Proposed Russian-Chinese PPWT Treaty does Little to Address Risks from ASAT Weapons
First, the threat to space security that is squarely in our sights today is the proliferation of destructive ASAT technologies based on Earth—weaponry that is not restricted by this draft treaty. China, Russia and the United States have all displayed capabilities to use physical force to attack and destroy satellites, and some other spacefaring powers now also consider following suit. In India, in particular, there appears to be a growing debate about whether India needs to develop and test such weaponry—either to keep up with an incipient ASAT arms race or to “beat” the announcement of any treaty so that they will not be stuck in the same “have not” position as they were when the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed. The proliferation of destructive, debris-creating ASATs however is in fact in no one’s interest—as sooner or later, someone would finally fail to resist the temptation to use them. Space debris is already a serious problem, and debris threatens all satellites indiscriminately. It knows no nationality, even during times of war. Unfortunately, last year was the worst year ever for debris creation, with the US Air Force now tracking about 18,000 pieces of debris larger than 5cm in diameter—that is, large enough to do serious damage to satellites. Estimates of smaller debris range from the hundreds of thousands to the millions, and even debris of 1cm in diameter can damage or destroy an operational satellite. As it is, the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space has adopted voluntary guidelines to mitigate the creation of debris because of concern about the ever-more polluted space environment. One of those guidelines is a pledge not to deliberately create debris through the destruction of on-orbit objects. However, that pledge is weakened by both a clause that says if you “must” destroy something on orbit, be sure to do it in a very low orbit where the debris will re-enter the atmosphere—leaving room for ASAT testing in lower orbits. It also includes a waiver for national security. Thus, there remain very few normative or legal obstacles to constrain the development and testing of such ASATs—despite their clear danger to the security of all satellites.
Hitchens, Theresa. Russian - Chinese Space Weapons Ban Proposal: A Critique. Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations - Conference on Disarmament, December 2008. [ 3 quotes ]
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