Evidence: Recently Added
The high ground of space is not nearly as strategically advantageous from a use of force perspective as some might think. It is true that aircraft are also required to operate in an environment where natural protection is minimal, however, aircraft possess inherent advantages that compensates for this.83 Aircraft move- ments are unpredictable and, as a result, so are the times and places where an aircraft might be used for the application of force. In an operational theatre, ingress and egress routes for aircraft can be quickly adjusted in response to developing threats. In high threat environments, commanders can choose not to employ their air resources or, alternatively, mix and match aircraft types to ensure that a grouping of aircraft includes the specialized capabili- ties necessary to respond to a variety of ground-to-air, and air-to-air threats. Space based systems lack this flexibility. Orbits, once established, can be easily observed and predicted.84 This limits the element of surprise and allows an adversary to plan to disable or destroy space based systems using a wide variety of means, ranging from an indiscriminate nuclear explosion in orbit, to tar- geted attacks using kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, directed energy weapons, or even the disbursement of debris in orbit. All of these options can be highly effective against delicate and unprotected, or lightly protected, satellite systems. The recent (January 2007) ASAT test undertaken by the Chinese highlights the vulner- ability of space based systems. In this case, the Chinese have not only demonstrated their ability to target and destroy an in orbit sat- ellite but perhaps more importantly have highlighted the conse- quences of using kinetic kill technologies in orbit. The debris field created as a result of this test will reportedly place a number of established low Earth orbit systems at risk for many years into the future.
The technology is not inherently limited to supporting the troops of the country that develops it. While building and launching the satellite for such a system would be expensive and technically complex, the ground station that receives the power would be easier to engineer and construct. That means the space-based power system could be used to support troops of a friendly nation without ever risking a nation's own forces, although the Pentagon report did not specifically mention this capability. It could also be used to support rebels or insurgents within the sovereign territory of another nation or to support a regime currently facing energy short- falls due to internal or interstate warfare. In an extreme case, the system could be used to support a foreign state that is facing an energy embargo or blockade. Because a space-based solar power beam cannot be jammed, interdicting such intervention might necessitate direct action against either the satellite itself or the receiving ground station, either of which could dramatically broaden the scope of a conflict.
The ability of the system to direct power on short notice to most points on the globe also has significance for international aid and disaster relief. In the wake of a natural or humanitarian disaster, power from space could be used to keep hospitals and refugee camps operational, as well as providing electricity for water desalination and other critical but energy-intensive processes. Operating in this mode, space- based solar power could become a powerful tool of diplomacy rather than one of force projection in the traditional sense.
Besides threats to the satellite itself, how such a system is used also has important security ramifications. In its 2007 report, which appears to be the only US government document dealing with the security aspects of space-based solar power, the Pentagon identified more than a dozen potential implications of the system. Key among these was the ability to deliver reliable and constant power to forward-deployed troops potentially anywhere in the world by redirecting the satellite's beam to another receiving station. Such a capa- bility could dramatically reduce the logistical burden of supporting armed forces, whose energy needs are now lar- gely met by transporting large quantities of fossil fuels. This new capability also has the potential to reduce casualties, because there would be reduced need for supply convoys to traverse hostile territory (NSSO, 2007).
The high altitude also makes the system less susceptible to intentional destruction. Anti-satellite weapons are an established and mature technology; both China and the United States have demonstrated their ability to use them in the recent past (Koplow, 2009). However, the Chinese and US anti- satellite tests engaged spacecraft at alti- tudes well below 1,000 kilometers (Gugliotta, 2008). Delivering payloads to geostationary orbit is more challeng- ing and requires large rockets. While a nation such as China or the United States could, in principle, conduct anti- satellite strikes in geostationary orbit, neither has demonstrated this capability nor seems eager to do so. Because of the difficulty of reaching such high alti- tudes, it is very unlikely that a rogue state or terrorist element would have the means to physically disrupt a power satellite.
Solar power satellites may also be degraded by physical disruption. Again, such damage could occur naturally or artificially. Collisions in space do occur. The primary source of such impacts is space debris. Orbital debris consists of everything from expended upper-stage rocket boosters to flecks of paint. At orbital velocities, even a colli- sion with a small piece of such flotsam can be catastrophic. Collisions can also occur between intact spacecraft. In early 2009, the Russian Cosmos 2251 satellite accidentally struck and destroyed a functional Iridium network satellite (Ianotta and Malik, 2009). The specter of space debris and direct collisions between spacecraft, however, is largely an issue for lower orbits. The majority of such detritus orbits well below the alti- tude of geostationary orbit, where a space-based solar power system is likely to be built (NASA, 2009).
Intentional service interruptions are another concern. A space-based solar power satellite has much in common with communications and GPS satel- lites, which also transmit radio- frequency beams to Earth. An adversary could jam these types of satellites and cause them to malfunction (Economist, 2011), but a space-based solar power system should be insulated from jam- ming for two reasons: First, most com- munications and navigation satellites operate at very low power, so a jamming signal need not be very powerful in order to drown out the information being transmitted. A full-scale solar power system, on the other hand, has a beam power that is rated in gigawatts; even if jamming such a beam were pos- sible in theory, it would be prohibitive in practice. Secondly, most jamming tech- niques rely on making signals unintelligible by transmitting ÒnoiseÓ that overwhelms the information-carrying signal, but a space-based solar power satellite transmits raw energy rather than noise-sensitive information. It should be noted, however, that it may be possible to jam the telemetry links between a power satellite and ground controllers, potentially leading to a loss of command authority over the system.
Under PEPAT, all parties must create environmental impact assess- ments before engaging in major activities in Antarctica.191 Those studies are then inspected by members of PEPAT and the organizing body, which determine the appropriateness of the action.192 For a PEPAT-based treaty, environmental impact studies would require parties to determine the potential harm of launching a space object, including potential debris cre- ation and the plan for retiring the satellite from orbit at the end of its oper- ating lifetime.
