Evidence: Recently Added
Those countries who are primarily concerned about the space environment are less worried than Russia and China about how the United States might use its superior military space capabilities for strategic or tactical advantage. Instead, they are more concerned about how “irresponsible” space-faring nations might act in ways that would degrade the space environment for those not engaged in a competition for military advantage there. The EU’s voluntary code of conduct hopes to build on the less controversial aspects of space cooperation, existing principles and best practices, but leaves the application of general principles to specific situations for individual states to decide. The code couches the most important new behavioral guidelines in environmentally friendly terms: avoid those actions that generate long-lasting space debris and those that otherwise damage or destroy space objects unless done to reduce space debris or address imperative safety considerations.
Such voluntary efforts to raise the standards for responsible space behavior might have seemed adequate in the 1990s, when most observers expected that the changing demographics of space users would steadily decrease strategic conflicts and increase incentives for cooperation on commercial, scientific, and human security applications. The United States’ recent efforts to achieve comprehensive space dominance, though, have changed the context such that China, Russia, and any number of other countries will not foreswear the ability to target satellites without legally binding reassurances about how the United States will develop and use its superior military space capabilities. Nor will they provide significantly greater transparency about their own space programs and plans unless they have much greater confidence that the information will not be used against them.
Enabling the full awareness of local space in the vicinity of a high-value asset can ensure that any object, even CubeSat-sized, will be detected and characterized. The United States must, therefore, make a concerted effort to develop CubeSat RPO technology for utility in the operational realm, exert deterrence by possession of such space control capabilities, and employ these RPO-capable CubeSats in a defen- sive posture to perform proximity operations around high-value assets and monitor their local space. If justi ed and directed, interception attacks by the RPO “guardian” CubeSat may even be needed to ensure the safety of the asset.
Guardian CubeSats designed for RPO can ensure the safety and sanctity of local space, while simultaneously performing as a contributing sensor yielding information to global SSA systems. Designed for passive, autonomous proximity operations, such CubeSats would not interfere with the primary asset’s mission. The presence of a responsive communication link between the Guardian and its high-value asset gives the COG suf cient time to maneuver out of the way of an interception. The Guardian would also be able to image the interceptor, perform orbital tracking, deliver responsive intelligence regarding the source of the attack, and provide a post-event battle damage assessment. This is apart from the deterrence aspect: the protective security function of the Guardian, the high likelihood of failure for hostile actions and subsequent negative consequences combine to dissuade the adversary from ever attempting the action. Critically, they also provide the United States the ability to respond to such an attack in a timely and proportional manner.
The natural evolution of a guardian paradigm becomes a truly revolutionary change to the status quo. Once the capability is established, and policy favors their continuous and rapid employment, deterrence becomes a function of uncertainty. In this scenario, Guardians are not deployed as continuous orbiters, but rather, “on demand.” Designs exist for ride-along CubeSats within the spare storage space aboard commercial telecommunications satellites;39 high-value assets could be similarly adapted to fit not one, but multiple RPO-capable CubeSats within their volume. In response to an increased threat or intelligence hinting at an impending attack, the high-value COG can deploy its Guardians to assess local space, determine threats, ensure safety, and provide responsive battlespace awareness. Deterrence by uncertainty can be achieved when adversarial nations are unable to determine if a particular target may (or may not) be hosting protector CubeSats within its volume. With the knowledge that these Guardians are RPO-capable, autonomous, and responsive to threats, the risk to invade the local space of a high-value asset will become too high to justify action, thus preparing the nation to deter aggressive action, while maintaining readiness to de ect an attack should deterrence fail.
As this technology becomes smaller and easier to launch, the detectability factor signi cantly decreases, which would allow adversaries to take autarchic actions against the US space enterprise with a lessened fear of retribution or discovery. One example is the Russian object 2014-28E. Initially thought to be drifting space junk associated with the launch of three Russian telecommunication satellites, it has since been observed to be maneuverable, and made a close approach to the rocket stage that boosted it into orbit as recently as November 2014.25
Apart from satellite killer, another translation of istrebitel sputnikov is satellite ghter (istrebitel translates as ghter aircraft). The big push in next-generation ghter aircraft is stealth, and it is not unreasonable to refer to small satellites as the stealth aircraft of space. The existence of 2014-28E was not announced, and the smaller the spacecraft, the less the probability of ground-based detection. If sensor avoidance techniques are employed during an approach, the target object may not ever detect another satellite in its local space.26 Cumulatively, this reduces the culpability for space control actions, emboldening adversaries to move past proximity surveillance to offensive actions. . . all from a CubeSat platform.
