Evidence: Most Popular
Co-orbital Anti-satellite Systems. The ability of satellites to maneuver together has both peaceful and military potential. Docking maneuvers are integral to such actions as resupply of the International Space Station and were fundamental to the American Moon landings. At the same time, however, any satellite, if it has sufficient fuel and can be finely controlled while guided by a sufficiently discerning tracking system, can serve as a co-orbital anti-satellite system; in effect, it would be a space kamikaze. Recent Chinese developments in small satellites and space robots, as well as manned space missions, have demonstrated an ability to maneuver satellites together.
In 2010, two Chinese small satellites, SJ-06F and SJ-12, engaged in a series of maneuvers that suggest a controlled conjunction, in which the two satellites “bumped.”14 The ability to undertake controlled approaches reflects a nascent ability to steer a satellite, and to bring it into contact with another space system. Similarly, China’s controlled docking maneuvers by the Shenzhou-VIII, Shenzhou-IX, and Shenzhou-X space capsules with the Tiangong space lab demonstrate China’s ability to closely monitor spacecraft operations, including approach and contact. That Shenzhou- VIII was remotely docked via ground control also reflects Chinese ability to bring spacecraft into carefully controlled contact with each other.
Ground-launched Anti-satellite Systems. In January 2007, China tested a direct-ascent kinetic- kill vehicle against a defunct FY-1C weather satellite, resulting in one of the worst debris- generating events in space history. This test, according to Paula DeSutter, then–Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, was not the first test, however, but followed two earlier non-destructive tests of the same system.9 This ongoing development program does not appear to have ended, although there have not been any comparable tests since 2007.
Since then, however, China has conducted three tests of a ballistic missile defense system that might also have anti-satellite applications. In 2010, the Chinese “conducted a test on ground-based midcourse missile interception technology within its territory.”10 As American defense officials noted, “We detected two geographically separated missile launch events with an exo-atmospheric collision also being observed by space-based sensors.”11 The Chinese conducted another missile defense test in January 2013, and used almost the exact same language to describe it (i.e., a midcourse missile interception). In July 2014, the Chinese conducted another test, which it has termed a missile defense test, but which the United States characterized as a non-destructive anti- satellite test.12 It should be noted that these tests resemble the American interception of the satellite US193 with an Aegis missile.
The Ability to Control Space. This follows from the ability to launch systems into orbit and successfully exploit space. Fundamentally, it is the establishment of space dominance, the ability to dominate a certain area of space at given times and places of one’s choosing, while denying an opponent the same ability. 8 Controlling space, in turn, requires fulfilling several distinct responsibilities. First, there must be the ability to preserve one’s own space assets, including the ability to operate in the face of enemy interference or destructive attacks. Second, there must be the ability to interfere with, disrupt, or destroy other nations’ space systems. Finally, there is the ability to conduct support to terrestrial operations, including the provision of space-to-ground attacks in the future.
To fulfill these tasks, a nation must field space forces that possess certain capabilities. These include:
- Space launch facilities;
- Space tracking, telemetry, and control facilities;
- Orbital space combat capabilities and units;
- Strategic missile forces;
- Ground-based space defense forces (which have the ability to establish SSA); and
- Space logistics and safeguarding capabilities and forces.
The PRC currently fields or is developing all of these forces. In the context of counter-space capabilities, of particular note is China’s interest in orbital space combat capabilities and ground- based space defense forces.
Any attack to the space segment of GPS would have to be initiated from a launch facility capable of reaching medium earth orbit. This most likely would require missiles to be readied and fueled out in the open for reconnaissance satellites to view. China is known to be developing a fourth deep space launch facility and the KT-2 ASAT missile that can reach GEO orbit. If China were able to conduct an attack on GPS satellites it could limit the U.S. naval surface force, but not totally cripple ability to conduct offense operations. Space reconnaissance of China’s launch facilities is critical for the ability of the Navy to prevent a surprise attack against GPS and, if overtly attacked give sufficient warning for alternate weapon employment. Lastly, due to the similar reasons of deep space launch, attacks on communication satellites would be nearly impossible to conduct without indications and warnings. With the continued commercial use of communication satellites in U.S. military operations, China will find it nearly impossible to cripple the communication infrastructure.
In parallel with its space program, China continues to develop a variety of capabilities designed to limit or prevent the use of space- based assets by adversaries during a crisis or conflict, including the development of directed-energy weapons and satellite jammers. On July 23, 2014, China conducted a space launch that had a similar profile to the January 2007 test that resulted in the deliberate destruction of a defunct weather satellite, and the creation of hundreds of pieces of long- lived space debris. Much of that debris continues to orbit the Earth where it poses a risk to the safe operation of many nations’ satellites. China’s 2014 launch did not result in the destruction of a satellite or space debris. However, due to the evidence suggesting that this was a follow-up to the 2007 destructive test, the United States expressed concern that China’s continued development of destructive space technologies represented a threat to all peaceful space-faring nations, and was inconsistent with China’s public statements about the use of space for peaceful purposes.
