Despite claims of a new space race to the Moon, significant international cooperation is developing for Moon and Mars missions. In 2007 the 14 largest space agencies agreed to coordinate future space missions in a document titled "The Global Exploration Strategy: The Framework for Coordination," which highlights a shared vision of space exploration, focused on solar system destinations such as the Moon and Mars. It calls for a voluntary forum to assist coordination and collaboration for sustainable space exploration, although it does not establish a global space program. Chinese authorities have also indicated that a mechanism for cooperation is being developed in Asia among countries pursuing lunar exploration programs.

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Space Security Index. Space Security 2008. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, September 2008. [ 13 quotes ] [ page 80-81 ]

 

In January 2007 the Indian Air Chief Marshall again announced plans for the establishment of the long-anticipated Indian Aerospace Command, originally envisioned as part of the Indian Air Force. This would substantially increase the role of India's military forces in space. However, instead of a fully fledged aerospace command, a space cell has been established under the Air Vice Marshal, and a dialogue on the shape of the eventual Command is expected to take place among the three branches of the Indian Armed Forces to establish a tri-services Aerospace Command. Training was also started for a core group of people to staff the Command in the future. In 2007 India also reportedly took steps to revise its defense doctrine to exploit the use of space to enhance the functional effectiveness of its armed forces. Indian Army Commanders ratified Space Vision 2020 — the philosophy of using space in future warfare — at an Army Commander's conference in October 2007. The document, drawn up by a special space cell at the Indian Army Headquarters, reportedly emphasizes aspects of force modernization, including battlefield transparency, long-range precision engagement, and integral air mobility. This follows a space policy reportedly developed by the Indian Air Force in 2007, as well as a new Air Force defense doctrine. Media reports indicate that the revised doctrine, which stresses the primacy of air power, also features the utilization of "space for real-time military communications and reconnaissance missions, ballistic missile defence and delivery of precision guided munitions through satellite signals."

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Space Security Index. Space Security 2008. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, September 2008. [ 13 quotes ] [ page 65-66 ]

 

The primary focus and competency of the EU in relation to space is on civil space applications, with military and defense issues the exclusive reserve of national governments. Nonetheless, the European Space Policy adopted in 2007 highlights implementation of the space dimension of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Since 2003 when the European Commission adopted the White Paper titled "Space: a new European frontier for an expanding Union," the EU has consistently stressed the strategic importance of space in implementing its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including the ESDP. Along this line, the European space policy seeks to develop synergies between defense and civil space programs and also to guarantee EU independent access to space. While military space capabilities remain within the exclusive purview of member states, the new policy urges them to increase coordination to achieve the highest levels of interoperability between military and civilian space systems. The policy envisages that "sharing and pooling of the resources of European civilian and military space programmes, drawing on multiple use technology and common standards, would allow more cost-effective solutions."

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Space Security Index. Space Security 2008. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, September 2008. [ 13 quotes ] [ page 66 ]

 

Another approach to detection would be to place sensors on every satellite to allow the detection of nearby satellites and negation efforts. While no actor has fully developed these capabilities, the ongoing US Radio Frequency Threat Warning and Attack Reporting (RFTWARS) program aims to develop a lightweight, low-power radio frequency sensor suite to attach to individual satellites to provide situational awareness. The US is also developing capabilities to detect electromagnetic interference on satellites through its Rapid Attack Identification Detection and Reporting System (RAIDRS) program. This largely classified program is defined by the US as a defensive counterspace system designed to identify, locate, and report attacks on US space systems, thus enabling timely deployment of defensive responses. The system has been operating since 2005 with six fixed ground stations and three deployable ground segments. Finally, the USAF is developing the Autonomous Nanosatellite Guardian for Evaluating Local Space (ANGELS) to shadow a space asset and provide local, on-orbit space situational awareness and anomaly characterization. The first ANGELS launch is currently expected in 2009.

