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<title>Spacedebate.org: New Evidence</title>
<description>Latest evidence added to the database on Spacedebate.org</description>
<link>http://www.spacedebate.org/</link>

	<item>
	<title>Unchecked Space Arms Race could Spread Globally, Collapsing Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Regime</title>
	<description><![CDATA[Currently, the economic and technological superiority of the USA in space is obvious and indisputable. However, if a space arms race is initiated, it will inevitably be joined by other countries, above all China, Russia, India, Brazil, Japan, and later possibly Iran, Pakistan, and others. As a result, the USA, despite its superiority in space, may lose more than all the rest because, in their military and civilian activities, they more than anyone else depend on the security of space vehicles. Historically, this is what happened with nuclear weapons and missile technology, where the USA initially had a monopoly or superiority, but now they see the proliferation of such weapons as the main threat to their own security.

In the long term, the growing threat of an arms race and, even more so, space conflicts, will inevitably lead to the "vertical" and "horizontal" proliferation of missiles and nuclear weapons, and to the irreversible crisis of the whole nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Additionally, outer space (which does not have natural borders and natural shelters) through its saturation by weapons, will present a grave threat from the point of view of accidents, incidents, false alarms, and navigational system failures.
----
@techreport{spacedebate:4148,
	author= {Alexey Arbatov},
	title= {Space Weapons: Science Fiction, Real Threats and Arms Control Opportunities},
	address= {},
	publisher= {International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament},
	keywords= {Space Weapons, Spacedebate.org}, 
	pages = {1-24},
	url= {http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Arbatov_Space_Weapons.pdf},
	year= {2009},
	month= {Aug}
}

	]]></description>
	<pubDate>Mon, 28 Dec 2009 12:45:00 -0800</pubDate>	<link>http://www.spacedebate.org/evidence/4241</link>
	<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.spacedebate.org/evidence/4241</guid>
	</item>


	<item>
	<title>Technically Difficult to Verify Ban on Aircraft-based ASAT systems</title>
	<description><![CDATA[However, as applied to the aircraft-based systems of the type deployed during the '80s by the USA (F15 SRAMAltair) and the Soviet development of anti-satellite systems based on the MiG31 fighter plane, the verification of bans on their deployment would be extremely difficult due to the dual purpose and massive numbers of such aircraft in operation, as well as the small size of intercepting missiles that may be stored in any airfield's storage facilities. Of course, such satellite systems possess special systems for targeting and navigation, but their banning would interfere in the overall ground-based infrastructure of space complexes, and would therefore be unrealistic. Limitation of quantity of such systems is a more achievable goal, but requires wide transparency and agreement on the functional differences between aircraft and missiles, facilitation of verification measures, agreed locations for anti- satellite systems, as well as the possible acceptance of rights of inspection upon suspicion (with brief notification) of other airforce bases of the parties.
----
@techreport{spacedebate:4148,
	author= {Alexey Arbatov},
	title= {Space Weapons: Science Fiction, Real Threats and Arms Control Opportunities},
	address= {},
	publisher= {International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament},
	keywords= {Space Weapons, Spacedebate.org}, 
	pages = {1-24},
	url= {http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Arbatov_Space_Weapons.pdf},
	year= {2009},
	month= {Aug}
}

	]]></description>
	<pubDate>Mon, 28 Dec 2009 12:45:00 -0800</pubDate>	<link>http://www.spacedebate.org/evidence/4242</link>
	<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.spacedebate.org/evidence/4242</guid>
	</item>


	<item>
	<title>Not Technically Possible to Verify Space Assets are not Space Weapons in Deployment and Operational Stage</title>
	<description><![CDATA[As opposed to this historical experience, space weapons will be the most difficult to ban and to limit at their deployment and operational stages, particularly where deployment in space is concerned, as it is in the Draft Space Weapons Treaty of 2008. To identify, through the use of NTMVs, banned satellites with weapons on board among approximately 700 space vehicles that are currently rotating in various orbits, would be exceptionally difficult. It could be even more difficult to prove that they are subject to a Treaty without their inspection in space or their being brought down to Earth (even if the Treaty could determine the technical characteristics of banned systems, and not just where they are based and where their possible targets are located).

