Jeffrey T. Richelson, author of a dozen books on U.S. and Soviet intelligence capabilities, said the United States understood the threat. He points to a 1977 memo from Brent Scowcroft, then national security adviser, to the secretaries of state and defense as well as the director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency on “U.S. Anti-Satellite Capabilities.”

The memo once classified “Top Secret” but now available at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library (and online) lays out presidential fears of Soviet dominance in the area and the means to counter it. “The Soviets should not be allowed an exclusive sanctuary in space for critical military supporting satellites,” Scowcroft wrote.

Scowcroft, on behalf of the president, proposed a twofold strategy. The more obvious solution was to be pursued in the open—the acquisition of an low-orbit anti-satellite interceptor capable of destroying “a small number (6 to 10) of important military satellites within a period of one week.”

But the “fact of” an electronic ASAT capability — one that would “electronically nullify critical Soviet military satellites at all altitudes up to synchronous” — was to be “classified and special compartmented,” meaning kept at the highest security level possible. The reason: “to avoid stimulating” counter measures by the Soviets.

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Windrem, Robert. "U.S. favors stealthy anti-satellite strategy." MSNBC News. April 11, 2007.