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Space Security Index. Space Security 2008. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, September 2008. [ 13 quotes ] [ page 141 ]

 

The ASAT potential of high-energy lasers has been extensively explored by the US the USSR/Russia and China. All states have access to low-powered lasers, which could be used to "dazzle" unhardened satellites in LEO, and many may already have the capability to use low-power lasers to degrade unhardened sensors on satellites in LEO. In 1997 the US Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser (MIRACL) was test fired against a satellite in a 420-km orbit, damaging the satellite's sensors. Reportedly, it was a 30-watt laser used for alignment that actually damaged the target satellite's sensors, suggesting that even a commercially available low-watt laser functioning from the ground could be used to "dazzle" or temporarily disrupt a satellite. The megawatt class MIRACL laser system is able to dazzle and blind sensors in GEO and heat to kill electronics on satellites in LEO — a significant ASAT capability. Similarly the USAF StarfireOptical Range at Kirtland Air Force Base inNew Mexico is undertaking laser experiments under the Advanced Weapons Technology program that was characterized as "experiments for application including antisatellite weapons" and called for a demonstration of "fully compensated beam propagation to Low-Earth orbit satellites" in the FY2007 budget request. Funding was only authorized after the USAF denied any intent to test Starfire as an ASAT. Until 2004 the US was developing a Counter Surveillance Reconnaissance System (CSRS) that employed lasers to temporarily disrupt surveillance satellites by dazzling their sensors.

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Space Security Index. Space Security 2008. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, September 2008. [ 13 quotes ] [ page 164 ]

 

In a related development, funding for SSA efforts was increased by more than $100-million by the US Congress in the FY2008 budget authorization. Programs that received additional funds include a variety of SSA and also potential space control functions including the Space Fence, RAIDRS, ORS, the Maui Space Surveillance System, Panoramic Survey Telescope and Rapid Response System, Space Situation Awareness research, the High Accuracy Network Discrimination System, Space Control, testing capabilities, and awareness. The Maui Space Surveillance System, which tracks satellites, is scheduled to receive $42-million, up from $5-million in FY2007. RAIDRS received an $11-million increase to $64-million. An initial cut in funding for the Space Fence was reversed and overall SSA operations spending was increased from $187-million to $197-million. The US Congress also directed the Secretary of Defense and Director of National Intelligence to create a Space Protection Strategy that establishes "the priority within the Nation's space programs on the protection of national security space systems," highlighting the growing vulnerability of space systems demonstrated by the Chinese satellite intercept. It claimed that protection and SSA capabilities could together help to mitigate that vulnerability and called for better coordination between the two.

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Space Security Index. Space Security 2008. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, September 2008. [ 13 quotes ] [ page 143 ]

 

On 11 June 2007 Israel launched the military optical remote sensing Ofeq-7 satellite, which became operational later that year. Ofeq-7 is the most advanced Earth imaging satellite launched from the Middle East, and significantly increases Israel's reconnaissance capabilities in the region. Its digital high-resolution camera can identify objects as small as approximately 0.5 meter. The lifespan of the satellite is expected to be four to six years. This enhanced optical imaging capability is expected to be complemented by the launch of Israel's TecSat (Polaris) SAR imaging satellite by ISRO in early 2008. The classified satellite encountered technical difficulties in 2007, pushing back its launch date. It is anticipated that its SAR technology will be capable of providing sharp pictures of sub-meter resolution, in all-day, all-weather, all-terrain conditions. Choosing India's launch service is thought to demonstrate a new era of significant military space cooperation between Israel and India.

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Space Security Index. Space Security 2008. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, September 2008. [ 13 quotes ] [ page 132 ]

 

India's Cartosat-2A was planned for launch in 2007, but delayed until 2008 for technical reasons. The original satellite Cartosat-2 was launched on 10 January 2007, but suffered problems once in orbit that affected the quality of its images. Cartosat-2A, intended for cartographic purposes, was built and will be operated by ISRO, but has dual-use military applications. Secretary of the Department of Space and Chairman of ISRO, G Madhavan Nair has explained that "[[w]e don't put a restriction on anybody using it," confirming beliefs that India's civil space program is available for military use. Indeed, earlier reports indicated that the Military Surveillance and Reconnaissance System to provide India with dedicated military satellite intelligence was to become operational by the end of 2007, but its current status is not clear. Cartosat-2A, like the original satellite, will carry a powerful panoramic camera and is intended to provide images with a resolution of one meter.

