Finally, it is far from clear that a country planning on or engaged in fighting the United States would appreciably reduce the amount of military power the United States could ultimately bring to bear by attacking LEO satellite constellations with a nuclear burst above the sensible atmosphere. Yes, the growing dependence of the American military on commercial satellites for reachback to data and information systems in the continental United States means that their loss would impose delays and problems for US operations. On the other hand, critical satellite components of DoD's communications architecture, such as the geosynchronous MILSTAR I/II satellites, are nuclear hardened. Consequently, even an exo-atmospheric nuclear burst seems unlikely to be as serious for the United States—economically or militarily—as would, say, a complete cessation of the flow of crude oil from the Persian Gulf to the developed countries. The costs of such a wantonly destructive act would be high and the likely benefits for the perpetrator, at best, fleeting and short term.

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Watts, Barry D. The Military Use of Space: A Diagnostic Assessment. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, February 2001. [ 8 quotes ] [ page 28 ]