Home > Evidence

All Evidence

The evidence library is a collection of quotes from authoritative sources and news articles that are used to support arguments in the database. You can click on the titles below to see the full quotation and see which arguments utilize the quotation. [ More on Evidence ].

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z 0-9     [ There are 1095 quotes ]

[ Most Recent ] [ Most Viewed ] [ View a Random Quote ]

A

---

 

• A 1994 U.S. Navy War Game Showed that China could Devastate U.S. by Attacking U.S. Space Assets [1752]
• A Code of Conduct could help Constrain China's ASAT Tests [3017]
• A Code of Conduct would Address many of the Issues Raised by China's Recent ASAT Weapons Test [2701]
• A Code of Conduct would do more to Preserve a Nation's Ability to Operate in Space than Limit It [2810]
• A Code of Conduct would Reduce Miscalculation Risks from Dangerous or Provocative Maneuvers [2808]
• A Single Nuclear Missile could Devastate U.S. Physically, Economically, and Morally [2752]
• A Space Arms Control Treaty is Best Way for U.S. and China to break out of Security Dillema [3523]
• A Space-Based Missile Defense System is the Only one Capable of Providing Truly Global Coverage [2707]
• A Space-Based Missile Defense would Dissuade Adversaries from Using Ballistic Missiles [2754]
• A Treaty to Ban Space Weapons would make U.S. ICBMs and Missile Defense Systems Illegal [2379]
• Accidental War is one of the Greatest Risks Posed by Space Weapons [1768]
• Achieving Qualitative Breakthrough in Space Imaging Capabilities would Require Unrealistic Intelligence Infrastructure and Vast Constellations of Satellites [3403]
• Adding Simple Layer of Coating on Missiles would Dramatically Increase Defenses against Lasers [3237]
• Additional Nuclear Proliferation is most likely outcome of space weaponization [2390]
• Advanced ASAT Technologies are Outside Capabilities of Rogue States [1230]
• Advanced Military Space Systems can Take Decades to Develop and Deploy [3082]
• Adversaries are Responding to U.S. Conventional Strength by Shifting Towards Mobile or Hardened Targets [2388]
• Adversaries can Defeat Dominant Player in a Medium through Stealth, Surprise, and by Varying Tempo [2820]
• Adversaries could Counter U.S. Space Weapons with Cheaper Imitations of Same Technology [1737]
• Adversaries Could Respond Assymetrically in a Way that Would Nullify any Strategic Advantage [1539]
• Adversaries Could use Market Power to Disrupt U.S. Access to Space Services [1837]
• Adversaries more likely to attack U.S. resources assymetrically rather than with space weapons [1234]
• Adversaries of U.S. will continue to keep targets mobile to thwart U.S. precision guided missiles [2389]
• Adversaries Will Pursue Weapons of Mass Destruction to Counter U.S. Dominance in Space [1181]
• Adversaries Will Respond to U.S. Space Dominance by Attacking our Early Warning and Communication Satellites [1180]
• Advocates of Space Weapons are in the Minority in Congress and Military [1556]
• Aegis/SM-3 Missile used in US 193 Exercise is not a Viable Space Weapon [3295]
• Air Force Focusing on Developing Directed Energy Weapons [2498]
• Airborne Laser could be used as an ASAT though its unlikely to Justify the Cost [2640]
• Airborne Laser Useful only Against Less-Advanced Liquid Fuel ICBMs [3236]
• Alarming Scenarios about U.S. Space Weapons are Political Theater, Unfounded in Fact [2825]
• Although Technically Possible, Political Constraints may Prevent U.S. from Attacking Neutral Space Systems [3345]
• Amateurs have been able to Locate Stealth Satellites Before [3562]
• Ambiguity over Definition of a Space Weapon makes Arms Control Impractical [3054]
• An Agreement to Ban ASAT Weapons Testing would be Significant First Step [2610]
• An Attack on U.S. Space Assets would Collapse Global Economy and Cripple Military [2294]
• An Attacker would only have to Disable some of the GPS Constellation to Degrade its Effectiveness [3436]
• An Informal "Code of Conduct" Agreement Would help Tame Lawless Outer Space Environment [2698]
• Anti-satellite conflict is not inherently escalatory [1257]
• Anti-Satellite Space Weapons are Inherently Escalatory [1423]
• Anti-Satellite threat is more hypothetical than real [1226]
• Anti-Satellite Weapons could be Developed that Would not Create Space Debris [2598]
• Anti-satellite weapons have offensive advantage because of their ability to specialize their attack method [1385]
• Anti-Satellite Weapons more Efficient than Ground-Based Strikes [1763]
• Any international backlash against space weapons will be short-lived [1217]
• Any Treaty Limitations on Missile Defense should Recognize Possibility that Technology, especially of Rogue States, could Outpace Agreement [3322]
• Arguing for the Inevitability of Space Weaponization is a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy [2423]
• Arguing that Space has Already been Weaponized ignores Political Perception that New Efforts would Cross a Threshold [2442]
• Arms Control Agreements cannot Keep Pace with Advances in Space Technology [1611]
• Arms Control would Contribute nothing to Reducing Threat to U.S. Space Assets and Security [2863]
• As Many as 30 States have Laser Blinding Anti-Satellite Technology [1638]
• ASAT Issue could be a Key Test for Sino-American Relations [3532]
• ASAT Test Indicates Breakdown in Communication between Chinese Military and Civilian Leadership [3499]
• ASAT Test is part of a Trend of Chinese Military Aggressiveness and will Embolden Hardliners in U.S. [2648]
• ASAT Test Represent China's Increasing Willingness to Test U.S. Military Hegemony [2712]
• ASAT Test Undermines China's Claim to Support Arms Control [2646]
• ASAT Test was not a Ploy to Force U.S. Back to Space Arms Control Negotiations [2721]
• ASAT Test will Raise Suspicions about China's Rise to Power [2647]
• ASAT Weapons are Part of China's Strategy to Deter U.S. Involvement in Taiwan Conflict [3010]
• ASATs could Cripple American Military Power [3512]
• Assumptions about China's Motives for its Anti-Satellite Test Incorrectly Assume Chinese Government Acted in a Unified Manner [3265]
• Attackers have Advantage in Missile Defense Cost Calculations [3235]
• Attacks on space assets are inevitable -- U.S. needs to build redundancy into system [2182]
• Attacks on Space Assets Increasing because Conditions that Led to Restraint During Cold War no Longer Exist [3052]
• Attacks on U.S. Space Assets Unlikely to Determine Outcome of Conflict [1818]

B

---

 

• Backlash Against U.S. Deployment of Space Weapons Could Undermine U.S. Conventional Strength [1304]
• Ballistic Missiles Offer Signficant Advantages over Strategic Bombing [1552]
• Ban on Space Weapons could Block Peaceful Dual-Use Technologies [2277]
• Basic Problem with Space Arms Control is that Virtually any Space System could Perform an Anti-Satellite Role [1471]
• Before China Tested its ASAT, U.S. Space Weapons Effort was Politically Uncertain [2720]
• Best Policy for Ensuring Commerical Spacepower is Encouraging Investment in R & D -- Isolationist Policies will only be Counterproductive [3135]
• Boost-Phase Missile Defense can Lead to Space Weaponization [2441]
• Boost-Phase Missile Defense doesn't Destroy Warhead, Leaving it to Fall on Populated Areas [3242]
• Boost-Phase Missile Defense Systems are not Viable Anti-Satellite Weapons [2798]
• Both the U.S. and China have a Vested Interest in Maintaining the Status Quo in Outer Space [3518]
• British Experience with Carrier Aviation after World War I Demonstrates Difficulty in Preserving Technological Dominance [1435]

C

---

 

