It is highly likely China is developing ground-based directed energy weapons with the capability to temporarily disable, damage, or even destroy a satellite. With roughly 300 organizations, 3,000 engineers, and 10,000 total personnel participating in laser-related efforts, Beijing's aggressive pursuit of advanced directed energy technology has given its program world-class status. As early as 1994, the Chinese successfully tested a free electron laser with a 140 megawatt output. They have since pursued miniaturization of laser systems, perhaps to enable a mobile system. According to other reports, China is seeking to build an ASAT system using a high-energy deuterium fluoride laser, mimicking the US Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser (MIRACL) design. ( More ... )

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France, Martin E.B. and Richard J. Adams. "The Chinese Threat to US Superiority." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 1, No. 3 (Winter 2005): 17-22. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 20 ]

 

China has a long-standing capacity to track objects in space. It is based on a number of ground stations (including two located outside of china) and four satellite tracking ships. The ability to track object in space is critical for space operations. China would need this capability in order to carry out manned missions as well as for orbiting satellites. However, it is also critical for anti-satellite operations, whether ground-based or for inorbit attacks. Locating U.S. satellites is a necessary precursor to the successful conduct of anti-satellite operations. This combination of tracking capability and a range of experimental anti-satellite programs suggest that anti-satellite efforts could be the greater source of risk for the U.S. This concern needs to be tempered by the lack of actual ASAT tests by the Chinese. An operational ASAT program would test its weapons (as the U.S. and the Soviets did in the past) against space targets. Although there have been terrestrial tests ground of lasers that may have been for anti-satellite purposes, the Chinese have not conducted tests against targets in space. ( More ... )

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Lewis, James A. "China as a Military Space Competitor." Perspectives on Space Security. Ed. Audrey M. Schaffer. Washington, D.C.: Space Policy Institute, December 2005. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 106-7 ]

 

India's first indigenously developed missile, the Prithvi, has provided the basic technology for further ballistic missile development. As a result of these efforts, the Indian government has several on-going ballistic missile systems in development that could launch an ASAT device. ( More ... )

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Chun, Clayton K. S. Shooting Down a Star: Program 437, the U.S. Nuclear ASAT System and Present Day Copycat Killers. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, April 2000. [ 11 quotes ] [ page 48-9 ]

 

The pace of growth in India's ballistic missile program combined with its nuclear capabilities and Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons and acquisition of ballistic missiles elevate the South Asia subcontinent to an area of grave concern for the United States and the world community. India's potential to deploy ASAT weapons raises the possibility that India could attempt to damage or destroy the intelligence-gathering satellites of the United States and other countries to blind or severely limit the ability of those nations to monitor military activity and nuclear weapons tests in the region. India's potential to develop and deploy an ASAT system is alarming given the ongoing military confrontation between these two countries. ( More ... )

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Chun, Clayton K. S. Shooting Down a Star: Program 437, the U.S. Nuclear ASAT System and Present Day Copycat Killers. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, April 2000. [ 11 quotes ] [ page 52 ]

 

If history is any indication, many scenarios involving conflict in space are almost certain to occur in the future. Each frontier that humans have entered has eventually ended up as a theater of warfare. On the other hand, the opportunities are there today for the United States, because of its unique position as the world's sole remaining superpower, to make the decisions and take the actions that will allow the world to more peacefully resolve these conflicts -- conflicts that will naturally come in the development of the frontier of space.

There are, however, and will continue to be, significant pressures that impact the development of the frontier of space. These pressures come from both economic activity and military desires and necessities. Both commerce and the military have tracked the frontier as it moved from land to sea to air, and they are continuing to follow the frontier into space. Commerce has always been driven by the need for access (and quicker access) to new markets and resources. The military continues to be driven by the need to protect both the core of a nation and that nation's interests in the frontier. How the United States responds to these pressures -- pressures that inevitably create conflict -- will define space, and the use of space, in the next century.

