Given that doing nothing in the face of enemy aggression in space is not an attractive option, and diplomatic demarches and economic sanctions may not achieve the desired results, national security planners must be prepared in advance with a range of options for the impending contingency of responding to hostile interference with US interests in space. The tailoring of responses involving military activities must take into account the possibility that the adversary may not own or operate spacecraft or find a tat-for-tat response sufficiently compelling to change its behavior. Deterring additional strikes and disarming the enemy's ability to inflict further damage on critical US space assets should take priority. Countering the enemy's space control weapons, C2, and targeting, as noted above, will be important approaches to achieving such a counterforce mission objective. It is important to recognize, however, this most likely would entail extending the geographic scope of the conflict. Operations planners should expect that concerns about the escalatory risks of conducting attacks against targets within the adversary's homeland might lead to political constraints on offensive responses in some contingencies. National decision-makers will be concerned about discrimination and restraint in the use of force. In particular, the president and secretary of defense could be averse to authorizing strikes against ground-based laser or direct ascent ASAT sites on the soil of a nuclear armed opponent in retaliation for an attack on a US satellite because it could entail the risk of a nuclear attack on North America.

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Berkowitz, Marc J. "Protecting America's Freedom of Action in Space." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 3, No. 2 (March 2007): 13-18. [ 11 quotes ] [ page 17 ]