• Can Defeat Anti-Satellite Weapons by Increasing Launch on Demand Capability [2886]
• Can Defeat Anti-Satellite Weapons through Stealth or Decoy Measures [2887]
• Cannot get Maneuvering Instructions to Satellites Fast Enough to Avoid Missile Attack [3434]
• Capabilities and Motivations to Develop Space Weapons now Widespread [2708]
• China a Threat Because it is Willing to Sell its Missile and Space Technology [1195]
• China Actively Developing Space Control Capabilities [1843]
• China Actively Pushing for Space Arms Control [1201]
• China already has the Technology to Threaten all U.S. Space Assets, even those in Higher Orbits [2856]
• China also Developing Electronic Jamming and Blinding Anti-Satellite Space Weapons [3008]
• China and Europe Cooperating on Galileo Project [3568]
• China and Russia are Pursuing Space Arms Control to Limit U.S. Missile Defense Efforts [2860]
• China could Attack U.S. Satellites through Ground Attack Means [3032]
• China could Decline to Ratify CTBT in Retaliation for US Space Weapons Push [3370]
• China Could Provide Space Services to Adversaries of U.S. [1193]
• China could Respond to U.S. Space Weaponization by Withdrawing from Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty [1891]
• China could Retaliate Against U.S. Space Weapons by Forgoing Participation in other Security Initiatives that are in the U.S. National Interest [3328]
• China Could Strike U.S. Intelligence Satellites Pre-Emptively [2635]
• China could Threaten Satellites U.S. is Depending on for Defending Taiwan [3009]
• China could Withdraw Support for CTBT in Response to U.S. Space Weaponization [1890]
• China currently unable to maintain on-orbit presence for critical satellites [2091]
• China Deterred from Attacking U.S. Assets in Space by its reliance on Space Assets and Fear of Escalating Conflict with U.S. [3549]
• China Developing Broad Military Space Capability to Enable its Military to Defend its Borders and Project Power Regionally [3451]
• China Developing Microsatellite Capabilities for Space Control [1845]
• China Developing Range of Anti-Satellite Capabilities [2833]
• China Directly Threatened by Revised U.S. National Space Policy [2703]
• China does not have a coherent spacepower strategy [2092]
• China does not Share Arms Control / Confidence Building Norms [3018]
• China Emphasizes its Civil Space Program to Divert Attention Away from its Military Program [2545]
• China Feels Compelled to Pursue Military Space Capabilities because of U.S. Dominance [2347]
• China Feels it is the Target of U.S. Missile Defense Efforts [2335]
• China has a Wide Range of Technological Options for Attacking Space Assets [1842]
• China has been Actively Working to Improve its Global Image [3251]
• China has Consistently Advocated Banning Weapons in Outer Space [1888]
• China has Demonstrated Direct-Attack Space Weapons [3029]
• China has Developed a Comprehensive National Space Program [3448]
• China has Expressed Concern that Testing and Deployment of Space Weapons will Increase Space Debris [1886]
• China has Heavily Invested in Space Economy and has an Interest in Securing its Investment [2722]
• China has Legitimate Security Interests in Pursuing Space Weapons and Recognizes that there is no Real Space Arms Control Solution [3023]
• China has Multiple Assymmetric Responses to U.S. Weaponization of Space [3332]
• China has Multiple Ways to Respond to US Space Weapons, all of which would Negatively Impact Global Security [3372]
• China has Range of Launch Options at its Disposal [2543]
• China Has Sufficient Resources to Develop Anti-Satellite Weapons [1199]
• China has Sufficient Tracking Ground Stations for Global Coverage [2830]
• China has Transformed Itself into a Global Strategic Power other Countries want to Cooperate With [3569]
• China Investing in Space Surveillance Capabilities [3028]
• China is Concerned Space-Based Missile Defense will Neutralize its Deterrent [1882]
• China is Concerned that U.S. Missile Defense Research is a First Step Toward Space Weaponization [1880]
• China is Concerned that U.S. Space Weapons will Threaten its Civil and Commercial Space Program [1884]
• China is Concerned U.S. Work on the Space-Based Interceptor Test Bed will Lead to Anti-Satellite Weapons [1881]
• China is Developing Laser Weapon System to Attack Satellites [1846]
• China is Developing Space Systems to Counter U.S. Hegemony [1926]
• China is Developing Spacepower Capabilities to Counter U.S. Conventional Strength, not as a Response to U.S. Spacepower [1840]
• China is Modernizing its Ballistic Missile Arsenal [2718]
• China is most Concerned about Effect of U.S. Missile Defense on its Deterrent [3335]
• China is not developing the ELINT capability it would need to challenge U.S. navy [2096]
• China is too Economically Dependent on U.S. to Confront it Militarily [2301]
• China is Using Space Arena to Challenge U.S. Hegemony [2723]
• China is Working on Indigenous Synthetic Aperture Radar Satellite for Naval Power [2336]
• China is Working on Lasers to Blind and Disable Satellites [1192]
• China Lacks Capabilities Necessary for a Viable Anti-Satellite Weapons Program [1910]
• China Lacks the Means or Motivation to Engage U.S. in a Space Arms Race, its Motives are Primarily Defensive [2706]
• China Likely to Attempt to Disable U.S. Satellites Before Attacking Taiwan [1198]
• China Likely to Carry out ASAT Attacks in Combination with Information Warfare Campaign [3011]
• China likely to Focus on Force Enhancement Rather than Space Control [3246]
• China Likely to Increase its ICBM Force if the U.S. Deploys Space Weapons or Missile Defense [1887]
• China Likely to Target U.S. Space Assets as a Precursor to an Attack Against Taiwan [1844]
• China Looking to Military Space for Force Enhancement [3250]
• China Looking to Reap National Prestige from Space Activity [3248]
• China may be Trying to Force U.S. to Expend Resources in Space Countermeasures Arms Race [3016]
• China may not have been Aware of Political and Environmental Risks from ASAT Test [2696]
• China Naively Assumed ASAT Test would not be Viewed as Provocative [3429]
• China Now Equally Dependent on its Satellite Infrastructure for an Attack on Taiwan [2888]
• China Pursuing National Power through Technological Advancement [3572]
• China Pursuing Space Weapons to Counter American Space Dominance [1182]
• China Recognizes U.S. Dependence on Outer Space [2813]
• China Recognizes U.S. Dependence on Space Assets and is Bolstering its Counterspace Capabilities [1169]
• China Reportedly Tested Ground-Based Laser Weapons Against U.S. Satellites [3125]
• China Researching Several Different Anti-Satellite Technologies [1191]
• China Seeks Superpower Status by being Included on International Space Station [3245]
• China Strategy is to become the Launch Services Market Leader for the Developing World [2087]
• China Trying to Develop Space Surveillance Capabilities [2351]
• China Unlikely to be Dissuaded by U.S. Space Dominance because it has a Narrower set of Strategic Interests [2558]
• China Unlikely to be Dissuaded from Developing Space Weapons [1927]
• China Unlikely to Try and Match U.S. in Space Weapons Arms Race [2626]
• China very Concerned about U.S. National Space Policy [2613]
• China views its Space Program as Critical to it's Grand Strategy [3447]
• China Views Space as a Conflict over Resources [2349]
• China Views Space Power as Key to Counter U.S. Strength [1194]
• China Views Space Power as Key to Economic Modernization [1183]
• China Wants to Keep Space "Weapon Free" [1200]
• China was Shocked by U.S. Demonstration of Spacepower in Recent Conflicts and is Modifying Strategy to Counter U.S. Military [2536]
• China will never Agree to any Space Arms Control because of the Strategic Necessity of its Counterspace Program [3033]
• China will only agree to Space Arms Control if its Strategic Environment Changes [3034]
• China will want to Conduct more Tests of its Direct-Ascent ASAT to be Confident that it is Viable [2857]
• China won't necessarily Challenge U.S. Hegemony Militarily [3548]
• China Working on Developing Indigenous Space Surveillance and Tracking Capability [2540]
• China Working on Directed-Energy Weapons to Dazzle or Physically Damage Satellites [3030]
• China Working on Electronic Attack Weapons to Disable Satellites [3031]
• China would be Strategically Isolated from Rest of the World in any Space Conflict [2088]
• China would View Space-Based Missile Defense as more Threatening than Ground-Based [3375]
• China's Anti-Satellite Weapon Test shows Space Weapons are Within Reach of most Spacefaring States [2569]
• China's ASAT Program took 20 years to Develop [3428]
• China's ASAT Test was a Demonstration of its Asymmetrical Capability against America's Military [3507]
• China's Committment to FMCT Dependent on Satisfactory Settlement of Space Weapons / Missile Defense Issue [3369]
• China's Counterspace Program Driven by Strategic Necessity [3024]
• China's Investment in Anti-Satellite Weapons may make Space Arms Race Inevitable Regardless of U.S. Decisions [3331]
• China's Military Space Policy has been Influenced by U.S. War Games [3247]
• China's military space program not focusing on systems it needs for an asymmetic advantage [2093]
• China's Silence after the ASAT Test could be due to Troubling Disconnect between Leadership and Military [2649]
• China's Space Power Ambitions are Driven by Commercial Interests [1184]
• China's Space Power Efforts motivated by desire to counter U.S. Strength and Preserve its Nuclear Deterrent [2812]
• China's Space Program Drive by Techno-Nationalism [3570]
• China's Space Program Driven by Desire for National Prestige [1190]
• China's Strategic Dependence on its Counterspace Program makes Arms Control Highly Unlikely [3027]
• China's Strategic Goal of Preventing Taiwanese Secession makes Counterspace Program a Strategic Necessity [3025]
• Chinese Ability to Invade Taiwan Kept in Check by Lack of Counterspace Capability [1197]
• Chinese Analysts Unambiguous about need to Develop Space Weapons [2633]
• Chinese Anti-Satellite Weapons Test Generated Dangerous Cloud of Space Debris [2571]
• Chinese Army may not have Informed Chinese Government about ASAT Test [2605]
• Chinese ASAT development is not a concern because they have not conducted any tests [2095]
• Chinese ASAT Program only one Part of Broad Counterspace Effort [3452]
• Chinese ASAT Test Complicates International Cooperation Efforts [2644]
• Chinese ASAT Test could Spark Arms Race with India [2594]
• Chinese ASAT Test Crossed the Metaphorical "Rubicon" of Space Weaponization [2588]
• Chinese ASAT Test Demonstrates how Space Weaponization would Decrease Investor Confidence and Increase Insurance Costs for Commercial Space Operations [2699]
• Chinese ASAT Test Exposes Two Major Weaknesses of U.S. Space Power [2687]
• Chinese ASAT Test Highlights Weakness of Indian Military Space Program [2677]
• Chinese ASAT Test Indicates China's Rise to Power will not be Peaceful [2608]
• Chinese ASAT Test is a "Wake-up" Call for the U.S. [2585]
• Chinese ASAT Test Largest Debris-Generating Event in History [2790]
• Chinese ASAT Test Likely Solely a Show of Strength [3249]
• Chinese ASAT Test may Spark Arms Race with Japan [2700]
• Chinese ASAT Test Meant as a Signal to Deter U.S. Interference in Taiwan [2612]
• Chinese ASAT Test Poses Serious Challenge to New IADC Space Debris Agreement [3494]
• Chinese ASAT Test Proves Need for Rules of the Road in Outer Space [2666]
• Chinese ASAT Test Shows Breakdown in Communication between Chinese Military and Government [2909]
• Chinese ASAT Test was a Reaction to U.S. Attempt to Exert Space Hegemony [3508]
• Chinese ASAT Test was Meant to Dissuade US Deployment of Missile Defense [3509]
• Chinese ASAT Test was Technically Impressive for Several Reasons [3022]
• Chinese ASAT Test will Push U.S. Politically Further Away from Negotiation Table [2694]
• Chinese Beidou System can be used to Improve Accuracy of ICBMS [2917]
• Chinese Commentators have Noted Utility of ASAT Weapons in Combating U.S. [2625]
• Chinese Counterspace Preparations to Deter U.S. Involvements in Taiwan Strait Scenario and U.S. Countermeasures Risk Crisis Escalation and Miscalculation [3036]
• Chinese Definition of Space Warfare [2624]
• Chinese Development of ASATs has Outpaced Intelligence Estimates [3510]
• Chinese Economy Limits Their Civil Space Power Ambitions [1202]
• Chinese Information Warfare Strategy Gives Clues on how they would Conduct Space Warfare [2631]
• Chinese Interest in Space Warfare Driven by U.S. Taiwan Policy and Missile Defense [1911]
• Chinese Leadership may not have been Fully Aware of Pending Anti-Satellite Weapons Test [2584]
• Chinese Military Space Program Driven Primarily by Security Interests, not as a Response to U.S. Space Control Initiatives [1841]
• Chinese Military Space Program still has Significant Structural Gaps [2630]
• Chinese Preparations for Attack on US Space Assets would be Highly Visible [3191]
• Chinese Publications show Interest in Countering U.S. Space Assets [2814]
• Chinese Reliance on Aged Soviet Space Technology gives U.S. Opportunity to Pursue Cooperation [2533]
• Chinese satellites jammed by Falun Gong protesters, neighboring states in 2005 [2231]
• Chinese space policy emphasizes international cooperation and peaceful use of outer space [2217]
• Chinese Space Power Significantly Raises Costs to U.S. of trying to Deter China [3456]
• Chinese Space Strategy is Foremost about Taiwan [3252]
• Chinese Strategic Logic Clearly Demands Emphasis on Anti-Satellite Weapons [1908]
• Chinese Strategists Recognize they need to Attack U.S. Networks and Space Assets to Counter its Military Strength [3026]
• Chinese Test has Pushed Space Debris Problem over the Threshold to Critical Mass [2660]
• Chinese Test was the First Successful Test of a Direct-Ascent, Ground-to-Space Anti-Satellite Weapon [2576]
• Claims of an Inevitable Threat to US Space Assets don't Hold up under Examination [3389]
• Clandestine ASAT Development would be Difficult [1811]
• Clementine 2 Program Showed Usefulness of Anti-Satellite Weapons Research for Defending Earth Against Asteroids [1526]
• Co-Orbital ASATs more of a Threat than Ground-based Methods [2801]
• Coalition in Operation Iraqi Freedom Attacked Iraq's Satellite Ground Stations [1648]
• Collabrative Space Surveillance Data Sharing would Enhance, not Undermine U.S. National Security [3177]
• Commercial Imagery and Communication Satellites not Threatened by Jamming [1432]
• Commercial remote sensing industry acknowledges risks to national security from spread of imagery [2162]
• Commercial Satellite Industry much more Concerned about Jamming than Kinetic Weapons [2772]
• Commercial Space Services Market Necessarily Global [3131]
• Competition over Scarce Space Resources and Rising Concerns over Fragile Space Assets is increasing Possibility for Conflict in Outer Space [1945]
• Competition over Scare Space Resources led to Hostile Jamming of a Satellite in 1996 [1731]
• Competition over Space Resources has Potential to Foster Conflict or Cooperation [3493]
• Confidence Building Measures would be a Constructive Intermediate Step Towards Preventing an Arms Race in Outer Space [1902]
• Congress Currently Trying to Balance Space Needs with Military Modernization [3053]
• Consensus among Senior Defense Officials Shifting towards Non-Offensive Defense to Protect Space Assets [3423]
• Continuous, Global SAR Coverage is Beyond Current Capabilities [3402]
• Contribution of Space to Global Economy Increasing [1477]
• Conventional deterrence can deter attacks on U.S. space assets [1345]
• Conventional ICBMs could Create Destabilizing Use-or-Lose Pressures [2399]
• Conventional Primacy not Useful against Insurgent Threats [2518]
• Conventional Strikes on Satellite Ground Stations may be Faster, Easier, and Cheaper than Using Space Weapons [1480]
• Conventional Weapons can only Disrupt and Deny, not Destroy HDBTs [2400]
• Conventionally-Armed Ballistic Missiles are Least Risky Long-Range Strike Option [1562]
• Cooperative CSBMs could Reduce some Risks from Using ICBMs Armed with Conventional Warheads [2398]
• Cost Exchange Ratio for Missile Defense Favors the Attacker [3231]
• Cost of Denying Adversaries their Space Assets Greater than its Worth [2638]
• Costs of U.S. Space Weaponization Outweigh Benefits, Including the Risks from Accidental Launch from Vertical Nuclear Proliferation [3329]
• Could use Space Surveillance Assets to Verify a Ban on Destructive Anti-Satellite Weapon Tests [2955]
• Counter Communications System far less Controversial than other Space Weapon Proposals [2774]
• Countries can complicate U.S. national security by 'soft balancing' against U.S. interests [2506]
• Cox Commission Report has Created a Legacy of Mistrust between U.S. and China on Space Policy [3520]
• Credible Missile Defense more likely to help Slow Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [2716]
• Critics Argue Space Weapons Risk Destabilizing Arms Races and Accidental Nuclear War [2975]
• Critics Exaggerate the Risks from Space Weapon Accidents [1210]
• Current Composition of US SSA Capabilities [3490]
• Current Legal Vacuum may have Motivated China to Conduct Anti-Satellite Weapons Test [2956]
• Current Trends Point to Increasing Incentives for Cooperative Space Security [3158]
• Current U.S. Military Dominance on Land and in Space should be Enough to Start an Arms Race in Space if it were Likely [1633]
• Current U.S. NMD does not Uniquely give it ASAT Capability [2797]
• Currently, Limited Capacity to take Advantage of Space Surveillance Data [3173]

