The rub, of course, is that potential adversaries may not elect to emulate American approaches to the military use of orbital space. A regional opponent primarily concerned with preventing the United States from projecting its military power into its region of the world could choose to exploit space assets in very different ways than mirroring American capabilities. Some focused capabilities in orbit along with a willingness to combat or negate US advantages derived from space using terrestrial means could very well go far to level the playing field between the United States and a future regional opponent. For example, a redundant fiber-optic network coupled with a few overhead transponders for relaying mobile communications could turn the enemy's in-theater command and control into a system the United States could find nearly impossible to take down. If targeted with data from commercial or military imaging satellites, the system could permit prompt precision-missile strikes against any theater bases and airfields bases being utilized by American forces. This sort of asymmetric response to US power-projection capabilities could be quite effective with only the most limited use of satellite assets, and the trend toward orbital assets becoming a global commons makes denying the enemy access to any commercial satellites a difficult proposition. In such a scenario, the far superior and more sophisticated space capabilities of the US military might yield little overall strategic or operational advantage.

---

Watts, Barry D. The Military Use of Space: A Diagnostic Assessment. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, February 2001. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 95 ]