This can also apply to future compact satellites used as a means of inspection of space vehicles in all orbits. Such on-site space inspection, as well as bringing vehicles down to Earth, is in many cases not technically possible, as well as being dangerous and, more likely than not, unacceptable for states because of military or commercial secrecy. Additionally, the creation of such systems and means of verification may of itself be interpreted as a type of anti-satellite weapon or combat operation.
----
@techreport{spacedebate:4148,
	author= {Alexey Arbatov},
	title= {Space Weapons: Science Fiction, Real Threats and Arms Control Opportunities},
	address= {},
	publisher= {International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament},
	keywords= {Space Weapons, Spacedebate.org}, 
	pages = {1-24},
	url= {http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Arbatov_Space_Weapons.pdf},
	year= {2009},
	month= {Aug}
}

	]]></description>
	<pubDate>Mon, 28 Dec 2009 12:45:00 -0800</pubDate>	<link>http://www.spacedebate.org/evidence/4243</link>
	<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.spacedebate.org/evidence/4243</guid>
	</item>


	<item>
	<title>Many Difficulties with Trying to Craft Arms Control Agreement against Directed Energy ASATs</title>
	<description><![CDATA[The banning of combat systems that are based on directed energy transmission, primarily lasers, is particularly complicated. They can be used for striking aircraft, satellites, ballistic missiles and their elements during flight, and also for the detection, probing and identification of ground, underwater and space objects, as well as for targeting other weapon systems and, in future, for the rapid transfer of immense amounts of information, i.e. for communications. Theoretically, effectiveness of lasers may be limited (thereby separating attack systems from ancillary purpose systems) by the ratio of power illumination to the area of the ray's cross-section (joules/steredian), which is an indicator integrating a laser's energy and the area of its mirror reflector.

But to come to an agreement regarding such limitations would be a complex undertaking if we take into account the different types of lasers ("pumping" methods) and the diverse areas through which they may pass (space, atmosphere). For example, a laser that does not have destructive potential in a dense atmosphere may be an effective weapon against satellites in space at long distances, or for striking booster stages of ballistic missiles at a shorter range when they leave the atmosphere, or missile warheads in space at a short distance.
----
@techreport{spacedebate:4148,
	author= {Alexey Arbatov},
	title= {Space Weapons: Science Fiction, Real Threats and Arms Control Opportunities},
	address= {},
	publisher= {International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament},
	keywords= {Space Weapons, Spacedebate.org}, 
	pages = {1-24},
	url= {http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Arbatov_Space_Weapons.pdf},
	year= {2009},
	month= {Aug}
}

	]]></description>
	<pubDate>Mon, 28 Dec 2009 12:45:00 -0800</pubDate>	<link>http://www.spacedebate.org/evidence/4240</link>
	<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.spacedebate.org/evidence/4240</guid>
	</item>


	<item>
	<title>Historically, On-Site Inspections of Space Launch Vehicles have been Ruled as Overly Intrusive and Technically Impractical</title>
	<description><![CDATA[Verification on space launching pads before the launch also seems improbable in the foreseeable future because of military and commercial secrecy. By the way, this question was touched upon at the end of the '80s during the USSRUSA negotiations on space weapons, in relation to a ban on orbital ABM systems. It was acknowledged at that time that such verification methods would be overly intrusive and practically impossible to implement for technical reasons (the necessity of opening containers with the payload, and its identification before being installed on a space vehicle). It is possible that in the context of radical disarmament measures and abandonment of military confrontation, such measures of pre-launch inspection could in time become possible for the verification of space disarmament. But at this stage they seem unrealistic, in particular regarding the RFPRC Draft Treaty of 2008. As regards land, air, and sea-based space weapons that are most likely to appear in the foreseeable future (but not addressed by the RFPRC Draft), even here the picture is mixed. The banning or limitation of such systems as were deployed by the Soviet Union in the '7080s (and experimental missiles tested by China against satellites in 2007) would not be difficult if their technical characteristics and locations could be agreed upon, using methods applied by the Treaty on Intermediate and Shorter Range Missiles and START-1.
----
@techreport{spacedebate:4148,
	author= {Alexey Arbatov},
	title= {Space Weapons: Science Fiction, Real Threats and Arms Control Opportunities},
	address= {},
	publisher= {International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament},
	keywords= {Space Weapons, Spacedebate.org}, 
	pages = {1-24},
	url= {http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Arbatov_Space_Weapons.pdf},
	year= {2009},
	month= {Aug}
}

