Evidence: Most Popular
Unfortunately, several trends point in the direction of an increased risk over the next 10 – 20 years of terrestrial conflict that may involve attacks on space systems, including the use of kinetic ASAT weaponry. These trends are primarily the results of the re-emergence of sustained strategic rivalries among some great and medium-sized powers – including the US and China in East Asia, the US and Russia in Eurasia, and potentially the China-India-Pakistan triangle in South Asia. With the exception of Pakistan, all of these states have already demonstrated a basic anti-satellite capability, and the US and China in particular are integrating space warfare scenarios into their military planning.
Moreover, the ongoing diffusion of underlying clusters of technologies – which include ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles (SLVs), advanced radar and seeker technologies, conventional and micro-satellites, solid-state or chemical lasers, as well as battle management networks to coordinate attacks – will further increase the number of states with a latent anti-satellite potential. It is entirely possible that the pace of technology diffusion will accelerate further in the coming decades.
Unfortunately, a country’s space behavior appears to have little affect on its terrestrial actions. Russia’s multidecadal human spaceflight partnership with the United States did not prevent it from invading and destabilizing Ukraine when it moved toward a closer relationship with the European Union, many of whose members are Russian partners in the International Space Station. Space cooperation has not, and will not, prevent the continued worsening of the security environment in Europe, which flows from Russian behavior on Earth, not in space.
Space cooperation with China is similarly unlikely to moderate its behavior. Tensions in Asia derive from China’s insistence on pressing unlawful territorial claims in the Pacific, most recently by transforming disputed coral reefs into would-be military bases. Ironically, civilian space technology has proved critical in documenting these aggressive moves.
To further demonstrate the civil space cooperation does not promote cooperation on Earth, we need look no further than recent history. The NASA administrator’s visit to China in the fall of 2014 nearly coincided with China’s hacking of NOAA, with whom Beijing has a “partnership” in studying climate change.
Military confrontation flows from the interaction of hard power in pursuit of competing national interests. Space cooperation falls into the realm of soft power. It has value in strengthening relationships among like-minded states with similar interests. China’s aggressiveness toward its neighbors, its human rights record and its cyberattacks on the United States strongly demonstrate that it and the United States are not of like minds. This is not the result of insufficient space cooperation, but of divergent national interests. The United States is a status quo power; China is not.
It is clear what the Chinese might seek from institutionalizing and deepening a cooperative civil space relationship with the United States. Accelerating Beijing’s learning curve when it comes to space technologies and operations, intelligence collection, technology transfer and political prestige all flow from working with the world’s most advanced space power.
Most space technology is dual-use, meaning hardware, applications and systems developed for civil or commercial purposes have military uses. China recognizes this and often pursues bilateral cooperation in order to enhance its own economic and defense capabilities, not for mutual benefit.
The Defense Department notes that “China’s advanced technology acquisition strategy continues to center on its civil-military integration policy as a means to leverage dual-use technologies to improve its defense industries. Despite improvements to its own indigenous technology development and industrial capacity, China continues to rely on the acquisition of critical advanced and Western dual-use technology, components, equipment, and know-how. These acquisitions manifest in the form of joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions, and close business partnerships with, and technology imports from, highly developed countries, primarily of the West, that offer access to critical advanced technology sectors.”
Consequently, the administration appears poised to put the U.S.-Chinese civil space relationship on a path that could eventually benefit the Chinese defense industry as soon as the congressional restrictions expire.
After the ASAT test, China continues to maintain secret military intentions. Cross-strait tensions also remain, but now China possess a weapon that it has concluded will allow it to take advantage of a U.S. military weakness. Senior Chinese government and party officials stated before the party congress that China would fashion a new policy to deal with the Taiwan.180 Instead of a more forceful move such as firing missiles, as it did in 1996, Chinese President Hu Jintao, stated that he was willing to explore peaceful means to reunify Taiwan during the 17th Party Congress in October 2007.181 However, Taiwanese President, Chen Sui-bian, called Hu’s offer a treaty of surrender of the Taiwanese people, rejected the proposal.182 There is evidence that China has continued to grow more impatient with Taiwan after January 11, 2007. Jianwei Wang, states the recent Taiwanese attempt to gain access to the United Nations via a name change has caused, “growing consensus among the leadership and elite that in the contexts of the Anti- Succession Law, Beijing has no other choice than to take some action including “non- peaceful means.”183 It is very possible that China perceives itself as being able to create a situation that will allow it to use force successfully without having to confront the total military capability of the United States. The ASAT test has most likely added to this sense of offense dominance.
According to all open sources, China simply cannot create a devastating first strike against U.S. low earth orbit assets. A worst-case scenario space attack, according to Geoffrey Forden’s evaluation, China could only destroy a total of nine U.S. satellites, and it would have to be done simultaneously against LEO assets.197 Destroying nine satellites in a quick and decisive manner would involve months of planning.198 Open source material that suggest that China would find it difficult to execute a space attack of this size covertly; and if a reality, it would only limit, not prevent the U.S. Navy from executing its strike and defense missions. China would have to preposition its mobile launchers throughout China, two launchers site per satellite.199 How well China is able to maintain covertness in positioning its mobile launchers throughout China is questionable. China may assume that they can keep paired TELs hidden from intelligence satellites, but it has been reported new and improved reconnaissance satellites are able to distinguish between camouflage and vegetation in addition to detect thermal heat sources.200 However, as mentioned in the last chapter, China is currently conducting exercising aimed at concealing its movements.201 However, this measure to dodge U.S. reconnaissance satellites may in fact be a result of China sense of false optimism.
