Currently, missile defense tests consist of low-altitude intercepts of a ballistic missile warhead, which is sub-orbital. A ban on destructive ASAT weapon tests would prohibit the missile defense interceptors from being tested explicitly against satellites, and the ban could set an upper altitude limit to missile defense tests.

Such a ban should be verifiable from the ground, perhaps with the already existing observational assets, perhaps with additional assets and coordination between observers. Countries that consider this idea may convene a panel of experts who could assess existing national technical means and their suitability for the purpose.

For example, U.S. early warning sensors could detect the launch of the booster carrying a ground-based hit-to-kill weapon; China’s destructive anti-satellite test as well as the tests leading up to it (that did not destroy a satellite) were observed in this way by the United States. Additionally, preferably with—but perhaps initially without—launch detection, all possible satellite targets for tests of a destructive ASAT test could be monitored and verified that they have not been destroyed in an ASAT test. The US Space Surveillance Network (SSN) regularly tracks thousands of objects of size greater than around 10 cm; its tracking of active satellites and inactive satellites and large pieces of debris is considered to be complete.

Countries could verify the ban independently using a surveillance system that is much simpler than the U.S. Space Surveillance Network. Developing an independent capability to track all possible targets is a much simpler and focused task than trying to replicate the U.S. SSN catalog, as the number and type of targets and the mission is tightly circumscribed.

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Grego, Laura. "Statement of Dr. Laura Grego." Testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs. Ed. . Washington, D.C.: , May 23, 2007. [ 6 quotes ]