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Space Security Index. Space Security 2008. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, September 2008. [ 13 quotes ] [ page 133 ]

 

Ongoing efforts to regulate access to commercial satellite imagery Controversy surrounding the potential use of Google Earth images by terrorists in Iraq in 2007 sheds light on the ongoing struggle between access to commercial space services and security needs. Although commercial services such as Google Earth are composed of unclassified photos many states have raised concerns and it is now routine for many commercial images to be blocked. Google replaced the images of Iraq with prewar data following complaints by the British government, and was asked by the Indian government to blur what it referred to as strategic locations in India. Similar policies exist in many other countries including Australia, Russia, South Korea, Thailand, and Israel. In 2007, as commercial providers launched new, improved capabilities, the Director of the National Geospacial-Intelligence Agency acknowledged that controls on distribution might need to be put in place. There is "little if any directly applicable international law" governing the controversy. Images of China's new Jin-class submarine also appeared on Google Earth in July 2007.

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Space Security Index. Space Security 2008. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, September 2008. [ 13 quotes ] [ page 108 ]

 

Following Congressional testimony by the then Commander of USSTRATCOM, General Cartwright, the US Congress has refocused development efforts for a US prompt global strike capability. The FY2008 Defense Authorization bill provided $100-million for a new Prompt Global Strike program, combining funds from the US Navy Conventional Trident Modification Program and US Air Force Common Aero Vehicle (CAV – part of the Falcon program). It is unlikely that this program will result in the development of a space-based weapon system. The US Congress has issued explicit instructions to the Department of Defense about the areas to which funding can be applied and asked for a report on the future roadmap within 90 days of the bill's implementation. Still, several advanced enabling technologies will be developed, including "advanced propulsion, payload delivery and dispensing mechanisms, weapon system command and control, and advanced non-nuclear, kinetic, and other enabling capabilities," which would be required to support a space-based strike system.

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Space Security Index. Space Security 2008. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, September 2008. [ 13 quotes ] [ page 182 ]

 

The broader category of space situational awareness, within which space surveillance is a primary capability, remains one of the "most urgent space security shortcomings" of the US, according to leading experts. The US has programs to bolster such capabilities, but they are generally under-funded and behind schedule. The US Deep View program plans to develop a high-resolution radar-imaging capability to characterize smaller objects in Earth orbit by 2010. The US Space Surveillance Telescope program intends to "demonstrate an advanced ground-based optical system to enable detection and tracking of faint objects in space, while providing rapid, wide-area search capability" by 2009. The Space Based Space Surveillance System (SBSS) is being developed to enhance capabilities for identifying and tracking debris in GEO, however the Orbital Deep Space Imager program was cancelled in 2006. This capability is also relevant for the broader US space control mission.

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Space Security Index. Space Security 2008. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, September 2008. [ 13 quotes ] [ page 35 ]

 

JDEC operations should be consolidated with HCoC There is significant overlap between the missions and intent of the bilateral JDEC and the multilateral HCoC. Both regimes call for nations to exchange pre-launch notification information. Indeed, when Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton agreed to create the JDEC, they hoped the center might evolve to include other interested states. By consolidating the JDEC with the HCoC, the presidents' vision is attained while simultaneously enhancing HCoC's stabilizing influence with the inclusion of voluntary early warning information. If the USA and Russia cannot come to terms over implementation plans establishing the JDEC in Russia, then the nations should consider placing the center in another, neutral country. Taxes and liabilities would become moot issues. Considering Austria's long history of neutrality, Vienna would be an ideal alternate location. Integration with HCoC operations should be technically simple.

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Larrimore, Scott. "International Space Launch Notification and Data Exchange." Space Policy. Vol. 23 (August 2007): 172-179. [ 7 quotes ] [ page 177 ]

 

The USA and Russia should continue to work on resolving issues with JDEC. The JDEC issue has been lingering in limbo for nine years with little headway. Lack of progress demonstrates the low priority both nations have placed on this endeavor, despite rhetoric to the contrary. The USA and Russia should re-evaluate their desire to implement this program and, if validated, quickly establish plans to stand up the center. Impediments towards progress, particularly the liability issue, have been resolved. Nations around the world will follow these nuclear powers' lead. The path could be either toward cooperation and transparency or toward opposition and obfuscation.

An operable JDEC may help diffuse some of the tension between Washington and Moscow over the USA's plans to build a component of its missile defense system in central Europe. Recently President Bush offered to give a detailed explanation of the country's plans to Russia and opened the door to further missile defense cooperation. The head of the USA's Missile Defense Agency, Lieutenant General Henry Obering, said his organization is ''very open to cooperation with Russia to strengthen missile defenses, including possible technology and data transfer''. Placing priority on implementing a previously agreed-upon collaborative missile warning center would be a good step.

