Evidence: Recently Added
These weapons could be used to blind the missile warning and radar satellites that allow the United States to target Chinese ballistic missiles on the ground or in flight, as well as the communications satellites that would direct systems such as the Common Aero Vehicle (CAV) to their targets. missile defenses, or place a large number of CAVs in orbit (aboard a space maneuver vehicle like NASA's X-37), China might target those weapons with anti-satellite weapons as well. If the United States were to deploy space-based This situation would essentially put the United States on "hair trigger" alert in space. A Chinese military exercise, for example, involving the movement of large numbers of troops and mobilization of ballistic missile units might be mistaken in the United States as a prelude to a surprise attack. With a military strategy that absolutely depends on vulnerable space assets to protect the homeland, an American president would face the unenviable task of choosing between launching a surprise attack on China or risking the loss of space-based intelligence, strike and missile defense assets that protect against nuclear attack.
If the United States develops and deploys space-based weapons for controlling space, self-interest dictates that other countries will follow suit. As with other technology, the great - est costs are normally incurred in the initial research and development (R&D) required to evolve a concept into a weapon. Once a new weapon has been deployed it is much easier, and less expensive, to observe the operational system, determine how it must operate, and then duplicate it. By doing this initial R&D, the United States will be paving the way for other nations to follow. The result may well be that assets which are now safe -- because no other nation has a pressing need to develop weapons to attack them -- will become vulnerable to attack because other nations will feel com - pelled to emulate the United States and deploy space-based weapons of their own.
Despite a proposed 7% increase in the Department of Defense (DoD) budget, resources are constrained. The billions of dollars -- some estimates are in the tens of billions -- needed to develop space-based weapon capabilities will take money from transformation efforts that will make greater contributions to the nation's security, both now and in the long term. Retired Navy Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, DoD's new Director of Force Transformation is correct in his oft-stated view that "numbers matter." Weaponizing space will mean fewer ships, planes, tanks, and other platforms capable of taking the fight to the enemy.
Although not verified through other sources, the Hong Kong Sing Tao Daily newspaper quoted unnamed Chinese resources in reporting that China is developing a space-based anti-satellite system. According to the report, the concept is to deploy very small "parasitic" satellites called nano-satellites that would attach themselves to satellites and re-main inactive during normal times. Upon activation, these parasitic satellites would destroy the satellite or disrupt its operations. Although the existence of a Chinese parasitic satellite program is uncertain, the existence of micro-satellite programs for data transmission, earth sensing and other programs is well documented. Whether the technology will translate into Chinese ASAT capabilities is not known. The Secretary of Defense is also concerned that China already may have, or is acquiring, the technology for developing laser radars to track and image satellites. This technology would be of great assistance in targeting orbiting satellites. China also already may have the capability to damage the optical sensors on US systems as they pass over China, and may be developing high-power microwave (HPM) technology to be used against satellites. Additionally, there is speculation China may be researching the use of steel balls to kill a satellite or the use of powder, paint and dust to render a space-based laser ineffective. If developed, these applications also could have an effect on other satellite sensors or solar panels. An additional possibility not mentioned in the literature is use of a nuclear ASAT. China already has such a capability within its ICBM force.
Yet we have little experience in reality to ground this freely wielded and rather academic assumption. By definition, anything that causes instability in armed relationships is to be avoided. But would "shots" in space, any more than shots on the ground, be that cause? When we look at what incites war, history instructs us that what matter most are the character and motivation of the states involved, along with the general balance of power (i.e., are we in the world of 1914, 1945, or 2001?). Fluctuations in national arsenals, be they based on earth or in space, do not determine, but rather more accurately are a reflection of, the course of politics among nations. In other words, it matters not so much that there are nuclear weapons, but rather whether Saddam Hussein or Tony Blair controls them and in what security context. The same may be said for space weapons.
Moreover, it is quite possible that if a potential enemy did want to develop the ability to attack U.S. space systems, it would choose to do so in wayssuch as investing in ground-based ASAT lasers or computer network attack capabilitiesthat would not involve weaponizing space, and against which the logical defensive countermeasures would not involve placing U.S. weapons in orbit either. For military as well as commercial satellites, bodyguard weapons in space would offer protection only from certain sorts of attacks, while the terrestrial links in satellite systems would remain inviting targets. Again it is the transition to larger networks of smaller satellites that will do the most to reduce vulnerability, perhaps together with supplementing satellite platforms for some military functions with new types of terrestrial systems, such as high endurance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs),[36] and improving terrestrial weapons with which to attack ground-based ASATs and satellite launch and control facilities. Conversely, if the United States decides that it must have the ability to deny an enemy the use of its satellites, it is quite possible that the most attractive means for doing this will prove to involve non-space weapons and, to an even greater extent, tools that are not weapons in the conventional sense at all.
If this analysis is correct, then the analogy between the development of navies in response to guerre de course and the emergence of space-based military capabilities in response to prospective attacks on satellites breaks downs in important ways. Sinking a nation's ship on the high seas, whether a military or commercial vessel, has long been viewed as an act of war. Article VIII of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty states that any party "on whose registry an object launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and over any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial body." In 1996, the United States declared as national policy that the space systems of any nation are "national property with the right of passage through and operations in space without interference." Nevertheless, damaging or destroying satellites does not seem to have quite the same status as damaging or sinking a nation's ships and killing its crew. Satellites may have owners and operators, but, in contrast to sailors, they do not have mothers. Granted, the destruction of a KH-11 or comparable satellite at a key juncture in a crisis with a major regional power would be taken very seriously by American leaders. Whether this act would inevitability lead to war, however, is far from clear.