D

---

 

• Data indicates U.S. Military Dependence on Space Assets is Significant and Growing [1925]
• Debatable whether Adversaries would want to or need to Rely on U.S. Space Surveillance Data to Attack Space Assets [3579]
• Debate over Military Space Policy Hinges on Definitions of Key Terms [1568]
• Debris from China's Recent ASAT Test is Forcing U.S. and Commercial Sector to Consider Costs of Space Weapons [3151]
• Debris is Already Becoming Self-Sustaining [3127]
• Declassification of Space Surveillance Data Complicated by its Potential for Offensive Counter Space (OCS) [3573]
• Defeating Hard or Deeply Buried Targets is a major defense priority [2395]
• Defensive Weapons will be Countered by Offensive Weapons, Sparking an Arms Race [1735]
• Definition of a 'space weapon' that distinguishes between capability and actuality [2149]
• Definition of a security dilemma [2341]
• Definition of a space-based weapon [2164]
• Definition of OCS Operations [2326]
• Definition of space militarization [2172]
• Definition of space power [2170]
• Definition of Space Weapons that Excludes "Residual" Weapons [2465]
• Demand for Geo-Synchronous Orbital Slots is Increasing [1667]
• Demand for Space-Based Radio Frequency Spectrum is Increasing [1635]
• Deploying Countermeasures to ASATs Only Continues Arms Race Logic -- Should First Try Diplomacy [3517]
• Deploying Space Weapons can Damage a Country's Security by Increasing the Vulnerability of its Military Center of Gravity [1532]
• Deploying Space Weapons would Run Counter to American Values [2302]
• Deploying Space Weapons would Undermine U.S. Soft Power [2328]
• Deployment of Space Weapons Increases the Risk that Malfunctions will be Perceived as an Attack [2338]
• Deployment of space weapons risks accidental nuclear war by threatening Russian early warning systems [1875]
• Deployment of Space Weapons will be Destabilizing because it will Expose Vulnerabilities [1644]
• Deployment of space weapons will cause world to align against U.S. [2143]
• Deployment of space weapons will set unique and damaging precedent, further threatening nonproliferation regime [2154]
• Deployment of Space Weapons would Cripple Commercial Space Sector by Increasing Costs for Satellite Insurance [1527]
• Desert Storm Convinced U.S. Military of Need for Space Control [1751]
• Despite Advances, Launch Costs Remain Largest Drag on Space Systems [2317]
• Destabilizing, "Use-or-Lose" Pressures of Space Weapons will Drive Automation, Increasing the Risks of Catastrophic Accidental War [1748]
• Development of Space Weapons necessary to Defend Earth against Asteroids [2085]
• Differences in Chinese and American Definitions of Outer Space [2632]
• Difficulty Identifying Attackers Creates Incentives for Pre-Emptive Strikes with Space Weapons [1481]
• Directed Energy Weapons not yet Viable for use as an ASAT Weapon [2542]
• Directed-Energy Weapons can Disable Satellites from a Distance [1684]
• Distrust between U.S. and China has Deadlocked Space Arms Control discussions in the U.N. Conference on Disarmament [3521]
• Doubtful that U.S. Pursuit of SDI Dissuaded Soviet Union [2535]
• Dual-Use Nature of most Satellites Causes both U.S. and China to Mistrust Each Other's Intentions in Space [3519]

E

---

 

• Economic and Military Pressures Make Space Conflict Inevitable [984]
• Economic Cost of Competing with U.S. could Dissuade Adversaries [2534]
• Effective Space Mine System would Cost $2 Billion [3226]
• Effective Space-Based Interceptors would Require Constellation of Several Hundered Interceptors [3229]
• Effects-Based Operations Depend on Next-Generation GPS [2471]
• Egypt has a Clandestine Program to Develop Ballistic Missiles and WMD [2451]
• Empirically, accidents have occurred that did not spark international crises [1209]
• Empirically, existence of technology does not establish that countries will be able to successfully exploit it [1227]
• Empirically, last Cold War-era ASAT test created cloud of space debris [2150]
• Empirically, Proximity Operations have caused Accidents [2807]
• Empirically, U.S. Naval and Aerial Dominance has not Dissuaded Adversaries from Building their own Navy or Air Force [2522]
• Empirically, U.S. Statements about Space Warfare have Prompted Chinese to change their Military Space Policy [2629]
• Environmental Constraints on using Space Weapons are Increasing as Space becomes more Crowded and Valuable [3153]
• Establishing Space Supremacy will be Necessary for Future Wars [2456]
• EU Started Alternative to U.S. Global Positioning to Guarantee Availability [3576]
• Europe Building up Space Surveillance Capabilities [3136]
• Europe is Benefitting from U.S. Restrictions on Satellite Exports to China [3555]
• Europe should Focus on Establishing a Space Deterrent through Development of a Space Surveillance Network [3464]
• Europe Trying to Develop Self-Sufficiency in Military Space Despite U.S. Protests [3556]
• European Countries often in the Dark because of Lack of SSA [3491]
• European Space Agency looking to develop independent space surveillance capability [2221]
• European Union concerned about Arms Race in Space and Advocates Pursuit of a Code of Conduct [2737]
• European Union moving towards Shared Military Satellite Programs [2870]
• Even HAND attack on satellites would not significantly reduce U.S. military power [1253]
• Even if China doesn't have ASATs, U.S. would have to pre-emptively strike to avoid losing space assets [1290]
• Even Low-Power Lasers can Seriously Damage Optical Satellites by Blinding [1960]
• Even the United States has Exercised Constraint in Deploying Space Weapons [3545]
• Even U.S. Weaponization of Space is not Inevitable [3465]
• Every environment accessible to humanity eventually becomes weaponized [1314]
• Evolution of Air Power too Dissimilar from Space to Serve as Useful Analogy [1541]
• Existence of 'latent' space warfare capabilities is not the same as actual weaponization [2148]
• Existence of vulnerabilities does not necessarily make an attack inevitable [1235]
• Existing BMD Technology Ineffective against Chinese Direct-Ascent Missile ASAT [3514]
• Existing Cold War Arms Control Treaties Prohibit Anti-Satellite Space Weapons [1677]
• Existing Defensive Counterspace Techniques are Inadequate to Defend Space Assets [2525]
• Existing International Agreements do not Preclude Deployment of Space Weapons [1465]
• Existing International Space Law Lacks Formalized Verification Procedures as Basis for ASAT Arms Control [3525]
• Existing missile defense systems are technically space weapons [2895]
• Existing U.S. Missile Defense Systems would be more effective against Satellites than Missiles [2861]
• Export Controls have Hampered Ability of Aerospace Industry to Complete Military Space Projects [3401]
• Export controls inhibit growth of commercial space sector [2226]
• Extremely Difficult to Determine Intent or Origin of Action against a Space Asset [3309]

