Although some assert that space is already weaponized because ocean-spanning missiles pass through this domain during testing, this argument is akin to claiming that world subways have been weaponized because the Aum Shinrikyo cult used sarin gas in the Tokyo subway system in 1995. Ephemeral, isolated events do not fundamentally shift international relations or military history. Even though nations have refrained for the past two decades from flight-testing weapons specifically designed to attack satellites, such capabilities are inherent in certain military capabilities designed for other purposes. For example, powerful missile defense interceptors and medium- or long-range ballistic missiles could be adapted for use as space weapons. These ‘‘residual’’ or ‘‘latent’’ space
warfare capabilities are also cited by those who claim that space is already weaponized. By these standards, the NPT has no meaning, since dozens of nations with strong nonproliferation credentials possess the technical capabilities to build nuclear weapons. While the potential misuse of latent military capabilities remains critically important, so,
too, does the distinction between residual and dedicated space warfare capabilities. Capability has not turned into actuality, in part because latent capabilities have served as an insurance policy and deterrent against the initiation of dedicated space warfare programs by potential adversaries.

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Katz-Hyman, Michael and Michael Krepon. "Viewpoint: Space Weapons and Proliferation." Non Proliferation Review. Vol. 12, No. 2 (July 2005): 323-341. [ 15 quotes ] [ page 325 ]