy US-193—with a view towards improved efficiency in “mid-course intercepts” in LEO.37 This includes defence against ABM/ASAT capabilities, such as the ones China has been testing, that could target US assets at higher altitudes, such as GEO. The Russian Federation has also announced that the 2018–2027 federal defence procurement programme includes funds for the development of the “Rudolph mobile anti-satellite complex”, a mobile missile system designed to target assets in orbit.38 None of these systems are finished products, and so will see further testing in the field. The concern, though, is that the Chinese, US or Russian militaries will once again find it necessary to test or demonstrate their capabilities in ways that result in long-lived debris.