Proponents of testing and deploying space warfare capabilities would argue that the above, much-abbreviated analysis is far too rational and analytical. They would argue that rational analysis does not apply to 'irrational' actors who are dismissive of the reasoned dictates of deterrence theory. Two rebuttals might be offered in response. The record of maverick leaders to date suggests that they are, indeed, capable of surprising steps but, above all, they are keenly interested in maintaining power. To initiate space warfare against the United States is not a good way to maintain power. But if irrationality rules behavior, and if a maverick leader were intent on using a nuclear weapon in a losing cause, why would that leader target satellites instead of an invading army? Asymmetric warfare in space does not favor the weak against the strong. The strong have greater means to reduce their weaknesses in space and to exploit the weaknesses of others. Moreover, weaker states have a greater chance of causing harm to the United States on the ground than in space. Attacks by weaker states against U.S. satellites would complicate and perhaps extend somewhat the Pentagon?s military campaigns, but they would not change the outcome of warfare, given the dominating and growing power projection capabilities enjoyed by the United States.

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Katz-Hyman, Michael and Michael Krepon. Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space. Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, April 2003. [ 16 quotes ] [ page 48-9 ]