F

---

 

• Finding Consensus on Definition of a Space Weapons is not Impossible if Political Will Exists [3324]
• Focus on Space Control Tradesoff with Focus on Fleeting Targets [2320]
• Focused Space Weapons Ban could be Acceptable to US because it would allow Ground-Based Missile Defense [3373]
• Force-projection Space Weapons are neither Politically nor Technologically Feasible [1708]
• Force-Projection Space Weapons could become a Decisive Force [1500]
• Force-Projection Space Weapons could Revolutionize American Military Power [1475]
• Force-Projection Space Weapons would be 10 Times more Expensive than Comparable Conventional Systems [1740]
• Foreign Adversaries can Utilize Commercial Satellite Services that the U.S. will be Politically Unable to Disable [1736]
• France Working on Space Surveillance Radar Capabilities [2538]
• French SPOT Imaging System has Dramatically Improved in Last 10 Years [2931]
• Funding for space weapons will come at the expense of other modernization efforts [1239]
• Funds for Space Weapons will Necessarily come from Budgets for Existing Conventional Operations [2309]

G

---

 

• Galileo would Remove U.S. Ability to Deny Enemy Use of GPS [3557]
• Given U.S. Success at Military Innovation, Other Countries would Fear the Worst from U.S. Space Weapons [2307]
• Globalization of Spacepower Capabilities has made Unilateral Attempts to Preserve it Counterproductive [3134]
• GPS Satellite System Adequately Hardened against HAND Attack [1962]
• GPS System could be Disabled by an Attack on Ground-Based Monitoring Stations and Satellites [1617]
• Ground Attack Strategy Limited by Inadequate Intelligence [1753]
• Ground-Based Attacks on an Enemy's Satellite Nodes may not be Practical Logistically [1764]
• Ground-Based Missile Defense Systems are not Flexible Enough to Deal with Changing Threat Environment [2753]
• Growing Chinese Space Power Decreases the Chances that War Between U.S. and China will Remain Limited Conflict [3459]
• Growing Competition in Space becoming major Security Challenge for Asia-Pacific Region [3478]
• Growing Consensus in Favor of Code of Conduct [3288]
• Growth in Military Personnel Devoted to Space Programs shows U.S. Dependence on Space [1924]
• GSO Crowding Leading to Increase in Jamming and Hijacking of Satellites [3495]
• GSO Slot Interference - both Inadvertent or Deliberate - could lead to Conflict [2553]
• Guiding U.S. Goal should be to Preserve its Leadership in Outer Space [1472]
• Gulf War Showed Threat Commercial Imagery Poses to U.S. Troops [2932]

H

---

 

• HAND ASAT Threat Deterred by U.S. Nuclear Arsenal [1229]
• Historical Record Demonstrates that not all Defensive Weapons Spark an Arms Races [1756]
• Historically, Dominance of a Regime (Air, Sea) by a Liberal Hegemonic State has been Beneficial for Commerce and Peace [2310]
• Historically, Dominance of Sea by Hegemonic Power Helped to Maintain Global Order and Commerce [3000]
• Historically, Economic Needs Have Motivated Nations to Go to War [986]
• Historically, Technological Monopolies Never Last [1174]
• Historically, Technology Concerns are Often Overrated [1413]
• History Demonstrates that Deployment of Space Weapons or Space-Based Missile Defense Unlikely to Start Arms Race [2709]
• History of Air Power Shows Other Countries will Quickly Develop Countermeasures to Space Weapons [1831]
• History of Air Power Shows Space Power Unlikely to be Decisive [1833]
• History of Miscommunication between U.S. and China on Space Issues [3244]
• History shows that character and motivations of states is more important than technology for determining what is 'destabilizing' [1212]
• History shows that even advanced surveillance capabilities do not give combatants a decisive advantage [1236]
• Human Nature Makes Development of Space Weapons Inevitable [1665]
• Humanity has Failed at Past Attempts to Restrict Development of Weaponry [1663]
• Hypothetical 'sneak-attack' on U.S. Space Assets is highly unlikely scenario [2303]

I

---

 

• ICBMs are a Better Alternative to Kinetic Energy Strike Weapons [2823]
• ICBMS only One Means of Attacking United States [3239]
• If given the chance to renegotiate the Outer Space Treaty, some countries may push to restrict remote sensing [2890]
• If the U.S. Deploys Space Weapons, Russia might miscalculate over a space debris collision [1176]
• Imbalance in Dependence on Space Assets between U.S. and China makes Chinese Pursuit of Space Warfare Inevitable [3450]
• Importance of Securing Space Resources Will Outweigh Treaty Obligations [1408]
• Impossible to Predict how States will Respond to U.S. Space Weapons [2457]
• Improving rapid reconstitution capability would reduce need for space weapons [1317]
• In a crisis, our Allies will still support U.S. use of space weapons [1218]
• In China-Taiwan Scenario, China could not be Assured that an Attack on U.S. Space Resources would Successfully Deter U.S. Conventional Attack [3550]
• Increase in Chinese Space Power puts U.S. Bases and Forces in Pacific Region at Greater Risk of Attack [3453]
• Increased Spending on Space Weapons has not lead to Increase in Capabilities [3394]
• Increasingly, the World Economy has become Reliant on "Global Utilities" from Space [1454]
• Independent SSA would Give Europe Capacity to Monitor Space Arms Control Compliance [3492]
• India and China Extending Rivalry into Outer Space [2263]
• India and Pakistan capable of developing space weapons [1276]
• India and Pakistan could develop direct-ascent or microsatellite ASATs [1275]
• India Developing "Real-Time" Military Space Capability [2573]
• India has the capabilities and motivation to deploy ASAT weapons [1282]
• India has well-established Indigenous Launch and Remote Sensing Capability [3123]
• India is 15-20 Years Away from even Rudimentary Space Defense Means [3484]
• India is Developing Missiles that Could Launch an Anti-Satellite Weapon [1436]
• India Many Years Away from Realizing its Vision for an "Aerospace Command" [2670]
• India Preparing to Counter Chinese Anti-Satellite Weapon Threat [2602]
• India Researching Directed Energy Weapons [1274]
• India Still Planning to Create Unified Space Command [3117]
• India working with Israel to develop its remote sensing capability [2228]
• India Worried about Threat from Chinese or Pakistani ASATs [2574]
• India, Iran, North Korea, and China all have the capability to develop an ASAT weapon [1277]
• India, Israel, Japan, China, and the European Union all took steps to increase military use of space in 2005 [2212]
• Indian Defense Planners Recognize Importance of Space Power [1434]
• Indian Hardliners Pushing for India to Develop Military Space Command to Counter China [2695]
• Indian Military Space Program Constrained by Infrastructural Impediments [2678]
• Indian Nuclear Test Showed the Limits of U.S. Coercive Spacepower [1662]
• Indian Push for ASAT Weapons could Initiate Regional Space Arms Race [3497]
• Indian Space Command is Many Years Away from Actual Implementation [3483]
• Inevitability Argument for Space Weaponization is too Simple [2425]
• Inevitability Arguments often based on Unreliable Historical Determinism [2554]
• Inherent Norm Against Space Warfare because of the Risks it Poses to Valuable Space Assets [3546]
• Instability and war more often a result of complex political, diplomatic, and military reasons [1214]
• Interational Cooperation will Increasingly be Used to Address "Global Commons" Problem of Space Debris and Space Security [3161]
• International Community could Decide to Mutually Refrain from Weaponizing Outer Space [1476]
• International Community will Interpret U.S. Deployment of Space Weapons as Supporting its Doctrine of Pre-Emption [1652]
• International Community will Unite Against U.S. Space Weaponization [2928]
• International Reaction to U.S. Space Weapons would Undermine Non-Proliferation [2936]
• International Space Law cannot come up with an Adequate Definition for Space Weapons [2710]
• Investment in Space Assets Makes it an Economic Center of Gravity [1418]
• Iran and North Korea unlikely to try and attack U.S. in space [2153]
• Iran continues to improve on its ability to jam satellite transmissions over large area [2232]
• Iran has Failed at Trying to Launch its own Communications Satellite for Almost 30 Years [1919]
• Iran is Launching its own Satellite to Test Long-Range Missile Technologies [2620]
• Iran is working on intercontinental ballistic missiles [2893]
• Iran launched its first remote sensing satellite in 2005 and plans to launch more advanced versions [2233]
• Iran Looking to Space Program for Economic Development [2942]
• Iran Working on Missiles that could give them MIRV and ASAT Capabilities [2776]
• Iran's Ballistic Missile Program is Threatening even Without its WMD Ambitions [2749]
• Iranian Government has Ambitious Spacepower Goals but it has Consistently Failed on Similar Projects because of Poor Coordination [1920]
• Iranian Rocket Launch is not a Military Breakthrough [2766]
• Iraq War and Modernization Demands have kept Space Weapons in Check [2319]
• Israel Concerned Chinese will sell ASAT Technology to Iran [2663]
• Israel Creating Military Space Force and Debating Counterspace Doctrine [3118]
• Israel Increasing Spy Satellite Capabilities [3115]
• Israel is working on building up its remote sensing capability [2227]
• Israel Pursuing Launch-on Demand Capability to Counter Anti-Satellite Weapons Threat [2664]
• Israel Seeking Capability to Jam Hezbollah's Commercial Satellites [2283]
• Israel tried to Jam Satellites During 2006 War with Lebanon [3116]
• Israeli Officials are Calling for development of spacepower capabilities [2220]