	]]></description>
	<pubDate>Mon, 28 Dec 2009 12:45:00 -0800</pubDate>	<link>http://www.spacedebate.org/evidence/4244</link>
	<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.spacedebate.org/evidence/4244</guid>
	</item>


	<item>
	<title>Proposed Russian-Chinese PPWT Treaty does Little to Address Risks from ASAT Weapons</title>
	<description><![CDATA[First, the threat to space security that is squarely in our sights today is the proliferation of destructive ASAT technologies based on Earth—weaponry that is not restricted by this draft treaty. China, Russia and the United States have all displayed capabilities to use physical force to attack and destroy satellites, and some other spacefaring powers now also consider following suit. In India, in particular, there appears to be a growing debate about whether India needs to develop and test such weaponry—either to keep up with an incipient ASAT arms race or to “beat” the announcement of any treaty so that they will not be stuck in the same “have not” position as they were when the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed. The proliferation of destructive, debris-creating ASATs however is in fact in no one’s interest—as sooner or later, someone would finally fail to resist the temptation to use them. Space debris is already a serious problem, and debris threatens all satellites indiscriminately. It knows no nationality, even during times of war. Unfortunately, last year was the worst year ever for debris creation, with the US Air Force now tracking about 18,000 pieces of debris larger than 5cm in diameter—that is, large enough to do serious damage to satellites. Estimates of smaller debris range from the hundreds of thousands to the millions, and even debris of 1cm in diameter can damage or destroy an operational satellite. As it is, the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space has adopted voluntary guidelines to mitigate the creation of debris because of concern about the ever-more polluted space environment. One of those guidelines is a pledge not to deliberately create debris through the destruction of on-orbit objects. However, that pledge is weakened by both a clause that says if you “must” destroy something on orbit, be sure to do it in a very low orbit where the debris will re-enter the atmosphere—leaving room for ASAT testing in lower orbits. It also includes a waiver for national security. Thus, there remain very few normative or legal obstacles to constrain the development and testing of such ASATs—despite their clear danger to the security of all satellites.
----
Hitchens, Theresa. Russian - Chinese Space Weapons Ban Proposal: A Critique. Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations - Conference on Disarmament, December 2008.	]]></description>
	<pubDate>Mon, 28 Dec 2009 12:30:00 -0800</pubDate>	<link>http://www.spacedebate.org/evidence/4232</link>
	<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.spacedebate.org/evidence/4232</guid>
	</item>


	<item>
	<title>Now is the Key Time to Determine whether Space will become a New Arena for Conflict</title>
	<description><![CDATA[At the end of the Cold War, under the conditions of an evolving multipolar system of international relations with intensive globalization and interdependence of the whole world, there was a chance to interrupt the historical process of accelerating arms races and military conflict and their transition to ever higher levels of technological complexity, affecting new areas of human activity. The growing commercial information and scientific value inherent in the use of space, and also its huge facilitating role for military action on Earth (including peacekeeping operations), is moving us in this direction, in order to achieve greater stability and facilitate the process of disarmament. In this sense, the accumulated mass of international legal norms regulating space activity is very important, as well as half a centurys experience of practical negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament, including in the area of strategic missile weapon systems and military activity in space. Insofar as the utilisation of space is concerned, mankind is now poised at an important historical juncture: space will either become a new arena for arms race and military conflict, or will remain an area for peaceful and exclusively ancillary military activity, and thus for promoting international cooperation, strategic stability and disarmament. Important choices in this direction will apparently be made in the next decade and perhaps even in the next few years.
----
@techreport{spacedebate:4148,
	author= {Alexey Arbatov},
	title= {Space Weapons: Science Fiction, Real Threats and Arms Control Opportunities},
	address= {},
	publisher= {International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament},
	keywords= {Space Weapons, Spacedebate.org}, 
	pages = {1-24},
	url= {http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Arbatov_Space_Weapons.pdf},
	year= {2009},
	month= {Aug}
}

	]]></description>
	<pubDate>Mon, 28 Dec 2009 12:30:00 -0800</pubDate>	<link>http://www.spacedebate.org/evidence/4237</link>
	<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.spacedebate.org/evidence/4237</guid>
	</item>


