Although the U.S. government claims ‘rogue states’ such as North Korea and Iran as putative targets for such programs, China increasingly perceives itself as an intended loser -- as a robust U.S. missile defense network and an arsenal of space-based weapons could effectively negate China’s nuclear deterrent and thus trigger a destabilizing arms race. The rationale for China’s angst comes from a number of places. In terms of background, in 1998 the Pentagon reinstated China as a strategic nuclear target in the U.S. nuclear war plan, and Bush’s 2001 Nuclear Posture Review identifies China for the first time in two decades as an “immediate or potential nuclear contingency.” Coupled with a U.S. national defense strategy that asserts a preference for preemptive strikes, even a modest missile defense capability would dramatically raise the risk for Beijing that the United States would be capable of disabling China’s strategic nuclear force. Considering that China has always maintained a policy of minimal deterrence with its immobile, liquid-fuel strategic nuclear force, circumscribed by a declared No-First-Use policy, Beijing feels particularly vulnerable.

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Hagt, Eric. "Mutually Assured Vulnerabilities." China Security. Vol. 1, No. 2 (2006): 84-106. [ 6 quotes ] [ page 85 ]