PEPAT members have the right to inspect one another’s facilities.193 For the new protocol, this would involve both inspections of launch sites and materials, and the use of existing debris tracking systems. Under PEPAT, nations regularly make use of their right of inspection, so if sim- ilar powers and attitudes are enforced in relation to activities in orbit, the international community would become self-policing.194 In conjunction with dispute settlement procedures,195 this would solve one of the major prob- lems with the current system of space treaties: the lack of enforcement mechanisms.196 Rather than merely requesting states to register objects or trying to deal with the later liability problems, a PEPAT-based treaty would work from the beginning of orbital projects, with states monitoring one another from the outset with the power to challenge any party that does not comply with the treaty.
Provisions requiring parties to take charge of waste, like the one contained in PEPAT,185 would dovetail well with existing programs to track debris. The waste provision could be adapted to require parties to “claim” all waste, and any unclaimed debris would then be removable by any nation. This would circumvent the Liability Convention, which implies that debris may not be removed unless the party who “owns” it has consented.186
PEPAT requires parties to clean up all waste from activities in Antarctica.187 This is a rule that could be directly translated to activities in orbit, once the technology for removing such debris is sufficiently developed. Merely mitigating the creation of debris is not enough; orbital debris must someday be actively removed.188 While the technology does not currently exist to remove orbital debris,189 a PEPAT-based treaty could be designed so that when this technology is developed, the treaty will work as a legal framework for the effort to remove the debris, rather than being a roadblock like current international space law.190
Over the past two decades, several watershed events have convinced U.S. allies that they, too, must make their own investments in national security space systems. The first event was the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent end of the Cold War that resulted in the significant drawdown of U.S. forces in Western europe, and with that, the inevitable diminishment, though not abandonment, of U.S. strategic commitment to european security. While extraordinarily close ties were main- tained with some european countries, such as the United Kingdom, other european countries perceived that they would have to make provisions for their own national security space needs, especially in military satellite communications and high-resolution satellite imagery. Thus, in the 1990s, a nascent european effort in national secu- rity space spearheaded by France quickly established a relatively ambitious military space program.31
The second watershed event was the launch of North Korea’s Taepo-Dong 2 ballistic missile over the yellow Sea in August of 1998. This event crystallized Japanese security fears and exposed a perceived dissatisfaction with U.S. intelligence support to Tokyo. As a result, the Japanese government began work on its Information- Gathering System comprising high-resolution electro- optical (eO) and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellites, supplemented by intelligence products provided by the U.S. and by commercial systems.32
The third watershed event was the 1999 conflict between U.S.-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces and yugoslavian forces in Kosovo. The aftermath of that conflict made clear a serious capability gap among european NATO partners, which demon- strated that europe was ill equipped to prosecute mod- ern warfare autonomously from the United States.33 The Kosovo watershed event spurred further development of european space capabilities to include high-resolution eO and SAR imaging satellites and military satellite com- munications by France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, among others, and also instigated the development of an autonomous satellite navigation system called Galileo.34
The fourth watershed event is the rise of Chinese space power, both in civil and national security realms, that has instigated a regional space competition mirroring existing geopolitical dynamics in the Asia-Pacific region. Hence, numerous countries in the region—India, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia—have developed, or are developing, significant space capabili- ties with credible national security applications.35
While allied national security space capabilities and the extent of their military integration lag behind the United States, allies of the U.S. are mimicking the U.S. approach to national security space and are also becom- ing increasingly reliant on their systems for military effectiveness. Both the United States, and increasingly its key european and Asian allies, have grown more dependent on space systems for national security purposes—a trend that shows no sign of abating.
While creating redundant communications and ISR networks should be a prerequisite to sound operational practice, the notion that space systems can be entirely replaced with terrestrial technologies is a dangerous one. Such a notion masks the realities about the role that space systems play even in the functioning of so-called alternatives, and ignores both the strategic attributes of space power and the limitations of these alternatives to satellites.
First, it is imperative to acknowledge that the majority of UAS capabilities for ISR purposes use space-based position, navigation, and timing (PNT) and satellite com- munications links to operate. The efficient uses of scarce UAS ISR capabilities often depend on high-resolution imagery satellites for their cueing and tasking.36 While a number of small-unit UAS capabilities are not necessarily space-dependent, the larger and more capable UAS systems certainly are and will remain so for the foreseeable future.
Second, the notion that satellites can be replaced in all circumstances with their aerial and terrestrial alter- natives shows an ignorance of the strategic attributes of space power in peace and war. On October 4, 1957, the Soviet satellite Sputnik became the first artificial sat- ellite to orbit the earth and thereby set an important legal precedent, establishing the principle of freedom of space which recognizes that satellites in orbit can pass overhead sovereign territory, waters, and airspace with the reasonable expectation on non-interference by the sovereign state over which they pass.37 UAS capabilities and aerostats do not enjoy the same legal privileges and so can only be used in foreign airspace with the permission of the sovereign state, as is the case today in Pakistan, or operate in that airspace after a hostile or resistant state has been neutralized by the force of arms. Use of UAS capabilities and aerostats in foreign airspace without permission risks provoking the sovereign state to force such assets from its airspace, or, at the very least, creat- ing diplomatic and political challenges to the use of such capabilities. Therefore, space systems play a strategic role that alternatives are unable to do legally.
Space systems also provide a strategic perspective and presence that aerial systems are only able to do in limited ways. These attributes are only possible because satellites occupy the high ground of space that, in turn, enables strategic presence and access globally, to include oth- erwise denied territories. This presence and access can provide strategic early warning of events that aerial and terrestrial alternatives cannot.38