J

---

 

• Jamming is an effective, and less politically divisive approach to space control [1319]
• Japan is Expanding its Military Space Program [2261]
• Japan Launching a Fourth Spy Satellite as Part of its Program to Boost Space-Based Defenses [2760]
• Japan not likely to become a military space power anytime soon [1242]
• Japanese LDP Party is Trying to Change Law to Allow for Using Space for Self-Defense [2761]

K

---

 

• Key Provisions of Proposed Code of Conduct are to Limit Space Debris and Share Space Surveillance Data [2862]
• Key Question Should be When is Space Weaponization Going to Happen, not Whether it is Inevitable or Not [2443]
• Key Threat U.S. now Faces is from Time Critical or Fleeting Targets [2314]
• Kinetic-Energy Strike Weapons ('Rods from God') could Strike Terrestrial Targets with 15-Minutes Notice [1615]

L

---

 

• Lack of Concise Definition of "Space Weapons" makes Arms Control Unworkable [3308]
• Large-Scale Military Space Projects Unlikely due to Bureaucratic Inertia [3083]
• Last Two Space Policy Addendums show Shift Towards Space Control [2321]
• Libya routinely jams commerical and military satellites [2234]
• Libya's Jamming of Satellite in 2006 is Biggest Jamming Incident Yet [3122]
• Limited Short-Term Consequences from All-out Chinese Attack on U.S. Space Assets [3189]
• Logic of China Threat Analysts makes it next to Impossible for China to Prove they are not a Threat [2384]
• Long History of Unwarranted Fear-mongering over U.S. Space Weapon Programs [2824]
• Long-Range Precision Strike Capabilities Needed to Address Challenge of Mobile and Relocatable Targets [1551]
• Loss of a communications satellite won't necessarily cause crisis escalation [1216]
• Loss of Space Services would have Signficant Impact on Global Economy [1484]

M

---

 

• Many Advantages to Temporarily Disabling, not Destroying Satellites [3233]
• Many Countries are Developing Precursor Technologies for Force-Projection Space Weapons [1682]
• Many Countries have Competitive Space Programs but U.S. is still Dominant [2316]
• Many Countries have Started Developing Independent Military Space Capabilities [3571]
• Many Historical Examples where U.S. Attempts to Preserve Commercial Spacepower have been Counterproductive [3133]
• Many Low-Budget, Low-Tech Options Available to Adversaries to Counter U.S. Space Weapons [1738]
• Many nations are capable of threatening U.S. space assets [1278]
• Many Nations have Invested Substantial Resources into Growing Space Economy [1483]
• Many other countries are pursuing spacepower capabilities [2179]
• Many States Considering Anti-Satellite Weapons to Reduce Security Threat from Remote Sensing Satellites [2946]
• May be Impossible to Defend Satellites Against Attack [1384]
• Meager Chinese Space Budget is still a Significant Drain on their Resources [2315]
• Microsatellite Technology Lowers Barriers to Developing ASATs [1957]
• Microsatellite Technology within Range of Dozens of Countries and Spreading Rapidly [1956]
• Microsatellites are a Threat because they are Difficult to Detect and Track [1958]
• Microsatellites can be Concealed in other Satellites ("Parasite Satellites") [1959]
• Midcourse Missile Defenses can be Easily Defeated with Countermeasures [3368]
• Military and Civillian Infrastructures Heavily Dependent on Space Assets [1402]
• Military and Conflict Always Follow Trade Into New Areas [992]
• Military Commanders and Policymakers need a range of options, including Space Weapons, to Respond to Attacks on U.S. Space Assets [2864]
• Military Doctrine and Institutional Inertia will Push the Development of Space Weapons [1485]
• Military has a Role in Protecting Space Assets just as the Navy Protects the Sea Lanes for Commerce [1478]
• Military is Concerned that Space Debris from Space Weapons could Damage Key Military Satellites [1679]
• Military Space Culture not used to Sharing Data [3574]
• Military Space Professionals Opposed to Space Weapons because of how they would Complicate their Operations [2643]
• Military Space Programs have to Surmount Significant Budgetary and Management Obstacles [2499]
• Military Space Programs Plagues by Cost Overruns and Technological Failures [3395]
• Military Space Systems have very Long Operational Lifecycle due to Slow Pace of Development [3081]
• Minimal Technical Requirements to be Considered a Space Power Threat [2342]
• MIRV experience does not prove technology demonstration causes arms races [1221]
• MIRV Experience shows how Damaging Initiating Arms Races can be to U.S. Security [1709]
• Mismanagement of Existing Military Space Programs is Biggest Threat to U.S. Space Assets [2453]
• Missile defense neccessary to defend against unknown future threats [2891]
• Missile Defense Systems are much more Effective Against Satellites than Against Missiles [1512]
• Missile Defense Systems Directly Related to Space Weapons [1749]
• Missile Defense Systems give U.S. Latent ASAT Capability [1610]
• More and more states are achieving access to outer space [2225]
• Most Likely Threats to U.S. Space Assets will be Cheap, Low-Tech, and Assymetric [2817]
• Most Military Space Programs Plagued by Cost Overruns and Technical Problems [3391]
• Most Satellites Already Hardened against Natural Levels of Space Radiation [1963]
• Much more Difficult to Defend the Higher-Value Satellites in Higher Altitudes [2858]
• Much Progress has been made in Increasing Laser Power Levels [2346]
• Multiple Countermeasure Options for Defeating Boost-Phase Missile Defense [3367]
• Multiple Countermeasures Available to Defeat Space-Based Missile Defense Systems [1889]
• Multiple Examples from Modern Times Dispute the Argument that Warfare Spreads Wherever Humanity Goes [1545]
• Multiple Examples of Hostile Jamming of Communications Satellites in Recent Years [1639]
• Multiple Factors Beyond Simple Action-Reaction Drive Armament Decisions [1757]
• Multiple historical examples of crises and accidents that did not escalate [1215]
• Multiple Indicators of U.S. Military Reliance on Space Assets [2295]
• Multiple Options Available for Adversaries to Attack Space Assets [1821]
• Must Assume that Future Adversaries will Target Space Assets [1561]
• Must Consider Costs in Space Weapon Debate [3232]
• Must Consider the Security Needs that are Motivating the U.S. Push for Space-Based Missile Defense for Progress on Space Arms Control [2739]
• Must Look at Space Weapons in Environmental Context [2970]
• Must Recognize Threat to Global Environment and Security Posed by Space Weapons [2971]

N

---

 

• NASA study shows risk of catastrophic collision with space debris may be higher than previously thought [2215]
• National and International Efforts to Mitigate Space Debris [3141]
• National Security Concerns are Driving Iran's Space Effort [2943]
• National Technical Means could be Used to Verify an International Treaty against ASAT Testing, Deployment, and Use [3527]
• Nationalism is Motivating Factor Behind Iran's Space Program [2941]
• NATO Forces Struck Serbian Satellite Ground Stations in Operation Allied Force [1647]
• Naval Analogy does not Apply to Space because Spacecraft are more like Lighthouses than Ships [1542]
• New Global Threat Environment Requires U.S. to Develop Long-Range Precision Strike Capabilities [1549]
• New National Space Policy does not Rule out Development of Space Weapons [2889]
• New National Space Policy emphasizes international space cooperation [2850]
• New National Space Policy is Example of American Hubris [2679]
• New Strike Capabilities Needed to Address Challenge from HDBTs [1550]
• New U.S. military space policy directive is imminent [2216]
• Next to Impossible to Conceal Satellite Launches and Orbits from Amateurs , let alone Military Professionals [3563]
• No Basis for Assumption that China Intends to Challenge U.S. Military Hegemony Strategically [3547]
• No Consensus on what Tools could be used to Effectively Verify Space Arms Control [3310]
• No country has used lethal or destructive force from, to, or within space [1250]
• No evidence for an actual threat to U.S. space assets [1222]
• No evidence of a significant space threat [1223]
• No Evidence that U.S. has already Developed Destructive Anti-Satellite Weapons [2796]
• No Military Advantage to be Gained from Attacking Russian Space Assets [3383]
• No nation currently possess an operational ASAT capability that poses a significant threat to the U.S. [1225]
• No need in Forseeable Future for U.S. to Deploy Space-Based ASATs [3225]
• No Other Nation has Ability to Compete with United States in an Arms Race in Space [1766]
• No Other Nation would be Able to Challenge the U.S. in Space if it Deployed Space Weapons [1761]
• North Korea is Continuing to Advance its Ballistic Missile Arsenal [2748]
• North Korea is Developing a new Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile [2777]
• North Korea is Interested in Launching a Satellite for Economic Reasons [2260]
• North Korea is working on long-range ballistic missiles [2892]
• Not clear that attacking a satellite is an act of war in the same way attacking a ship would be [1254]
• Nuclear proliferation more likely consequence of space weaponization than an arms race in outer space [2146]
• Number of States Emphasizing Military Space in their Military Doctrine is Increasing [1668]
• Number of States with Access to Outer Space is Steadily Increasing [1669]

O

---

 

• Offensive Counterspace Technology is Spreading Throughout the World [1447]
• Offensive Space-Strike Weapons would be a Threat to Entire Planet [2331]
• On-board Decoys could Defend Satellites from Attack [1554]
• On-Site Inspections and Consultations could Supplement but not Replace National Technical Means in ASAT Testing Arms Control Treaty [3528]
• Once One Nation Achieves Ability to Shoot Down Space Launch Vehicles, it can Dominate Outer Space [1619]
• Once Started, Space Weaponization would be Irreversible because of Limits of Verification [1710]
• Online Debate on Space Weaponization Lacks Nuance Necessary when Discussing Complex International Issues [3586]
• Only European Union could Construct a Space Surveillance Network to Compete with the U.S. [3466]
• Only U.S. Currently has Capability to Integrate Space Systems on the Battlefield [1830]
• Orbits of Space Assets are Easy to Observe and Predict [1417]
• Other countries are rapidly eroding U.S. lead in space technology [1238]
• Other Countries may Simply be Unable to Compete with U.S. Technological and Military Dominance [1658]
• Other countries oppose U.S. space weaponization to check U.S. hegemony [2180]
• Other Countries will Respond to Space Weapons by Pursuing their Own or by Pursuing WMDs [1555]
• Other nations motivated by national prestige to match U.S. advances in military space [1240]
• Other Nations Unlikely to Engage U.S. in Space Arms Race [2308]
• Other states unlikely to be influenced by U.S. decision not to deploy space weapons [1220]
• Outcome of the debate over space weaponization still up for grabs [2181]
• Outer Space Treaty does not Prohibit Space Weapons [1460]
• Overall Costs of Space Weapons Outweigh the Benefits [2937]