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Hyten, John E. A Sea of Peace or a Theater of War: Dealing with the Inevitable Conflict in Space. Urbana-Champaign, IL: Program in Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security, April 2000. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 17 ]

 

Although not verified through other sources, the Hong Kong Sing Tao Daily newspaper quoted unnamed Chinese resources in reporting that China is developing a space-based anti-satellite system. According to the report, the concept is to deploy very small "parasitic" satellites called nano-satellites that would attach themselves to satellites and re-main inactive during normal times. Upon activation, these parasitic satellites would destroy the satellite or disrupt its operations. ( More ... )

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Thompson, David J. China in Space: Civillian and Military Developments. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, August 2001. [ 4 quotes ] [ page 24 ]

 

Some instruction on these points may be found in a simulated war against the People's Republic of China conducted at the Naval War College in the spring of 1994. The war game, set in the year 2010, was a part of the Pentagon's ongoing study of the revolution in military affairs. In the scenario, Beijing provokes the U.S. Navy into patrolling China's shores, luring vulnerable aircraft carriers and other surface ships within range of precision-guided cruise missiles. The Chinese begin their ambush by attacking U.S. satellites, which confounds American targeting abilities and precludes any significant counter-offensive by the U.S. Navy. The Chinese also use space-based assets to enhance the effectiveness of their own forces. U.S. players in this war game were routed, their forces hit before they could throw up adequate defenses. ( More ... )

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Lambakis, Steven. "Space Control in Desert Storm and Beyond." Orbis. Vol. 39, No. 3 (Summer 1995). [ 6 quotes ]

 

The ASAT potential of high-energy lasers has been extensively explored by the US and to a lesser degree by the USSR. As many as 30 states may already have the capability to use low-power lasers to degrade unhardened sensors on satellites. In 1997, the US Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser (MIRACL) was test-fired against a satellite in a 420-kilometer orbit, damaging the satellite's sensors. Reportedly, it was not the mega-watt MIRACL laser, but a 30-watt laser used for alignment that actually damaged the target satellite's sensors. This suggests that even a commercially available low-watt laser could be used to 'dazzle,' or temporarily disrupt, a satellite functioning from the ground. ( More ... )

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Cowan-Sharp, Jessy, Robert Lawson et al. Space Security Index 2004. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, June 2005. [ 13 quotes ] [ page 128 ]

 

China is suspected of developing ground-based laser weapons and electronic pulse weapons that could blind or destroy satellites. A weapon does not need to destroy a satellite to render it useless, just damage the susceptible optical sensors. The closer Sino-Russian relationship also is contributing to China's advancement, as Russia turns the former Soviet Union's tremendous Cold War research and development budgets and technological advancements into economic gains. ( More ... )

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Thompson, David J. China in Space: Civillian and Military Developments. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, August 2001. [ 4 quotes ] [ page 12 ]

 

Libya has been accused of blocking broadcasts of two international satellites (Eutelsat's Hotbird and Loral Skynet's Telsat 12), interrupting signals of several TV and radio stations serving Europe as well as some American diplomatic, military, and intelligence communications. The primary target is thought to be Sowt Libya (Voice of Libya), a Britishand Arab-owned commercial radio station broadcasting on human rights issues to Libya. ( More ... )

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Collard-Wexler, Simon, Thomas Graham et al. Space Security 2006. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, July 2006. [ 26 quotes ] [ page 138 ]

 

The absence of hostile anti-satellite systems during Desert Storm also made the achievement of space control for the positive uses of space extraordinarily simple. Not too long ago, however, the United States could not take the liberty of planning for war without providing for satellite survivability. During the cold war, the United States had to defend against an enemy that had developed the capability to disrupt and destroy space systems. For almost two decades, until its collapse, the Soviet Union maintained a dedicated co-orbital interceptor in readiness at its launch site at the Tyuratam cosmodrome. The Soviets also deployed exoatmospheric nuclear-tipped anti-ballistic missiles around Moscow, which could have been used against U.S. satellites in low Earth orbit. It was believed that Moscow also sponsored research and development of directed-energy weapons, lasers, and nonnuclear direct-ascent interceptors for use against enemy satellites. Today, Russia continues to deploy nuclear interceptors and may still have an operational co-orbital anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon. ( More ... )

