I have worked arms control issues for a good number of years -- going back to the time when Professor Harrison and I worked together in the days of the Cold War. During that entire period, no one has been able to formulate an agreed definition of what is meant by a "space weapon." What is often meant - at least in international arms control fora - is whatever the U.S. may be exploring in terms of ballistic missile defenses in space, but not weapons on the ground that would attack our satellites in space.

Acceptance of such an approach would not, in my assessment, constitute sound or productive arms control. While some may disagree, I believe this is a case where no arms control is better than bad arms control.

Let me give you an example. Some of you may recall that in the 1978-79 timeframe, the Carter Administration engaged in anti-satellite, or ASAT, arms control negotiations with the former Soviet Union. The ASAT negotiations failed for a number of reasons, including the determination that effectively verifying compliance was unattainable based in large part on definitional problems and determining what constitutes an ASAT. There was also judged to be an unacceptable risk of "breakout" from the agreement from which the United States could not rapidly recover.

With regard to the definitional problem, in particular, negotiations were stymied by questions of which so-called "space weapons" capabilities should be limited - co-orbital interceptors, direct-ascent interceptors, ground-based, or just space-based directed-energy systems? Lets not forget that the Soviet Union wanted to define the U.S. Space Shuttle as an ASAT weapon and ban it.

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Joseph, Robert G. "Remarks on the President’s National Space Policy – Assuring America’s Vital Interests." . January 11, 2007.