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Larrimore, Scott. "International Space Launch Notification and Data Exchange." Space Policy. Vol. 23 (August 2007): 172-179. [ 7 quotes ] [ page 177 ]

 

As space launch and ballistic missile technologies proliferate, countries around the world need to be increasingly vigilant to potential attack. Correspondingly, the opportunities for misunderstandings and false alarms increase as well. The strategic consequences of a ballistic missile attack magnify the necessity to minimize these potential errors, to increase launch transparency, and to establish other confidence-building measures. Early warning false alarms by countries holding the world's foremost nuclear arsenals underscore this imperative. Leaders of the USA, the former Soviet Union, and later Russia, have had to consider their nuclear attack options at least four times in the past as a result of technical problems, administrative errors or system false alarms.

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Larrimore, Scott. "International Space Launch Notification and Data Exchange." Space Policy. Vol. 23 (August 2007): 172-179. [ 7 quotes ] [ page 173 ]

 

On 25 February 2007, a suborbital sounding rocket blasted off from a launch pad in Iran, bringing that country a step closer towards a domestic space launch capability and membership among spacefaring nations. Several news organizations had mistakenly reported the test as an actual space launch, in part because of the lack of international transparency in Iran's space plans and because of statements the previous month of an imminent Iranian space launch from a leading member of the Iranian parliament.

As the Iranian launch shows, proliferation of space technology continues its march around the world. Fifteen countries have joined the satellite-owning club with spacecraft of their own within the past decade, an increase of 50%. The steady increase of space capable nations is illustrated in Fig. 1. While most states contract launch services from established providers, others are seeking launch independence as well. A decade ago only half a dozen nations could launch their own spacecraft. Fig. 2 shows that this number will double in a few years, as nations such as South Korea, Iran and Pakistan field independent launch systems.

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Larrimore, Scott. "International Space Launch Notification and Data Exchange." Space Policy. Vol. 23 (August 2007): 172-179. [ 7 quotes ] [ page 172 ]

 

Space surveillance capabilities are vital to the mitigation of environmental hazards. There is no international space surveillance mechanism, but several efforts to create one date to the 1980s. In 1986 Canada presented the so-called PAXSAT study, which proposed a space-to-space remote sensing system (PAXSAT A) based on non-superpower technology available at the time. In 1989 France proposed the creation of an Earth-based space surveillance system consisting of radar and optical sensors to allow the international community to track the trajectory of space objects. This proposal was presented in the Conference on Disarmament and evolved into a proposal to establish a UN International Trajectography Centre (UNITRACE). It was suggested that, in the context of rapid technological advances and easier access to high-quality information, the UNITRACE proposal could be revisited and updated. Such an initiative could complement the US-Russian agreement to establish the Joint Center for the Exchange of Data from Early Warning Systems and Notification of Missile Launches and would be consistent with that agreement's anticipated multilateralization. In the absence of an international system, countries are establishing independent space surveillance capabilities, with some degree of information exchange.

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Space Security Index. Space Security 2008. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, September 2008. [ 13 quotes ] [ page 34 ]

 

While a laudable concept, there are some inherent challenges with the JDEC. One party cannot be guaranteed that the information provided by the other has not been manipulated in some manner. If hostilities ever ensued, a belligerent would not provide launch information of its attack to its adversary. Furthermore, the information exchanged is processed rather than raw data, impeding the potential merger, corroboration and synthesis of the countries' data together.

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Larrimore, Scott. "International Space Launch Notification and Data Exchange." Space Policy. Vol. 23 (August 2007): 172-179. [ 7 quotes ] [ page 176 ]

 

Although agreed to in concept almost a decade ago, there has been very little movement standing up the JDEC. First, relations between the USA and Russia became strained over NATO's Operation Allied Force against Serbia in 1999. Both nations changed presidential administrations following elections in 2000 in their respective countries. Despite strong Russian support following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, bilateral relations subsequently cooled with growing US concerns over Moscow's crackdown on internal dissent and hostility towards its weaker neighbors. Relations further chilled with the USA's withdrawal from the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty in 2001. Progress on joint initiatives, such as the JDEC, slowed to a standstill.