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Lambakis, Steven. "Space Control in Desert Storm and Beyond." Orbis. Vol. 39, No. 3 (Summer 1995). [ 6 quotes ]

 

The number of states emphasizing the security uses of space in national policies continued to increase in 2005. In January, the Japanese government introduced a plan to deploy a new generation of spy satellites. Japan also continued talks with the US throughout 2005 on furthering missile defense cooperation. The Israeli Air Force unveiled plans in June to launch additional surveillance satellites to boost intelligence capabilities and to manufacture micro-satellites that could provide information on combat zones (see Space Support for Military Operations). In addition, Yuval Steinitz, chairman of Israel's Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee, stated that defense and industry officials should consider future developments of "anti-satellite missiles" and "satellite-attacking lasers." India also continued to pay greater attention to the military uses of space. The Indian Air Force urged the government to set up a Strategic Aerospace Command to purportedly facilitate the development of capabilities to degrade space weapons in preparation for "future star wars." While some reports contend that the government has rejected the proposals, Indian Air Force Chief S. P. Tyagi insists that the recommendations are still under consideration, particularly in light of the Parliamentary Standing Committee's declarations that India needs the ability to counter any threat from space. Media reports throughout 2005 revealed significant speculation about China's space capabilities and military-related space intentions, although Chinese officials maintain that the country's space program is solely for peaceful purposes.

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Collard-Wexler, Simon, Thomas Graham et al. Space Security 2006. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, July 2006. [ 26 quotes ] [ page 60 ]

 

The United States' reliance upon space systems for numerous military force applications is a tempting target to many nations. The post-cold-war era has left the United States with a downsized military in terms of personnel, equipment, and bases. This situation has forced our military to rely on a number of force multipliers such as space-based systems to overcome force size, enemy geographic advantages, and distance concerns. ( More ... )

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Chun, Clayton K. S. Shooting Down a Star: Program 437, the U.S. Nuclear ASAT System and Present Day Copycat Killers. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, April 2000. [ 11 quotes ] [ page 69-70 ]

 

India is pushing ahead with its ambitious space programme while casting an envious eye at neighbouring China, which is on the verge of becoming the third nation to put a man into orbit, analysts say.

The two Asian giants have taken their traditional rivalry into space; India, which fought a border war with China in 1962, may be behind in terms of space technology, but is eager to catch up. ( More ... )

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"India, China Turn Traditional Rivalry Into Space Race." Spacedaily. October 12, 2003.

 

Technology accessible to China today enables attack by ground-segment interdiction, computer network disruption, communications jamming, laser blinding, direct ascent ASAT interceptors, space mines, debris rings, and high-altitude nuclear bursts. Interdicting ground stations may be the easiest way to disable space systems. Due to their concentration within US and Allied borders, such attacks would likely be highly escalatory. Computer network attack, communication jamming, and laser blinding have the advantage of being bloodless and potentially deniable, but can be susceptible to countermeasures. Options such as ground-launched missiles, co-orbital mines, fragmentation rings, and high-altitude nuclear bursts (supercharging the Earth's Van Allen radiation belts) offer the advantage of a hard-kill, but are non-discriminatory. China's satellites, as well as those belonging to third parties, would likely be damaged or destroyed by residual debris and radiation. While the above-listed methods provide China a number of technologically-available near-term options, further advances may give them the additional benefits of increased range and precision. ( More ... )

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France, Martin E.B. and Richard J. Adams. "The Chinese Threat to US Superiority." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 1, No. 3 (Winter 2005): 17-22. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 19 ]

 