	<item>
	<title>Navy Conventional Trident Missile is most Effective and Least Risky Conventional Ballistic Missile Option</title>
	<description><![CDATA[In the near term, the U.S. Navy's Conventional Trident Modification proposal is the most cost-effective prompt global strike weapons system that will enable the most risk mitigation leverage for the United States. Given that conventional Trident D-5 SLBMs would occupy only two out of twenty-four launch tubes on the Ohio-class submarines that carry such missiles, U.S. taxpayers will not bear the cost of an entire submarine committed solely to ensuring the survival of CBMs. If CTM were deployed, then military planners should ensure that the submarines launch their missiles from areas of the ocean that would obviate the need to travel over or near nuclear-armed states with missile warning systems to avoid the chance of miscalculation. Because circumstances would not always permit missile flights to remain undetected by nuclear-armed states, the United States should work to implement other mitigation measures.
----
Sugden, Bruce M. "Speed Kills: Analyzing the Deployment of Conventional Ballistic Missiles." International Security. Vol. 34, No. 1 (Summer 2009): Vol. 34, No. 1, Pages 113-146.	]]></description>
	<pubDate>Mon, 28 Dec 2009 12:30:00 -0800</pubDate>	<link>http://www.spacedebate.org/evidence/4236</link>
	<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.spacedebate.org/evidence/4236</guid>
	</item>


	<item>
	<title>Multilateral Treaty Negotiations less likely to Succeed because of Technical Secrecy</title>
	<description><![CDATA[Multilateral Treaty Negotiations less likely to Succeed because of Technical SecrecyThe multilateral nature of the array of countries wishing to participate in the proposed drafting of such a Treaty gives rise to serious doubts. The highly complex technological systems that are involved are military and strategic in nature and are known only to a few states, and questions related to them are of an exceptionally sensitive nature. So any hope for practical negotiations on these problems in a multilateral format based on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) is hardly justified. A more practical format would involve two or, at most, three parties (RFUSAPRC), and seems more practical, at least at the initial stage.
----
@techreport{spacedebate:4148,
	author= {Alexey Arbatov},
	title= {Space Weapons: Science Fiction, Real Threats and Arms Control Opportunities},
	address= {},
	publisher= {International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament},
	keywords= {Space Weapons, Spacedebate.org}, 
	pages = {1-24},
	url= {http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Arbatov_Space_Weapons.pdf},
	year= {2009},
	month= {Aug}
}

	]]></description>
	<pubDate>Mon, 28 Dec 2009 12:30:00 -0800</pubDate>	<link>http://www.spacedebate.org/evidence/4238</link>
	<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.spacedebate.org/evidence/4238</guid>
	</item>


	<item>
	<title>Language of PPWT Treaty is Unclear on the Definition of "Threat"</title>
	<description><![CDATA[Second, while it may be counterintuitive, it is unclear what is meant by Article III’s “not resort to the threat … of force against outer space objects”. This is because the concept of a “threat”—outside of a direct, declaratory statement of intent to do harm—is really a matter of perception. The current US National Space Policy says that the United States holds the right to “if necessary, deny adversaries the use of space”. Is that a threat? I suppose if one considers oneself as a potential US adversary, yes it is. Is the destruction of the Chinese satellite in 2007, even if it proves to be an isolated case, a threat of force? Arguably, yes—especially considering that such an event can instil fears of development and testing of destructive space capabilities. What about missile defences, or laser tracking stations, that could be tweaked to harm satellites? Are they threatening? Maybe, maybe not. The point is that what one nation might see as legitimately preparing to ensure its “right to self-defence” may be seen as “a threat” by another. How do you mitigate that? It strikes me that even finding an agreed definition of “threat” would be awfully difficult; but failure to define it would run the risk that charges of non-compliance would be a recipe for never-ending international dispute. Even the issue of the “use of force” in this article is not clear. Does the text mean that the use of positioning or communications jammers in wartime would be a prohibited use of force? While the draft treaty language defining “use of force” and “threat of force” seems to include them in its scope, such jamming devices already exist in large numbers and have been used in warfare; does anyone really expect nations in possession of such systems to just hand them over? And while this clause does some good to mitigate against the non-inclusion of terrestrially based ASATs directly, its vagueness leaves a great deal of room for concern about how it would or could be applied.
----
Hitchens, Theresa. Russian - Chinese Space Weapons Ban Proposal: A Critique. Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations - Conference on Disarmament, December 2008.	]]></description>
	<pubDate>Mon, 28 Dec 2009 12:30:00 -0800</pubDate>	<link>http://www.spacedebate.org/evidence/4233</link>
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