Finally, another factor that transcends the three historical cases has been the role of transparency in promoting cooperation. In dealing with space nuclear testing and in assessing debris from kinetic-kill weapons tests, national decision makers have been able to act with confidence that they will know if their adversary attempts to achieve any "breakout" capability. Unlike in other environments, where the development of new destructive capabilities can often be hidden, the fact that space weapons need to be launched and tested in an internationally governed and highly transparent region allows any other country with a reasonable space surveillance system--such as the type possessed by both the USA and the USSR/Russia since the late 1960s and by at least also members of the European Space Agency and China today--can be confident that they will detect the development of any major weapons systems. This factor should play a positive role in weakening the credibility of claims that "secret" programs by potential enemies might create a "catastrophe" some day in space.

Looking ahead, however, it must be noted that there may be limitations on this factor. Specifically, when speaking about non-kinetic weapons (such as lasers) and the activities of small satellites, it will be more difficult to detect the acquisition of potentially harmful capabilities by opponents in space. On the other hand, just as stealth technologies are moving forward, technologies for detection-- including through on-board sensors--are advancing as well. Thus, there is likely be a continuing ability to track most capabilities and to continue to have confidence that any significant military advantages are not being acquired by other players in space.

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Moltz, James Clay. "Protecting Safe Access to Space: Lessons from the First 50 Years of Space Security." Space Policy. Vol. 23 (November 2007): 199-205. [ 12 quotes ] [ page 203-4 ]