The US has a variety of ongoing programs developing advanced technologies that would be foundational for a space-based conventional ASAT program, including maneuverability, docking, and on-board optics. The Experimental Spacecraft System (XSS) employs microsatellites to test proximity operations, including autonomous rendezvous, maneuvering, and close-up inspection of a target. For example, XSS-10 was launched in 2002 and performed maneuvers within 40 meters of another satellite. The Near-Field Infrared Experiment (NFIRE), designed to provide support to ballistic missile defense, would employ a kill vehicle to encounter a ballistic missile at close range, with a sensor to record the findings. Although NFIRE is not designed for space systems negation, it could be modified for such use. Another missile defense technology currently under development which could enable space systems negation is the space-based interceptor (SBI). The SBI, tentatively scheduled for a 2011-2012 deployment, will test ballistic missile interception using small, light-weight kill vehicles from a space-based platform. ( More ... )

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Collard-Wexler, Simon, Thomas Graham et al. Space Security 2006. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, July 2006. [ 26 quotes ] [ page 136 ]

 

Anti-satellite (ASAT) programs entail ground-based high-energy weapons, ground- or air-launched interceptor missiles, or 'hunter-killer' satellites that destroy their target through explosion or ballistic impact.

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Lao, Shu-Hsien. "Will China become a Military Space Superpower?." Space Policy. Vol. 21 (2005): 205-212. [ 1 reference ] [ page 209 ]

 

Iran continued to jam satellite reception in Tehran in 2005. While satellite dishes are technically banned in Iran, the government has reportedly taken additional steps to prevent reception of international opposition television stations, including Voice of America's Persianlanguage programming. The jammers did not affect the uplink, but instead broadcast microwave signals across Tehran to prevent reception over the local area, a procedure that is not banned by international law. The US Broadcasting Board of Governors responded on 17 June 2005 in support of Voice of America and other affected stations by providing access to a third satellite to broadcast their signals simultaneously with the current two (Telstar 12 and EutelSat's Hotbird), thus making it more difficult for Iranian authorities to jam the signals. This local jamming technique would be applicable to counter-intelligence or battlefield situations as well, providing the ability to temporarily block satellite reception over specific areas without damaging space assets or disrupting services outside of the area.

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Collard-Wexler, Simon, Thomas Graham et al. Space Security 2006. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, July 2006. [ 26 quotes ] [ page 138 ]

 

China's burgeoning microsatellite program enhances its ability to attack American spaceborne assets. Beijing could discretely launch such small, lightweight and difficult to detect satellites as secondary payloads on otherwise overt missions. When desired, the hitchhiker could then maneuver into position for attack. With the help of Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd, (the leading microsat development company in Europe, if not the world) China is making tremendous strides in microsat design, fabrication, and operations. ( More ... )

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France, Martin E.B. and Richard J. Adams. "The Chinese Threat to US Superiority." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 1, No. 3 (Winter 2005): 17-22. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 20 ]

 

A number of electronic jamming incidents targeting media broadcasts by communications satellites have been reported in recent years, with the interruptions in US service blamed on Iran working within Cuba, Turkey blocking Kurdish news broadcasts, and the Falun Gong group in China. Iraq's acquisition of GPS-jamming equipment for use against US GPS-guided munitions during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 suggested that jamming capabilities are proliferating, as the equipment was reportedly commercially acquired from a Russian company, Aviaconversiya Ltd. Although these jammers interfere with the GPS signal in a limited area on the Earth and not the GPS satellites themselves, they do constitute space negation because they disrupt satellite communications. ( More ... )

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Cowan-Sharp, Jessy, Robert Lawson et al. Space Security Index 2004. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, June 2005. [ 13 quotes ] [ page 123 ]

 

Since size and the need for refueling limit current laser weapons designs, the US is pursuing solid state laser (SSL) designs, which are generally lighter, smaller, and of longer operational life, but have not been able to generate the same level of continuous power as other types. The Pentagon's Joint High-Power Solid-State Laser (JHPSSL) program is funding the development of a 25-kilowatt SSL capable of more than 300 seconds of run-time. Twenty-five kilowatts is the approximate minimum power needed to heat-to-kill electronics on satellites in LEO and 300 seconds is the typical flyover time of a satellite in LEO. JHPSSL contractor Northrop Grumman announced on 9 November 2005 that it had successfully tested a 27-kilowatt SSL for 350 seconds, the most powerful continuous SSL to date. ( More ... )