Work on the JDEC stalled in February 2001, ostensibly over tax and liability issues. The nations disagreed over whether US contractors would have to pay Russian taxes and whether they could be held liable for injuries or damages occurring in the course of their job. The Bush administration believed acquiescing to Russian demands would set a precedent that could jeopardize larger and potentially more dangerous joint projects under the Cooperative Threat Reduction program.

The impasse might recently have been broken. On 15 September 2006, the USA and Russia finalized an agreement resolving a liability dispute on a project to dispose of excess Russian plutonium, potentially establishing a precedent for other joint projects. A liability resolution process is now in place, as well as protection of US companies from employees' individual transgressions or negligence. The Bush administration's strategy was to try to resolve the most difficult case first and then apply that solution to less worrisome projects such as the JDEC.

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Larrimore, Scott. "International Space Launch Notification and Data Exchange." Space Policy. Vol. 23 (August 2007): 172-179. [ 7 quotes ] [ page 176 ]

 

The increase in the number of spacefaring states and launch sites raises security issues for many states. Several countries seeking indigenous launch capabilities are doing so in the context of regional arms races. The problem is that space technologies, and rocket technology in particular, are inherently dual purpose. Technology used to develop a space launch vehicle could be directly applied to ballistic missiles. Technology used for meteorology or land development could be used for reconnaissance. While there is by necessity a good deal of transparency in commercial space launches, this launch segment's market share remains about half that of the combined national civil and military sectors. When one state launches a ballistic missile or spacecraft, another state may not know whether a potential adversary is launching a satellite, a destructive ballistic warhead, or some other weapon of war.

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Larrimore, Scott. "International Space Launch Notification and Data Exchange." Space Policy. Vol. 23 (August 2007): 172-179. [ 7 quotes ] [ page 172 ]

 

However, speaking at a Nov. 20 breakfast session with reporters, [U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition John] Young questioned whether the price tag for the new weapons would justify their benefits.

"There are a lot of people who think we ought to have this in our arsenal," he said at the event, sponsored by the Center for Media and Security. "I'm not sure I want to argue all day with them. But I do think it is a very expensive capability that I'm not sure all the rest of the elements of our structure are prepared to support."

Young specifically questioned whether a U.S. president would have enough confidence in the intelligence available to support such an attack. Critics have said the use of a future prompt-strike missile, potentially based on sketchy information about a target, could lead to unintended deaths and harm to U.S. interests abroad.

The defense acquisition chief also doubted whether the military chain of command could act quickly enough to disable or destroy an ephemeral target. Pentagon leaders have said the weapons should be able to launch within an hour of an attack order, and flight times would be measured in minutes.

"You have to convince yourself you have all the elements to support that," Young said, noting this confidence would be necessary even if just a small number of such weapons were built. "Do you have a command authority; and a chain of command; and quality and timeliness of intelligence to let you target that and all those things?"

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Grossman, Elaine M. "Senior U.S. Official Doubts Conventional Global Strike Value." Global Security Newswire. November 26, 2008.

 

The USAF initiated an upgrade of the CounterCom satellite jamming system it first deployed in 2004.The CounterCom system is a "mobile, ground-based antenna that can jam the signals from a single satellite in geosynchronous orbit." The upgrade aims to fully equip two squadrons with seven jamming systems, up from the current two. USAF also started pre-acquisition work for next-generation jammers, which will have "enhanced capabilities for SATCOMdenial" using largely commercially available components.The USAF also intends to reduce the number of authorization steps and shorten the decision time to launch offensive cyber attacks against enemy networks. The goal is to provide lower-ranking officers with the authority to launch attacks so that they could take place within minutes. Currently the only authority rests with the President and the Secretary of. Electronic jamming is in keeping with the USAF preference for temporary and reversible means of space systems negation. In 2007 the US Army reported that it had deployed and is using a "wildly successful" ground-based system that is complementary to the USAF CounterCom to deny US enemies the ability to use commercial space capabilities.

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Space Security Index. Space Security 2008. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, September 2008. [ 13 quotes ] [ page 159 ]

 

Let us be clear. A successful EMP attack on the U.S. would have a dramatic effect on the country, to say the least. Even one that only affected part of the country would cripple the economy for years. Dropping nuclear weapons on or retaliating against whoever caused the attack would not help. And an EMP attack is not far-fetched.