P

---

 

• Pakistan could target third-party satellites used by the Indian Army [1273]
• Pakistan Supports International Effort to Prevent an Arms Race in Outer Space [2736]
• Past 60 Years of Escalating Military Space Activity have not been Destabilizing, no Reason to Expect Weaponization would be Either [2435]
• Past Efforts to Develop Force-Projection Space Weapons Failed because Conventional Weapons Offered Same Capability [1544]
• Pearl Harbor Scenarios are Unrealistic Scare Tactics [2304]
• Pentagon expects China to preemptively strike U.S. space assets [1289]
• Planned Missile Defense Systems have an Inherent ASAT capability [1673]
• Planned Missile Defense Systems would Give U.S. Latent Anti-Satellite Weapons Capability [1513]
• Political Constraints may Prevent U.S. from Trying to Disrupt Commercial Satellites Providing Information to Adversaries [3344]
• Political constraints will prevent any country from taking action against commercial high-resolution satellites [2158]
• Political Costs too High for China to Develop Anti-Satellite Weapons [2090]
• Political Leaders Lack Technical Training to Adequately Evaluate Military Space Programs [3399]
• Political Troubles with Galileo Demonstrate Difficulty of European Union Cooperation on Space Projects [2794]
• Poor Ground Infrastructure and Command and Control Prevents Russia from Fully Exploiting Imagery and Signals Intelligence Satellites [3382]
• Possible for Space Weapons to be Both Ineffective and Destabilizing at the Same Time [2444]
• Possible that an Informal International Agreement could be Reached with Spacefaring Nations [2611]
• Pre-Emptive Defensive Maneuvers against ASATs would Defeat the Purpose of Intelligence Gathering Satellites [3435]
• Pre-Emptive Strikes on Early Warning Assets Invites Nuclear Escalation [2528]
• Preception of U.S. Vulnerability is Motivating Chinese Military Space Efforts [2634]
• Previous Conference on Disarmament Discussions have Demonstrated Problems with Verification of Space Arms Control [1906]
• Previous Russian ASAT System is no Longer Functional [1955]
• Previous Space Arms Control Negotiations have Failed over Inability to Define "Space Weapons" [2549]
• Previous Space Weapon Proposals were Stifled because of their Risk to the Collective Space Environment [3152]
• Previous U.S. Administrations have Found Space Arms Control Unworkable [2548]
• Prohibitive Costs and Technical Barriers make Space-Based Strike Weapons Unlikely [3126]
• Proliferation of satellite imagery puts U.S. forces at risk from terrorists [2175]
• Proponents Argue Space Weapons Needed to Deter Attacks against Valuable Space Assets [2974]
• Protecting Satellites should take Precedence over Preserving Freedom of Action in Space [3506]
• Protection through redundancy offers an alternative to space-based weapons [1316]
• Prowler Satellite Intercepts Signals by Maneuvering Closer to the Target Satellite [2882]

R

---

 

• Radiation Belt Remediation to Counter HAND attack could Adversely Disrupt Radio and GPS Transmissions [2265]
• Rapid reconstitution best way to counter HANDs Strike [1318]
• Rapid Reconstitution Capabilities and Modernization Efforts could Reduce Risks from Anti-Satellite Weapons [1707]
• Rapid Replacement of Satellites is Best Way to Defend Satellites against Kinetic-Energy ASATs [3516]
• Reactive Maneuvers are Ineffective Tactics against Intercept Anti-Satellite Weapons [3433]
• Reading New National Space Policy with Previous Military Documents shows Clear Intent to Weaponize Outer Space [2403]
• Realistically Verifiable ASAT Treaty would Focus on Prohibiting the Testing, Deployment, and Use of ASATs [3526]
• Recent Allegations of Chinese Laser ASATs were more Politically Motivated than Cause for Alarm [3390]
• Recent Calls for Space Weapons Funding have been Politically Stifled, Even After Chinese ASAT Test [3150]
• Recent example from Operation Iraqi Freedom illustrates danger of satellite imagery to U.S. security [2161]
• Recent Russian Military Reforms Created a Separate Russian Space Force [3378]
• Recently Unclassified Memo shows U.S. has long Policy of Seeking Methods to Jam and Interfere with Enemy Satellites [2881]
• Redundant Communication Links will Keep Loss of Space Assets from Escalating Conflicts [1773]
• Reforms have Fixed Acquisition Problems in U.S. Military Space Program [3112]
• Regardless of its Intentions, U.S. Missile Strike on Spy Satellite Likely to Spark Space Arms Race [3284]
• Releasing Space Surveillance Data would Help Improve Data Processing [3178]
• Relying on Arms Control Treaties for Space Security is Poor Strategy [2802]
• Remote Sensing not as Militarily Useful as often Argued [2637]
• Reports of Chinese ASAT programs often a Misinterpretation of Chinese Sources [2348]
• Researchers Conducted a Review of Open-Source Literature and could not Establish Definitive Proof that China is Pursuing an Anti-Satellite Weapon [1909]
• Resources for Space Weapons will Tradeoff with Conventional Military Needs [2455]
• Responsive Space Strategy would Enhance U.S. Soft Power in the World while not Shortchanging Security [2926]
• Responsive Strategy would allow U.S. to Prepare Space Weapon Deterrent without Losing Leadership Role [2925]
• Restructuring of Chinese Space Program has Severely Constrained their Military Space Program [2385]
• Revised National Space Policy can't be Blamed for Chinese ASAT Test [2592]
• Rise of Chinese Space Power is Indication that U.S. is no longer Hegemon in Asia-Pacific Region [3454]
• Rods from God is an old Concept [2822]
• Rogue States more Likely to Attack U.S. on Ground than in Space [2467]
• Russia also Concerned about Strategic Effect of US use of Space Assets to Augment Conventional Forces [3377]
• Russia and China Already Developing Space Weapons, US 193 Exercise won't Start Arms Race [3294]
• Russia Building up Space Defense out of Concern over U.S. Space Weapons [3124]
• Russia Continues its Committment to International Cooperation in Outer Space [2537]
• Russia has Researched Space Mines as Countermeasure to a Strategic Defense System [1446]
• Russia is only other State with Dedicated Space Surveillance System [3139]
• Russia is still a Significant Spacepower Threat [3001]
• Russia Lacks Critical, Up-to-date Space Infrastructure to become a Significant Military Space Power [3380]
• Russia Lacks the Industrial Infrastructure to become a Spacepower Threat [1953]
• Russia lacks the Necessary Ground Infrastructure to Fully Exploit Military Space Assets [3381]
• Russia may modernize its nuclear arsenal to respond to U.S. space weapons [1294]
• Russia more Likely to Pursue Assymetric Strategy Against US Space Weapons than try to Compete with US in Space Arms Race [3376]
• Russia more worried about budgets than external space threats [1224]
• Russia no longer has Either the Military and Industrial Organizational Infrastructure Necessary to Develop a Space-Based Weapons Program [1954]
• Russia Successfully Developed and Deployed Co-Orbital Anti-Satellite Weapon during Soviet Era [1750]
• Russia will respond to U.S. space weapons by modernizing its nuclear force rather than engaging in space arms race [2152]
• Russia's Military Space Doctrine is Focused on Defensive Measures [1683]
• Russian Alert Status Means Minor Accident in Space Could Cause Miscalculation [1179]
• Russian military space policy focused on defense -- they've pledged not to be the first to deploy space weapons [2211]

S

---

 