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Collard-Wexler, Simon, Thomas Graham et al. Space Security 2006. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, July 2006. [ 26 quotes ] [ page 140 ]

 

Although technological progress, the absence of arms control regimes banning most military uses of space, and the growing use of space for tactical warfighting purposes suggest that space may ultimately be weaponized, the issue is not a simple yes or no proposition. The nature of the weapons that might ultimately reach space, or affect space assets, is important. So does the timing of weaponization, and the state of great power relations when it occurs. Even if weaponization is indeed inevitable, in other words, when and how it happens may matter a great deal. ... The outcome of the debate is unclear, and fundamentally up for grabs. ( More ... )

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O'Hanlon, Michael E. "The State of Space: From Strategic Reconnaissance to Tactical Warfighting to Possible Weaponization." Testimony before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of the House Armed Services Committee. Ed. . Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, June 21, 2006. [ 4 quotes ] [ page 15 ]

 

Only the PRC seems to have the requisite quantity and quality of launch and nuclear resources to produce an ASAT weapon in the near future. The Chinese have developed a series of space launch vehicles, have orbited space vehicles, and have tracked and controlled them. Additionally, their existing space program has become a valuable asset that they need to protect or, in some cases, use to deny space superiority to others. ( More ... )

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Chun, Clayton K. S. Shooting Down a Star: Program 437, the U.S. Nuclear ASAT System and Present Day Copycat Killers. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, April 2000. [ 11 quotes ] [ page 67 ]

 

Perhaps the greatest danger posed by the militarization of space is that of war by accident. At any given time, several thousand satellites and other pieces of equipment -- spent booster stages and the like -- are circling the earth, most of them in low orbit. The space immediately above the atmosphere has begun to resemble an expressway at rush hour. It is not uncommon for satellites to miss each other by only a kilometer or two, and satellites crashing into each other may explain some of the mysterious incidents in which space vehicles simply vanish from the skies. One civillian TV satellite has been lost in space; it never entered its intended orbit, and no signals were heard from it to indicate where it might have gone. Collision with something else in space seems a reasonable explanation of this disappearance. Even a tiny fragment of metal striking a satellite at a relative velocity of a few kilometers per second would wreck the satellite, ripping through it like a Magnum slug through a tin can. Now suppose that kind of mishap befell a military satellite -- in the worst possible situation, during a time of international tension with all players in the spacewar game braced for attacks on their spacecraft. The culpable fragment might be invisible from the ground; even something as small and light as a paper clip could inflict massive damage on a satellite at high velocity. Unaware of the accident, a less than cautious leader might interpret it as a preconceived attack. Wars have begun over smaller incidents. ( More ... )

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Ritchie, David. Spacewar. New York, NY: Antheneum, 1982. [ 1 reference ] [ page 191-2 ]

 

There are more than 620 operational satellites in orbit today: about 270 in LEO, 50 in Medium Earth Orbit, and slightly more than 300 in GEO. Demand is greatest for GEO orbital slots, where most communications satellites operate. Competition for orbital slot assignments has increased, and disputes between satellite operators seeking slots are more frequent. In reaction to this scarcity of orbital slots, some actors agreed to exchange or share rights to certain slots in 2004. Telesat Canada agreed to allow a DirecTV satellite to move into one of its slots in exchange for Telesat Canada's use of a DirecTV satellite in another orbital slot. New Skies sold the rights to an orbital slot to Intelsat, which had acquired a satellite that would be too close to avoid interference if New Skies were ever to launch to that slot. Pakistan announced plans to launch an indigenous satellite in a slot that it had maintained with a place-keeping satellite. The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) delayed internal reforms designed to address slot allocation backlogs and related financial challenges. ( More ... )

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Cowan-Sharp, Jessy, Robert Lawson et al. Space Security Index 2004. Waterloo, Ontario: Space Security Index, June 2005. [ 13 quotes ] [ page VIII ]