Creating the worst-case scenario described above for U.S. LEO space assets would be difficult. With the required number of ASAT launchers needed to pull of a sudden attack of LEO assets, it seems highly unlikely that China would be able to position its launchers without being detected first. Due to the predictable track over ground of LEO satellites, intelligence professionals could predict the day of attack due to the disposition of Chinese TELs. Ocean surveillance satellites, NOSS, appear to be more difficult to target due to the fact that these satellite orbit in close proximity to another, so a potential attack affecting the United States naval surface ability to locate enemy ships at sea will most likely remain intact. Reconnaissance satellite are important for surface force operations but a potential loss can be replaced by other assets under Navy TENCAP and other commercial service programs capable of provided excellent detail for naval warfare. Additionally, if China decided to use its ASAT weapon, the U.S. could move its satellites, thus making it difficult for the Chinese to know in advance to disperse its launchers.
China would find it difficult to create a successful surprise attack on U.S. low earth orbit space assets, and if conducting a covert attack, would have limited success. The PLA would most likely need to position its TELs throughout China in advance, but due to the predictable orbit of low earth orbit satellites intelligence annalists would foil the coming attack and maneuver the satellites to a safe orbit, avoiding Chinese targeting and the ability to maneuver the TELs into position to pose a threat. Targeting NOSS satellites would prove harder to conceal. If attacks were to occur, Navy TENCAP could quickly be used to apply overlap coverage in place of the lost assets. Recent PLA Second Artillery exercises are aimed at foiling the U.S. ability use reconnaissance satellites to track movements. If reconnaissance satellites are secure, attacks on other space assets are more difficult to achieve. Any attack to the space segment of GPS would have to be initiated from a launch facility capable of reaching medium earth orbit. This would require missiles to most likely be readied and fueled out in the open for reconnaissance satellites to view. China is known to be developing a fourth deep space launch facility and the KT-2 ASAT missile that can reach GEO orbit. If China were able to conduct an attack on GPS satellites it could cripple the U.S. naval surface force, therefore, space reconnaissance of China’s launch facilities is critical for the ability of the Navy to promote its Sea Power 21 concepts with the threat of attacks upon the GPS space segment. Lastly, due to the similar reasons of deep space launch, attacks on communication satellites would be nearly impossible to conduct without indications and warnings. With the continued commercial use of communication satellites in U.S. military operations, China will find it nearly impossible to cripple the communication infrastructure. China could not successfully attack U.S. space assets and create a shift in the balance of power. Although it appears that China might contain an offense dominate position due to its possession of ASAT weapon, it has in fact incorrectly measured its ability to create a shift in the balance of power.
China’s ability to conduct a devastating first strike against U.S. space assets is very limited, as Chapter III explored. This chapter concludes that China will currently find it difficult to create a successful surprise attack on U.S. low earth orbit space assets; therefore making surprise attacks on other space assets nearly impossible. To conduct an attack on low earth orbit assets, the PLA would most likely need to position its mobile launchers throughout China in advance, but due to the predictable orbit of low earth orbit satellites intelligence analysts could predict a surprise attack in the making. Maneuvering the satellites to a safe orbit and avoiding Chinese targeting appears to be a reasonable solution. Potential targeting of NOSS satellites would also prove difficult to conceal. If attacks on space assets were to occur, Navy TENCAP could quickly be used to apply overlap coverage.
Rapid Space Launch Capability. In terms similar to how American analysts describe “operationally responsive space,” Chinese analysts cite the need for rapid launch of satellites to augment current constellations in time of crisis, and to replace lost assets in time of conflict. Intriguingly, it is also suggested that it may not be necessary to deploy a complete constellation in peacetime; if one possesses a rapid-launch capacity, it would be possible to augment a minimal peacetime constellation in time of crisis or conflict.21 In this regard, Chinese development of the Kuaizhou solid rocket space launch system would seem to suggest that the PLA has already prioritized improvements in this area.22
Cyber Capabilities. As noted earlier, the Chinese interest in counter-space is not limited to developing systems to attack orbiting satellites, but also extends to the ability to degrade or damage datalinks that connect satellites to ground stations. Space dominance can be achieved if a key satellite is shut down, its mission payload is pointed in the wrong direction, or it is unable to communicate at critical moments, as if it had been destroyed by an anti-satellite system. Indeed, this may be a preferable outcome, since attribution may be difficult and such approaches are unlikely to generate space debris (and attendant political and diplomatic criticism). Consequently, Chinese cyber capabilities should be considered an integral part of China’s counter-space capabilities.
Several recent cyber incidents involving space systems have been attributed to the PRC, suggesting that they are actively exploring vulnerability in space information systems. Hacking incidents in 2007 and 2008 against the LANDSAT-7 and Terra AM-1 EOS (Earth Observation System) satellites reportedly allowed cyber-intruders to gain control over all functions of these satellites for several minutes.19 The attacks have been attributed to the PRC. Other reports suggest that China is responsible for hacking into the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s weather satellite system.20