• Salyut 7 Experience Shows Risks of Hydrazine Re-Entry [3293]
• Satellite Jaming Incidents Becoming more Feasible and Common [3138]
• Satellite Jamming Weapons most Likely form of Counter-Space Attack U.S. will Face for Several Reasons [1928]
• Satellites can be easily Hardened against EMP Weapons [3243]
• Satellites Could be Defended with Built-in Self-Defense Capability [1553]
• Satellites could be Equipped with Evasion Technologies to Detect and Avoid Some Incoming ASATs [3515]
• Satellites have yet to achieve the economic importance that the Spanish treasure galleons had for the British Royal Navy [1255]
• Satellites vulnerable to cyber-attacks [2159]
• Saudi Arabia Recieved Nuclear Technologies from Pakistan [2452]
• SBIs would Create too Much Debris to be Practical [3241]
• SDI-era Space Weapons Push was Scuttled for Fear it would Ignite Space Arms Race with Soviet Union [3154]
• Sea-Based Midcourse Defense System would have Latent Anti-Satellite Weapon Capability [1510]
• Security Dilemma Paradigm is a Useful Framework for Understanding U.S.-Chinese Military Space Policy [3522]
• Self-interest will motivate other countries to match U.S. deployment of space weapons [1315]
• Sheer Number of U.S. Programs for Potential Space Weapons shows Space Weaponization is Inevitable [2977]
• Shielding is a Better Solution to Threat of Laser Blinding than Space Weapons [1388]
• Should be Careful not to Conflate Space-based Missile Defense with other Space Weapon Proposals [2751]
• Should be Concerned about Risk of Miscalculations from Use of Space Weapons [3470]
• Should be not Overly Alarmed by China's Anti-Satellite Weapons Test [2672]
• Should Carefully Analyze Potential Gains to Avoid Pursuing Technology for its own Sake [2520]
• Should Emphasize Common Security and Confidence Building over Arms Control to Achieve Space Security [3425]
• Should Expand Missile Defense Efforts to Deal with Threat from Asteroids [2334]
• Should Guard Against Polarizing the Debate Over Space Weapons [2323]
• Should Implement Space Code of Conduct Incrementally [3438]
• Should not Compare U.S. Operation with Chinese Anti-Satellite Test [3276]
• Should not Criticize Military Planners for Evaluating Space Weapons -- thats a Policy Decision [2296]
• Should not Draw Conclusions from 19th Century Mercantilist Model for Outer Space [3159]
• Should not ignore the detrimental effect space weapons will have on non-proliferation efforts [2147]
• Should not let Concerns over Generating Space Debris Outweigh Military Needs [2599]
• Should not let Definitional Concerns Stop Work Towards Space Arms Control Treaty [3584]
• Should not Let Pursuit of Perfect Agreement for Space Security become Enemy of the Good [3424]
• Should not Place too much Emphasis on Risk of Cheating in Space Arms Control Regime [3327]
• Should not put too much Faith in Moscow's "Moratorium" on Testing Space Weapons [2799]
• Should not Stigmatize Anti-Satellite Weapons as Escalatory [1449]
• Should not Underestimate Enemy Intentions by Projecting our Own [2815]
• Should use Proliferation Security Initiative as a Model for a Space Security Confidence Building Measure [3014]
• Significant Parallels between Missile Defense and U.S. 193 Exercise [3279]
• Six nations are capable of producing a crude HAND ASAT [1281]
• Small Constellation of Space-Based Interceptors would be Sufficient to Defend against Ballistic Missiles Worldwide [2756]
• Solid Fuel Rocket Boosters are Within Reach of Rogue States [3234]
• Some Satellite Defense Options Compete Against Each Other [1383]
• South Korea and Taiwan Pursuing Independent Spy Satellites [3142]
• Soviet Experience Shows Difficulty in Sustaining Space Supremacy Campaign [2447]
• Space Actors are Increasing Efforts to Protect Satellites from Attack [1747]
• Space Arms Control Complicated because anything can be Defined as a Space Weapon [1907]
• Space Arms Control Efforts Will Quickly Become Out of Date [1414]
• Space Arms Control is Impractical and Unverifiable [1775]
• Space Arms Control is not Worth Pursuing because it is Unenforceable and Unverifiable [2999]
• Space Arms Control Proponents Ignore the very real Incentives States Already have to Pursue Space Weapons [2426]
• Space Arms Control Should Focus on Banning Activities Rather than Objects [3585]
• Space Arms Control would not have Prevented Ground-based Chinese Anti-Satellite Weapons Test [2735]
• Space Arms Race could Spiral out of Control, Risking Miscalculation and Accidental War [3341]
• Space Assets are a Center of Gravity only because they are Centralized -- Decentralizing Resources would reduce need for Space Weapons [2555]
• Space Assets are Critical to U.S. Economy and National Security [1829]
• Space Assets are Growing in Importance for National Economies [2420]
• Space Assets are the Foundation of Modern American Military Might [3511]
• Space Assets are Vital Component of Global Economy [1828]
• Space Assets are Vital for much of World's Population [1944]
• Space Assets can Shape Events through Presence [1426]
• Space Capabilities are an Integral Part of Modern War-Fighting [1455]
• Space Debris Accumulation Risks Making Space Unusable for all Purposes [2973]
• Space Debris Becoming a Significant Problem for Military and Civilian Space Sectors [1439]
• Space debris caused several fragementation and collision events in 2005 [2214]
• Space Debris Collisions Probably Occur more Frequently than We Know [3175]
• Space Debris Concerns should not Trump U.S. National Security Interests [3003]
• Space Debris from Chinese Anti-Satellite Weapons Test puts Space Station at Risk [2617]
• Space Debris from Chinese ASAT Test will Complicate Space Activities for Next 20 Years [3051]
• Space Debris from Space Weapon Use or Testing Threatens all Space Efforts [1443]
• Space Debris from US 193 Shot Delaying Launch of Followup Spy Satellite [3290]
• Space Debris is an Inevitable Consequence of Space Activity [2596]
• Space Debris makes any "Victory" in Space Warfare a Pyrrhic Victory [3437]
• Space Debris Risks may make the Use of Space Weapons Taboo as it would cause the "Mutually Assured Destruction" of all Space Assets [2704]
• Space debris threatens human space flight [2151]
• Space Dominance Allows Military to Overcome "Fog of War" [1622]
• Space has been Weaponized for the Past 60 Years [1630]
• Space is Already Weaponized, Depending on how you Define Space Weapons [3055]
• Space is Becoming Vital Part of the Global Economy [1458]
• Space is Key Component of U.S. Military and Economic Strength [1516]
• Space is Militarized but not Weaponized -- Existing Space Assets are only Force Enhancers [1401]
• Space Mines not Practical Counterspace Solution for Space Dependent Nations [3227]
• Space mines would be difficult to defend against [1171]
• Space Power Necessary to Deal with Extraterrestrial Space Threats [1523]
• Space Radar could have Revolutionary Impacts on Military and Society [3056]
• Space Situational Awareness is a Necessary Component of Code of Conduct and Confidence Building Measures [3489]
• Space Situational Awareness Mission same as Asteroid Defense Mission [2805]
• Space Situtational Awareness Capabilities Widely Available [1563]
• Space Systems are Composed of Satellites, Data, and the Ground Receivers [2556]
• Space Systems are Very Difficult to Maintain or Repair [2523]
• Space Systems can be Protected against HAND Attacks [2439]
• Space Systems Lack Element of Survivability and are Unlikely to be Relied on in Crisis [1406]
• Space Tethers not Viable Space Debris Removal Option [3114]
• Space War Inevitable Due to Economic Motives [985]
• Space Warfare Between India and Pakistan Would Quickly Escalate into Nuclear Conflict [1272]
• Space Warfare Unlikely to be Confined to Space [1424]
• Space was not Weaponized during the Cold War because both Superpowers Recognized that it was in their Mutual Interest to Refrain from Weaponizing Space [1537]
• Space Weapon Program Costs Tradeoff with much more Justifiable Military Modernization Programs [1531]
• Space Weaponization has not yet Occurred although it is likely given Current Political Environment [1947]
• Space Weaponization Key to Global Military Dominance [1536]
• Space Weaponization Runs Counter to Goals of Sustainable Development of Outer Space [2972]
• Space Weaponization Would Compound Space Debris Dangers Exponentially [1303]
• Space Weaponization Would Threaten Outer Space Environment by Increasing Space Debris [1302]
• Space weaponization would uniquely damage nonproliferation norm [2391]
• Space Weapons are Destabilizing because they are Based on the Doctrine of Pre-Emption [1557]
• Space Weapons are Destabilizing Because they Target Satellites Used Extensively by Noncombatants [1307]
• Space weapons are destabilizing because they threaten the flow of stabilizing satellite imagery intelligence [1873]
• Space Weapons are Especially Destabilizing in the Regional Context [2142]
• Space Weapons are Impossible to Identify and Define, Complicating Arms Control [3004]
• Space weapons are no less provacative than nuclear deterrence [1256]
• Space Weapons are Similar to Nuclear Weapons in that they Pose an Omnipresent Existential Threat to Other Countries [2324]
• Space Weapons are too Costly an Investment Considering their Low Survivability and High Risk [3156]
• Space Weapons Arms Control would Reduce threat to U.S. Space Assets [3374]
• Space weapons cause instability during crises because they threaten early warning satellites [1178]
• Space Weapons Encompass Missile Defense and Ground-Attack Options but most Relevant and Timely Debate is around Anti-Satellite Weapons [2958]
• Space Weapons give Military Commanders more Options, Enhancing Deterrence and Diplomacy [1631]
• Space Weapons in the Hands of Democratic States can Improve Global Peace and Stability [1632]
• Space Weapons Increase Likelihood of War by Creating Incentives for Pre-emptive Attack [1558]
• Space Weapons Inherently Stuck in Risky High-Alert Posture [1421]
• Space Weapons Inherently Vulnerable because of Limited Manueverability [1416]
• Space Weapons Invite Pre-emption and Escalation in Regional Context [2141]
• Space Weapons may Provoke Pre-Emptive Attacks [2337]
• Space weapons placed in geosynchronous orbit are particularly destabilizing because they threaten early warning satellites [1874]
• Space Weapons Technology within Reach for Several Different Countries [2421]
• Space Weapons will come at the Expense of Military Modernization [1405]
• Space Weapons will Inevitably be Deployed for Defense [1437]
• Space Weapons will not Address the Higher Priority Threat of Terrorism [2300]
• Space Weapons will not Fundamentally Alter the Nature of War [2705]
• Space Weapons will not Pose Offensive Threat to other Countries' Sovereignty [2322]
• Space Weapons Would Create 'Hair Trigger' Posture in Outer Space [1300]
• Space weapons would destabilize the international system because they give an incentive to strike first [1241]
• Space Weapons would Hinder Civil and Commercial Space Development by Increasing Space Debris [1528]
• Space Weapons would Quickly and Dramatically Increase Space Debris Risks [1508]
• Space-Based Force-Projection Weapons less Reliable than Ground-Based Options [1741]
• Space-based kinetic weapons waste too much energy, conventional strike options are more efficient [1346]
• Space-Based Laser Weapons Insufficient to Counter Threat of Laser Anti-Satellite Weapons [1387]
• Space-Based Missile Defense Best way to Defend Against HAND Attack [2755]
• Space-based missile defense interceptors have wider range to engage ballistic missiles [2894]
• Space-Based Missile Defense will Dissuade Adversaries from Developing Ballistic Missiles [2450]
• Space-based missile defense would improve flexibility and responsiveness of missile defense [2896]
• Space-Based Missile Defense would provide Global Coverage against Emerging Threats [2757]
• Space-Based Particle Beam ASAT Weapons can Disable other Satellites [1704]
• Space-based Strike Weapons Likely to be Economically and Technically Impractical for Many Years [3080]
• Space-based weapons are destabilizing because they lack survivability [1170]
• Space-based weapons needed to protect the space assets the U.S. relies on [1313]
• Space-Basing Offers Several Advantages over Air-Breathing Systems [1714]
• Space-to-Earth Strike Weapons are not Practical Currently [2747]
• Spacefaring Nations have always Taken Risk from Satellite Re-Entry very Seriously [3292]
• Spoofing of Satellite Signals is easy to Overcome [1430]
• Spread of remote sensing technology is a real danger to U.S. national security [2174]
• Spy Satellite US 193 was not a Threat to Public Safety [3281]
• Starfire Optical Range could be Testing Lab for Directed-Energy ASAT [3393]
• START, INF, and CFE Treaties do not ban the use of Anti-Satellite Weapons [1517]
• States will base decision on whether or not to deploy space weapons on their own rational calculus [1219]
• Strategic Logic of Space Power is Inevitable, Even if only to Combat Extraterrestrial Space Threats [1524]
• Strategic Logic of Space Weapons Technology may be Irresistible [1666]
• Strategic space-based laser for force projection still a viable concept [1348]
• Strategic Technological Advantage Empirically Short-Lived [1643]
• Studies have Disproven the "Rods from God" Concept [2448]
• Successful Diplomatic Resolution of ASAT Issue could have Broader Consequences for Sino-American Relations [3533]
• Supporters of Space Weapons Recognize Failure of Acquisition Process Dooms Proposals for Space Weapons [3397]
• Syria has Ballistic Missile Capability [2719]