On May 13, 2013, China launched an object into space on a ballistic trajectory with a peak altitude above 30,000 km. This trajectory took it near geosynchronous orbit, where many nations maintain communications and earth- sensing satellites. Analysis of the launch determined that the booster was not on the appropriate trajectory to place objects in orbit and that no new satellites were released. The post-boost vehicle continued its ballistic trajectory and re-entered Earth orbit 9.5 hours after launch. The launch profile was not consistent with traditional space-launch vehicles, ballistic missiles or sounding rocket launches used for scientific research. It could, however, have been a test of technologies with a counterspace mission in geosynchronous orbit. The United States and several public organizations expressed concern to Chinese representatives and asked for more information about the purpose and nature of the launch. China thus far has refrained from providing additional information.
China possesses the most rapidly maturing space program in the world and is using its on-orbit and ground-based assets to support its national civil, economic, political, and military goals and objectives. China has invested in advanced space capabilities, with particular emphasis on satellite communication (SATCOM), intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), satellite navigation (SATNAV), and meteorology, as well as manned, unmanned, and interplanetary space exploration. In addition to its on-orbit assets, China’s space program has built a vast ground infrastructure supporting spacecraft and space launch vehicle (SLV) manufacture, launch, C2, and data downlink.
China is developing its own missile defense capability, going beyond the long-range SAMs that it has acquired from foreign suppliers that provide only a limited capability against ballistic missiles. China continues to develop a missile defense umbrella consisting of a kinetic energy intercept capability at exo-atmospheric altitudes, as well as intercepts of ballistic missiles and other aerospace vehicles within the upper atmosphere. China has tested a ground-based, midcourse interceptor, with the first test occurring in January 2010. Shortly after the test, China claimed that the test was defensive in nature and not directed at any country. China’s next test of the ground-based interceptor came in January 2013. It too, was successful, prompting a Second Artillery Force Engineering Institute professor to claim that “the success of this missile defense test means that China has already successfully resolved the issues of upper atmosphere target identification, tracking, and terminal guidance issues and that its mid-course missile defense technology is at the forefront of world technology.” Meanwhile, other Chinese commentators have noted that China remains far behind the United States, with a number of issues still needing to be addressed. These include resisting electronic attack and the capacity to respond to multiple warheads. Finally, if China is to deploy an effective BMD system, it will need to be supported by a space-based early warning system, currently missing from China’s BMD infrastructure.
Improved Offensive and Defensive Space Capabilities. China is clearly developing a number of anti-satellite systems, including a demonstrated capacity for direct-ascent kinetic-kill vehicles, co-orbital anti-satellite systems, and cyber tools that could interfere with space control systems. Future developments may include more soft-kill options that would lead to “mission kills” on satellites, preventing them from gathering or transmitting information, rather than physically destroying the system. The PLA suggests that these efforts might include co-orbital jammers and satellites that could eavesdrop on a target satellite’s control and data transmission in peacetime, and perhaps hijacking or other interference with the satellite in time of crisis or conflict.25
Other areas that the PLA is likely to pursue include defensive measures that would counter adversary attempts at establishing space dominance by allowing Chinese space systems to either survive enemy space attacks or repair and otherwise ameliorate damage. These might include robots capable of on-orbit repairs, or a greater emphasis on small satellites that could allow rapid reconstitution of key space information support functions.26
First, reentering material threatens infrastructure and people, poten- tially leaving a wake of destruction on Earth’s surface that, while sound- ing like science fiction, occurs far more frequently than is commonly believed. For example, in 1978, a Russian spy satellite (Cosmos 954) failed to separate from its nuclear reactor before reentry. Consequently, the Canadian arctic was littered with radioactive debris from the satellite crash. In 1979, the American Skylab space station descended un- controlled, striking parts of Western Australia. More recently, four solid rocket motors crash-landed in Uruguay, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, and Argentina since 2001.4 Second, the International Space Station is also frequently at risk of damage, placing in danger the lives of astronauts onboard and in transit. By some estimates, over the course of a typi- cal mission, space shuttles faced the risk of a 1-in-250 chance of being catastrophically damaged by a high-velocity micrometeor or piece of debris.5 In the course of 100 missions, that risk would reach a cumulative 33 percent—an admittedly dramatic but illustrative assessment.6 Finally, space junk has the potential to disable a host of satellites critical to global commerce, national defense, international navigation, and agriculture.