Evidence: Recently Added
It is also hard to see how active defenses or offensive counterspace capabilities would be a credible deterrent unless they are accompanied by a dramatic shift in current U.S. space policy. The deterrent value of both offensive and defensive systems rests on the adversary’s belief that the systems will work.
That implies that adversaries would need to be aware of the active defenses and offensive counterspace systems, and that the systems would need to be tested to demonstrate their effectiveness.
However, testing destructive systems would seem to be contrary to what most countries, including the United States, would consider to be responsible behavior in space. Testing such systems would establish a precedent that it would be okay for other countries, such as Russia and China, to develop and test their own active defenses, which in turn would likely lead to the development of more threats by all parties.
Fifth, it is important that the debate over how to overcome the current strategic instability in space also includes voices from the commercial sector. Revenues from the commercial satellite communication sector now surpass global military spending on space, and there is a recent acceleration in private sector activities and innovation in many other areas of space activities.
Commercial uses of space will continue to increase over time, and many aspects of daily life and the global economy increasingly depend on the continued ability to use space. Increased tensions and strategic instability in space will have significant negative impacts on the economic viability of private sector activities in space.
As difficult as it is for the U.S. national security space community to accept, the stakes in this situation are too high for the answer to the problem to solely be a function of what is best for a particular faction within the U.S. government. Space is no longer a relatively simple war game analysis of red versus blue, and no longer purely the domain of the national security community.
Space is becoming more international and commercialized each year, and space is becoming increasingly important to the functioning of the global economy and the security of everyone on Earth.
It is in the best interests of all to pursue a strategy that will lead to greater stability and and sustainability in space.
Fourth, the United States needs to take into consideration the perspectives of its allies in implementing a strategy for dealing with a contested space environment. Increased international cooperation and allied integration with U.S. space capabilities is crucial to protecting U.S. national security space capabilities.
Although most allies would likely be supportive of the concept of self-defense in space, many are also wary of the dangers of the weaponization of space and in the past have distanced themselves from U.S. activities in space because of weaponization concerns.
If the United States insists on a definition of self-defense that is overly aggressive, there is a strong chance it could lose some of the allies it needs to fulfill its overall strategy, further weakening its ability to deal with a contested space domain.
If the United States were to develop increased offensive counterspace capabilities, there would be significant drawbacks. The biggest drawback is that it will not halt the proliferation of counterspace capabilities and development programs in other countries, and may accelerate that proliferation even more.
Russia, China, and other countries already consider the U.S. missile defense program as evidence of a “stealth” space weapons program and proof of why they should develop their own hit-to-kill ASAT and missile defense capabilities.
A new U.S. effort to develop offensive counterspace capabilities to “defend” U.S. satellites is likely to only deepen these perceptions, potentially leading to an arms race instability scenario, and an all-out competition in space that the U.S. tried to avoid in the 1970s.
The end result would be increased threats to everyone’s space systems and increased tensions that could lead to or escalate conflict.
Effective debris removal is not possible with current technology.131 Large pieces of debris, such as defunct satellites, could be removed individually by a revival of the Space Shuttle program, or the Russian Soyuz.132 However, such an endeavor would be both time-consuming and costly. Debris smaller than five inches in diameter is undetectable to the U.S. space- monitoring network, and thus impossible to remove in any organized manner. Even if these fragments were detectable, with the sheer number of them, removal would require a massive expansion of international space operations. Other proposals, such as building "ground-based 'laser brooms' to sweep debris from orbit,"133 are even less feasible. Until technology improves, the world cannot fix its past mistakes-it can only avoid making them again.
There exist both domestic and international 'codes of conduct' aimed at preventing additional space debris. The U.S. was the first country to issue such domestic guidelines.122 The Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices outline a number of goals, including selecting safe flight profiles, and safely disposing of defunct spacecraft.123 Since the U.S. created these regulations in the late 1990s, other countries, including the EU and Russia, have adopted similar regulations.124 These regulations have helped curb debris-related damages. However, since any state's space operations indirectly affect those of all other states, an international regime is necessary to regulate space effectively.125 Differing domestic regulations complicate dispute resolution, and make it difficult to answer several questions. Could states be liable for debris-related damages if they violated the victim state's regulations? Or would they only be liable for breaking their own regulations? What administrative bodies would have jurisdiction over these disputes? Furthermore, individual states cannot solve the problem on their own-all spacefaring countries need to regulate their behavior.126
First, recent budget cuts have forced the U.S. to shut down important parts ofits monitoring network. Most significant was the shutdown of the Air Force Space Surveillance System, known as the 'space fence,' which was recently deactivated to save fourteen million dollars per year.116 Unlike other radar systems, which must be tasked to look at specific areas of space, the space fence could simultaneously track debris over several extremely large areas.117 It was considered a "key part"118 of the U.S. surveillance program, important for general awareness of the debris environment in Earth orbit. The fence was shut down on September 1, 2013.119 The extent of damage to U.S. efforts to detect and avoid debris caused by the shutdown is unclear.
Lastly, it is worth noting that collisions and discarded parts are not the only sources of debris. Satellites at the end of their life cycle are often simply left in crowded orbits.74 These crafts "cannot realistically carry enough extra propellant to move into an atmospheric disposal orbit at the end of their useful lives.75 Crafts may be able to move themselves into a less-populated orbit,76 decreasing the chance that they will collide with any active craft or break up into debris. Nevertheless, evidence shows that most satellite operators simply do not do this.77 The European Union found that in 2009, only 11 of 21 satellites at the end of their lifespan were actually relocated to a higher, less-popular orbit.78 As discussed below, this happens despite non-binding international guidelines that require satellite removal.79 Whether by collision-caused fragmentation, abandonment of defunct spacecraft in orbit, or just paint chipping off of satellites, the amount of space debris in orbit is rapidly increasing, and it will all stay in orbit for potentially a million years or more.80
According to several NASA scientists, the number of pieces of debris will continue to increase even without any additional spacecraft being launched:
Even without new launches, collisions will continue to occur in the LEO [low-Earth orbit] environment over the next 200 years, primarily driven by the high collision activities in the region between 900-and 1000- km altitudes, and will force the debris population to increase. In reality, the situation will undoubtedly be far worse because spacecraft and their orbital stages will continue to be launched.71
This prediction came in 2006, before the Chinese missile test and the Russo-U.S. satellite collision. Those events have accelerated the debris-propagation process. Further compounding the problem, debris tends to remain in orbit for many years (depending on what level of orbit it originated in) before its orbit decays and it begins an atmospheric descent or drifts into outer space.72 Based on the present level of debris, some estimate that it would take anywhere from one to ten million years for space in Earth's orbit to clear entirely.73
Two events in the past six years substantially increased the amount of debris in orbit. The first was a Chinese anti- satellite missile test conducted in 2007.53 The Chinese government chose a defunct, one-metric-ton weather satellite as their target.54 Upon striking the satellite, the missile obliterated it.55 This test was the largest fragmentation event on record, resulting in over 150,000 pieces of debris larger than one centimeter.56 Scientists estimate that 80% of this debris will still be in orbit in 2107. This single incident makes China responsible for almost half of all tracked satellite breakup debris.58
The second recent fragmentation event occurred when a defunct Russian satellite collided with an active U.S. commercial satellite.59 This was the worst accidental collision on record, producing thousands more pieces of debris.60 The U.S. commercial satellite belonged to a private telephone company called Iridium, and not the U.S. government.61 The collision caused only a small interruption in Iridium's phone service.62 However, since the satellite was launched from the United States, the Liability Convention implies that the U.S. government may be liable for damage caused by its debris.63