Small satellites in space control are not a near-future scenario; rather, they are today’s emergency. China has developed a small satellite reputedly able to capture another satellite with a robotic arm.22 Published work by US academic authors discusses the concept and ongoing design of a CubeSat-sized RPO mission, with precise attitude determination and control, pointing accuracy, real-time maneuver commanding, and even optimal trajectory design for docking applications from a future CubeSat platform.23 A 10–25 kg (12U) CubeSat with optical sensors and agile maneuvering capability is a con guration that is easily achievable with today’s technology; such vehicles have a negligible radar cross-sectional area. In geostationary orbit, they would be invisible from the ground.
Any hostile action against a US spacecraft is considered tantamount to a declaration of war.19 However, in reality, the distance of and limited access to space provides anonymity to offensive space actions, similar to cyber attacks. It is more likely that to maintain regional superiority, adversarial nations would seek to develop a denial of service counterspace capability against the United States. A satellite malfunction could be caused by space environment conditions, faulty, or inadequate satellite de- sign, or even orbital debris factors.20 Culpability, attribution, and retaliation are complicated by the lack of borders or sovereign regions in space and the infeasibility of total space situational awareness (SSA). This adversary may, therefore, be able to deny, disrupt, or degrade the US military space enterprise while maintaining plausible deniability. The uncertainty involved increases exponentially if hostile CubeSats are deployed as co-orbital ASAT devices. A low-velocity impact can be engineered to have just enough speed to shatter the impactor, causing disabling damage to the target, and leaving relatively little debris.
In less than a decade, space miniaturization technology has come so far that students at a high-school level of education are now capable of designing, integrating, launching, and operating CubeSat systems.10 Some university-designed systems boast sophisticated maneuvering and navigation capabilities and are capable of advanced military-relevant mission sets.11 From a doctrinal and policy point of view, it is important to consider that CubeSat systems are far easier for nations with less sophisticated space programs to design, build, and launch. The price of failure in the small-satellite industry is less, making incremental growth more practicable. With the elimination of a need for heavy space lift and triple-redundant systems, it is almost certain that adversarial nations with smaller space programs can soon assemble and field capabilities they are today incapable of. It is feasible that within the next decade, we will see North Korea fielding a surveillance capability via a crude optical sensor on a CubeSat, in competition with South Korea, which is today developing a CubeSat-based telescope system.12 Equally probable is Iran fielding a rudimentary missile warning system onboard a vehicle similar to the “Promise of Science and Industry” national satellite, recently built by Iranian university students and launched atop a modified long-range missile.13
Today, America’s strategic advantage and military superiority are critically codependent on its space superiority.1 Space-based systems provide critical information, intelligence, warning, and communication capabilities to com- manders and war ghters across the spectrum of global con ict. As the reliance of the military enterprise on the effective use of space power grows, top leaders are consis- tently sounding the warning bell about a growing vulnerability to hostile action.2 Calling the US dependence on space its “soft ribs,” one Chinese analyst writes, “for countries that can never win a war with the United States by using [. . .] tanks and planes, attacking the U.S. space system may be an irresistible and most tempting choice. Part of the reason is that the Pentagon is greatly dependent on space for [. . .] its military action.”3 It is, therefore, no surprise that countries such as China, Russia, and India have chosen to aggressively invest in counterspace capabilities.4
For this regime to have any force within the international community, litigation must be a credible threat. With a fault- based system, disputes could drag on for prolonged periods of time, and aggrieved states bear a substantial risk of losing on the fault question itself. These costs could deter litigation. With strict liability, an easily interpreted legal standard would emerge, and the evidence needed to win would be objective and fact-based. If the accused state created the precipitating piece of debris, it is liable. This leaves less room for legal maneuvering, and facilitates efficient adjudication. Faster judgments are not always a good thing, but are at least partially justified by the "abnormally dangerous or ultra- hazardous character of space activities."" There may be rare cases in which an innocent country is forced to pay for damages, but the severe consequences of ignoring the debris problem compensate for this eventuality. Provided they have the monitoring data, even poorer countries should be able to bring and win a lawsuit over debris-related damages in space.
The costs of writing the amendment are also worth considering. Changing a few words in the Liability Convention could be done cheaply and quickly. Any other solution would likely require creating an entirely new regulatory regime. Pursuing other avenues may lead to a very lengthy negotiation and drafting process, even before debates on ratification begin. Because space debris must be dealt with immediately, the speed and ease of a strict liability amendment are major advantages.
Strict liability creates similar incentives to invest in debris removal. Given the inexorable increase in the debris population, even without the launch of new spacecraft, removal is the only long-term way to stabilize the debris environment. As long as debris collisions produce more debris, countries' exposure to liability will increase. The threat of liability may encourage research on debris removal methods and related technologies. It is not possible to chart the course of technological advancement today, and it is equally impossible to guess when a solution to the problem of debris removal will be available. But the process must begin as soon as possible. The threat of strict liability could serve to kick-start the required research.