Regardless of progress on the rapid relaunch front, the United States is probably entering an era when it should no longer count on its satellites remaining safe and secure. No foe is likely close to an ability to "clean up the heavens," systematically eliminating the dozens of GPS and communications satellites on hand for U.S. military use when needed. But satellites deployed now only in small numbers, such as imaging and signals intelligence satellites, may be more plausibly attacked. Over time, minisatellites or directed-energy weapons may even put the large constellations at risk. Although such a period of time is probably quite distant, the United States should avoid blind optimism in the availability of all satellite capabilities. The United States needs backups to satellites. Even if they prove less capable or efficient than the satellites they would replace, they are important, because the United States cannot afford to develop "single-point failures" that would bring down whole warfighting systems after the loss of a single type of asset. Catastrophic degradation of U.S. military capabilities from a single type of action or attack must be prevented.

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O'Hanlon, Michael E. "The State of Space: From Strategic Reconnaissance to Tactical Warfighting to Possible Weaponization." Testimony before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of the House Armed Services Committee. Ed. . Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, June 21, 2006. [ 4 quotes ] [ page 21 ]