A future enemy may not be able to achieve space superiority, but it
may be able to deny this advantage to the United States. A nation with
a few ASATs might use that capability as a deterrent, offensive
weapon, or terrorist device. Such a nation may not want the United
States to use its space resources over a particular area or during a
certain time period.

For example, because it might not want a US reconnaissance satellite
to detect or watch an amphibious invasion of Taiwan, or support a US
counterstrike against the PRC, China might use its ASATs to blind or
disable a number of US military space satellites until the successful
conclusion of the operation. Additionally, without space support, a US
attempt to help Taiwanese forces recapture their territory would be
more difficult. The destruction of US space satellites might also
serve as a warning not to interfere in this situation. Any nation that
wanted to warn the United States that it should not meddle in that
state's affairs or intervene in a dispute could build and deploy a
rudimentary ASAT system at least as capable as Program 437. By doing
so it would gain the capability to inflict serious damage on US space
systems.

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Chun, Clayton K. S. Shooting Down a Star: Program 437, the U.S. Nuclear ASAT System and Present Day Copycat Killers. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University, April 2000. [ 11 quotes ] [ page 70 ]