Evidence: Recently Added
In space, as with terrestrial missile defenses, it is far more challenging to mount a successful defense than to penetrate a soft target. Because of their threatening nature and their vulnerability, weapons designed for space warfare, whether on the ground or in orbit, would become extremely high-value targets. To prevent a precarious and dangerous mix of satellites interspersed with ASATs, the United States would seek to prevent space mines and other attacking devices either from being launched or from being parked in orbit. Alternatively, if the United States does not prevent the deployment of foreign ASATs in space, it must be prepared to wage war by shooting first and asking questions later. Military operations in space would thus be placed on continual hair-trigger alert because successful dominance in space would not be possible without the capacity for preemptive strikes or preventive measures. Having first crossed key thresholds relating to the flight-testing and deployment of space weaponry, would the United States arrogate to itself the right during peace time to carry out preemptive strikes to prevent others from following suit? And having rejected arms control arrangements prohibiting the flight-testing and deployment of space weaponry, would the United States seek to impose or dictate these constraints solely on others, and by force of arms?
Placing space mines in the immediate vicinity of high-value American satellites would likely be a major component of an opponent's strategy. These weapons could be fairly lightweight and possess considerable range. For example, a directional fragmentation warhead similar to that of a Claymore mine could project 100,000 one-grampellets in a pattern that would cover a 100 x 100 meter area with 10 pellets per square meter at a range of 1 kilometer. One approach to the space mine is to "design a very small stealth weapon that is moved into position over a long period of time" and in secrecy. However, while a stealthy space mine has definite advantages, it is not clear that an unobserved approach is required. In a fully weaponized space environment, U.S. space-based lasers and mirrors, each capable of attacking satellites thousands of kilometers away, threaten distant satellites as much as would a space mine in close proximity. In any case, until space mines actually damaged or interfered with their victims, it would be difficult to challenge their legitimacy. To attack or disable them as a potential threat would set a precedent for preemptive strikes against U.S. space-based weapons, if not all its satellites.
For example, in 2000 the PRC Defense Minister said that space-power is viewed as the key to China's planning to supplant the United States. PLA doctrine would deny the advantages of space to the US, seeking to leverage space for China's own advantage. This is in direct confrontation with the recently released Rumsfeld Commission report characterizing space as a "vital national interest" for the United States. As the Hong Kong newspaper Sing Tao Daily reported in January 2001, "to ensure winning in a future high-tech war, China's military has been quietly working hard to develop asymmetrical combat capability [sic] so that it will become capable of completely paralyzing the enemy's fighting system when necessary by 'attacking selected vital points' in the enemy's key areas." This correlates to CIA Director George J. Tenet's February 2001 testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee that weaker foreign militaries view US space systems as a key vulnerability during potential conflicts.
Similar international support may be expected in the future, even if the United States were to deploy space-based interceptors to slap down ballistic missiles aimed at New York or Los Angeles or antisatellite weapons to blind prying eyes in times of crisis or conflict. When the stakes are high and the United States must act militarily in self-defense or to protect its interests, allies and friends are likely to judge U.S. activities in space to affect politico-strategic conditions on Earth appropriately and in context.
Today, an early US nuclear monopoly continues to erode with every additional nation that acquires nuclear weapons. It can not be ignored that the growing American vulnerability to such weapons is in part compliments of the United States. It was the United States that demonstrated the feasibility of nuclear weapons and paid the tremendous nonrecurring development costs to do so. It was from the United States that atomic secrets leaked to its chief adversary. In general, the growing fraternity of nuclear powers benefited from American hindsight and experience. It ought to be expected that the same thing could be repeated should the United States accelerate development of advanced space weapons.
Critics of ASATs frequently maintain that satellite destruction would be "escalatory," implying that such actions will take the confrontation to new levels of horror and cause the United States' enemies to exploit its vulnerabilites in space. This depiction of satellite warfare was reinforced in the Clinton Pentagon by conscious reference to "tactical" space control, implying that the deliberate destruction of satellites escalates the level of engagement to "strategic." We have all grown accustomed, after all, to understanding the dire consequences of "strategic confrontation." Yet ASAT weapons do not approach strategic nuclear weapons in their destructive power or indiscriminate effects. Stigmatizing ASATs ("ASATs = Armageddon") obscures the fact that counterspace operations can be very precise, highly discriminate, and locally nonlethal. Far from being "precipitous," satellite destruction could prove to be the most rational and militarily effective course of action for our leaders to take in some situations.
A more practical approach to denying an enemy use of his space-based assets may be to jam the communication links between the satellites and the ground stations. Since this approach would not damage the satellites, the fact that they may be owned by third parties would be less of a factor. Jamming the communications between satellites and their ground stations may prove difficult because the large antennas used by ground stations are highly directional and jam - ming them could require inordinate amounts of power. An additional problem would be positioning the jamming platform within line of sight of the target ground station. Such an approach would be contingent on having total air supremacy, a condition that may not always prevail. Some satellite dependent communication systems, on the other hand, are easier to jam. These systems rely on lower power, nondirectional antennas on the ground, and sensitive receivers on the satellite. Operational problems with current SATCOM systems indicate that high-power jamming of a satellite may be sufficient to block communications.
With our hardware and our brainpower, the United States has unchallenged mastery of air, sea, and land. Except for our government's failure to defend us from ballistic missiles -- a glaring, reprehensible exception -- no one can seriously threaten us with conventional forces. Experts on such things say that this is a period of "strategic pause," a rare opportunity to catch our breath and rethink our strategy and force structure. Although the cold war required us to follow a course of incremental advances in doctrine and procurement just to keep pace with the Kremlin, nothing of the scope and scale of that technological competition exists today. As they say at the war colleges, we have no "peer competitor." Although I vigorously oppose those people who use this fortunate circumstance to justify reckless cuts in defense spending or to ratio-nalize their refusal to support an effective ballistic missile defense, I do see an opportunity for us to exploit this period of unchallenged conventional superiority on Earth to shift substantial resources to space. I believe we can and must do this, and, if we do, we will buy generations of security that all the ships, tanks, and airplanes in the world will not provide. This would be a real "peace dividend" -- it would actually help keep the peace. None of us can truly imagine the opportunities that space may one day offer. But for now I think we can agree that space offers us the prospect of seeing and communicating throughout the world; of defending ourselves, our deployed forces, and our allies; and, if necessary, of inflicting violence?all with great precision and nearly instantaneously and often more cheaply. With credible offensive and defensive space control, we will deter and dissuade our adversaries, reassure our allies, and guard our nation's growing reliance on global commerce. Without it, we will become vulnerable beyond our worst fears.
The argument presented here is that terrestrial U.S. military dominance would be impaired, rather than enhanced, by American initiatives to weaponize space. While the United States clearly has the ability to outspend competitors, and to produce more advanced types of space weaponry, weaker adversaries will have affordable, asymmetric means to counter U.S. initiatives in space, as well as on earth. The net result of an uneven competition to weaponize space would be that prudent U.S. defense planners could not count on protecting space assets, and that weaker adversaries could not count on the negation of U.S. advantages. Neither could be certain of the outcome of space warfare, but both adversaries would have to fear the worst. Because of the vulnerability of space assets to ASATs, both would need to assume a dangerous hair-trigger posture in spaceunless the United States employed preemptive military means to prevent the launch or deployment of presumably hostile space assets belonging to other states.