Twice in the last eight years, in the Caspian Sea, the Iranians have tested their ability to launch ballistic missiles in a way to set off an EMP. The congressionally mandated EMP Commission, with some of America's finest scientists, has released its findings and issued two separate reports, the most recent in April, describing the devastating effects of such an attack on the U.S.

The only solution to this problem is a robust, multilayered missile-defense system. The most effective layer in this system is in space, using space-based interceptors that destroy an enemy warhead in its ascent phase when it is easily identifiable, slower, and has not yet deployed decoys. We know it can work from tests conducted in the early 1990s. We have the technology. What we lack is the political will to make it a reality.

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Claremont Institute - MissileThreat.com. "What a Single Nuclear Warhead Could Do." Wall Street Journal. November 24, 2008.

 

For these reasons, this author calls upon the United States to support the creation of a legal agreement that provides for greater transparency in space activities and establishes a space weaponization dispute resolution mechanism. This agreement should achieve the following:

1. Strengthen the Registration Convention reporting requirements. The ability of States to conceal the location and function of registered space objects should be inhibited by requiring registries to contain more detailed information. Reports to the Secretary-General should be furnished within a specific period of time, eliminating the ability of States to delay.


2. Allow States engaged in space weaponization to clarify the purpose and intent of their activities. This may come in the form of "notices of intent" filed with registration reports that explain why a State has undertaken a particular space weaponization activity.


3. Provide a forum through which States may request information and clarification of space weaponization activities. In this forum, States can raise perceived violations of applicable law, request treaty obligations be fulfilled, and call for negotiations.


4. Establish a body that facilitates communication and negotiations for the purposes of preventing weaponization and removing weaponization systems already deployed.


5. Establish a legal mechanism to resolve disputes over the interpretation and application of the Outer Space Treaty, in particular as it relates to space weaponization. This dispute resolution mechanism could be three-tiered. The first-tier would allow for private mediation, similar to the consultation provisions of the Moon Treaty. The second-tier would be binding arbitration, subject to appeal. The third-tier would be the International Court of Justice, or other judicial body, whose decisions would be final and binding. The United Nations Security Council would be the appropriate body to enforce the decision.

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Mineiro, Michael C. "The United States and the Legality of Outer Space Weaponization: A Proposal for Greater Transparency and a Dispute Resolution Mechanism." Annals of Air and Space Law. (2008): 441-466. [ 5 quotes ] [ page 465 ]

 

The goals outlined above are not outside the scope of political reality, for they attempt to strike a balance between idealism and pragmatism. All nations, whether or not they have deployed or have the capacity to deploy space weapons, have an interest in the peaceful development of outer space. At the same time, States have an incentive to weaponize outer space because the absence of a diplomatic sovereign to arbitrate international conflicts means that States must rely upon their own strength for protection.111 A spiraling cycle of weaponization can only be prevented if States are more transparent with their activities, clear on the intent and purpose of their activities, willing to negotiate, and have an effective legal means to resolve disputes.

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Mineiro, Michael C. "The United States and the Legality of Outer Space Weaponization: A Proposal for Greater Transparency and a Dispute Resolution Mechanism." Annals of Air and Space Law. (2008): 441-466. [ 5 quotes ] [ page 466 ]

 

The current legal regime requires little, if any, transparency and provides hardly any mechanisms for dispute resolution. The reporting requirements established under the Registration Convention provide very little transparency, allowing States to effectively conceal whether or not a registered object is a space weapon.106 The Outer Space Treaty does provide for the application of international law and the United Nations Charter. Thus, in case of a dispute relating to outer space weaponization, in accordance with article 2(3) of the Charter, States are obligated to negotiate in good faith under article 33 of the Charter.107 However, in the event that negotiations fail, few other methods of dispute resolution are available. While article IX of the Outer Space Treaty calls for international consultations, it is unclear whether the deployment of a space weapon alone triggers this obligation and even if it does, to what extent such.

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Mineiro, Michael C. "The United States and the Legality of Outer Space Weaponization: A Proposal for Greater Transparency and a Dispute Resolution Mechanism." Annals of Air and Space Law. (2008): 441-466. [ 5 quotes ] [ page 464 ]