Moreover, the ASAT threat that is postulated is a nuclear threat. According to noted defense analyst James Kitfield, “The U.S. military has long worried that an adversary might detonate a crude nuclear weaponin space, frying the delicate electronics of all satellites, and disproportionately hamstringing U.S. troops who rely on satellites for missile and bomb guidance and for communications.” If such a detonation were to occur, even though not directed at a terrestrial target, the nuclear threshold would have been crossed. Even a so called “irrational” adversary would have to think twice before using a nuclear weapon. And, certainly, the United States would view such an attack differently than if a conventional weapon had been used and would respond accordingly. During the Cold War, a distinct demarcation between conventional and nuclear weapons existed. Even if lower yield battlefield or tactical nuclear weapons had been used (e.g., in a scenario involving a Warsaw Pact invasion of a NATO country), escalation to a larger-scale retaliation using the United States’ strategic nuclear arsenal was a very real possibility. Although a “doctrine” may not be in place to respond to a low yield nuclear ASAT scenario, the United States would probably go beyond the use of conventional weapons to retaliate. Potential adversaries know this. For example, the United States made clear to Iraq that use of chemical or biological weapons would trigger an appropriate U.S. response, including the possibility of nuclear weapons.

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Pena, Charles V. and Edward Hudgins. Should the United States 'Weaponize' Space? Military and Commercial Implications. Washington, D.C.: CATO Institute, March 18, 2002. [ 5 quotes ] [ page 8 ]