T

---

 

• Taiwan Situation Illustrates Limits to U.S. Ability to Dissuade China [2524]
• Technical Fixes and Rules Unlikely to Suffice Without New Agreements [2935]
• Technical Objections to Space Weapons Usually Fall Away Over TIme [2297]
• Technological Means to Jam or Blind Satellites Already Widespread [1836]
• Technology Advancements Have Made Past Arms Control Irrelevant [1419]
• Technology Diffusion will Quickly Erode any Technological Monopoly [1653]
• Terrorists could use remotely sensed imagery to plan attacks [2160]
• Testing of space based missile defense will be viewed as a strategic threat by Russia and China [1877]
• Testing of space-based missile defense would increase the risk of accidental nuclear war by undermining Russian confidence in there ballistic missile early warning systems [1876]
• The Common Aerospace Vehicle (CAV) would allow global strategic strike from space [1347]
• The Soviets abandoned anti-satellite weapon tests during the Cold War because they had already conducted enough to prove the system successful [2884]
• The U.S. has Opposed Space Arms Control in the U.N. Conference on Disarmament because it believes that there is no Threat of a Space Arms Race [1904]
• Threat from Residual ASAT Systems is Limited [1812]
• Threat to U.S. Space Assets can no Longer be Viewed as Speculative [2852]
• Threat to U.S. space assets no longer speculative - multiple examples of attacks on space assets worldwide [2186]
• Three types of anti-satellite weapon programs [2238]
• Three-Part Definition of "Space Weapons" [2976]
• Threshold to Space Weaponization very Unclear [2440]
• Through Technology Transfer, Many Countries could Compete in Space Arms Race [1530]
• Tight Budgets Mean Space Weaponization will Tradeoff with Modernization Efforts [1010]
• To minimize collateral damage, the U.S. could jam the ground-based recievers of satellite date rather than the satellite itself [1320]
• Tongasat Incident shows Attacks on Satellites Within Means of even Relatively Underdeveloped Nations [1459]
• Too Late to Stop an Arms Race in Space [3305]
• Too much Uncertainty around HPM Attacks to make them Practical [3238]
• Top Space Control Priority for the U.S. should be Expanding Space Situational Awareness [2811]
• Transparent Nature of Outer Space helps Preserve Norm of Military Space Restraint [3157]
• Trying to Accelerate Development of Military Space Programs is Doomed to Fail [3398]
• Twelve Days of Silence after ASAT Test Refutes Idea that Test was meant to Force Arms Control Negotiations [3498]
• Two Plausible Scenarios where Countries could Cheat on Space Arms Control [3311]

U

---

 

• U.N. Discussions on Space Weapons Arms Control Going Nowhere [1440]
• U.S. abandoned anti-satellite weapon tests during the Cold War because they didn't think they would be practical against the Soviets superior launch-on-demand capabilities [2885]
• U.S. Ability to Stabilize World through Space Dominance should Outweigh Concerns over Political Backlash [1618]
• U.S. Actions and Policy Documents show Aggressive Plans for Weaponization of Outer Space [3333]
• U.S. Actively Pushing for Space Transparency in International Community [3174]
• U.S. Air Force is Preparing for Space Warfare [1946]
• U.S. Air Force Planning Documents show Intent to Weaponize Space [2497]
• U.S. Air Force Space Command already shares weather, intelligence, and missile warning data [2851]
• U.S. Air Force waiting for Policy Decision before Deploying Anti-Satellite Weapons [3358]
• U.S. Air-Borne Laser Missile Defense System could be Used as an Anti-Satellite Weapon [1511]
• U.S. Already has Proven Satellite Jamming Technology [2641]
• U.S. and China Conducting Research on Ionosphere Modification as a Satellite Jamming Technique [3128]
• U.S. and China Unlikely to Compete in a Space Arms Race for Several Reasons [2702]
• U.S. and Chinese Anti-Satellite Weapon Tests could Provoke India, Pakistan, and Iran to Follow Suit [3583]
• U.S. and European Union continuing work on hypersonic flight programs [2229]
• U.S. can Defend Space Assets Against Chinese ASATs without Igniting Space Arms Race [3323]
• U.S. Can Employ Technical Defensive Measures to Protect Satellites [2934]
• U.S. can only Preserve its Spacepower Dominance through the Marketplace [3132]
• U.S. can use Ground-Based Offensive Counterspace Operations [2519]
• U.S. can't use Anti-Satellite Space Weapons for Deterrence because U.S. has Most to Lose from Loss of Space Assets [1386]
• U.S. can't use ASATs against an Adversary because few Adversaries have anything Worth Targeting [2642]
• U.S. Cannot Act Through Unilateral Military Power Alone [2933]
• U.S. Command of the Global Commons Gives Other Nations Incentive to Accept U.S. Hegemony [1730]
• U.S. Commercial Satellite Sector Concerned About Military Restrictions [1410]
• U.S. Conventional Weapons already Capable of Accomplishing Long Range Strike Goals [1817]
• U.S. could Easily Convert Minuteman ICBMs to Anti-Satellite Role [3230]
• U.S. Could Hedge Against Breakout by Including Withdrawal Provision into any Space Arms Control Treaty [3531]
• U.S. Could Lose Technological Lead in a Space Arms Race [1441]
• U.S. Could Recover Quickly from any Space Conflict [1729]
• U.S. could Safeguard Space Arms Control Treaty against Technological Obsolesence by Including Periodic Review Periods, Modelled after Non-Proliferation Treaty [3530]
• U.S. Currently Unable to Implement Replenishment Strategy [2557]
• U.S. Decision in 1983 to Conceal Satellite Orbits Provoked Growth of Amateur Satellite Spotter Hobbyists [3561]
• U.S. demonstration of feasibilty of nuclear weapons encouraged other nations to develop them [1237]
• U.S. dependence on space systems makes them a tempting target for attack [1280]
• U.S. Deployment of Anti-Satellite Weapons Increases the Risks that False Alarms Will Be Percieved as an attack [1175]
• U.S. deployment of space weapons could bring more stability to international system [1213]
• U.S. deployment of space weapons gives China strong incentives to increase its nuclear alert levels [1293]
• U.S. deployment of space weapons will let the "genie out of the bottle" [1291]
• U.S. Deployment of Space Weapons won't Initiate an Arms Race because Other Countries will Realize U.S. is not a Threat to Them [1725]
• U.S. Deployment of Space Weapons would be Viewed as Purely Offensive [2329]
• U.S. Deployment of Space Weapons would Strain World's Patience for U.S. Military Dominance [2305]
• U.S. Destruction of Spy Satellite has Opened the Door to Further Tests by Other Nations [3272]
• U.S. Destruction of Spy Satellite not a Significant Test of Anti-Satellite Capabilities [3283]
• U.S. does not have a Clear Declaratory Policy to Deter Attacks on U.S. Satellites [3012]
• U.S. Does not have Capacity to Takeout all Chinese Mobile Launchers [3432]
• U.S. Dominance in Military and Commercial Space Sectors is Slipping [3566]
• U.S. Dominance in Space Allows it to Police Globe [1623]
• U.S. Dominance of Low-Earth Orbit could Prevent a Space Arms Race [2454]
• U.S. Dominance of Low-Earth Orbit would Prevent an Arms Race [2311]
• U.S. Dominance of Outer Space is Preferrable to Allowing another Country to Dominate [1765]
• U.S. Dominance of Outer Space would Prevent Hegemonic Power Struggle [1762]
• U.S. Dominance of Space will Prevent a Space Arms Race [1848]
• U.S. dominance of space would spread peace and stability [1246]
• U.S. Dominant in Space at Pivotal Point for Future Management of Outer Space [2959]
• U.S. Economic Dependence on Space Assets is Indisputable [1515]
• U.S. Economy and Military Power Dependent on Access to Space Assets [2750]
• U.S. Efforts to Upgrade Space Surveillance Network have hit Funding Roadblocks [3140]
• U.S. Eforts to Enhance Space Surveillance Network Underfunded and Behind Schedule [3137]
• U.S. Experience in the Cold War shows Limitations of Trying to use Military Dominance to Shape Events [2327]
• U.S. Export Controls have Eroded our Dominance in the Commercial Space Sector [3567]
• U.S. Gains Training, Experience from Effort to Shoot Down Spy Satellite [3261]
• U.S. Global Power is a Result of its Control of the Global Commons (Air, Sea, and Space) [1728]
• U.S. Government cannot Rely on Commercial Market to Sustain Space Industrial Base [2470]
• U.S. ground stations are a much easier target to attack [1233]
• U.S. Ground-Based Missile Defense Interceptors could be Effective as Anti-Satellite Weapons [1509]
• U.S. Ground-Based Missile Defense System at Fort Greely has Kinetic-Kill ASAT Capability [1637]
• U.S. has already Crossed the Threshold to Weaponize Outer-Space [1657]
• U.S. has already Weaponized Space through its Sophisticated Use of GPS and Precision-Guided Munitions [1646]
• U.S. has Asserted its Right to Defend its Space Systems against Interference [2433]
• U.S. has Developed Methods to Jam Telemetry, Tracking, and Control Signals for Satellites [2880]
• U.S. has Effectively isolated China from other Major Space-Faring Nations [2089]
• U.S. has Empirically Benefitted most from Norm of Military Space Restraint [3160]
• U.S. has inadequate intelligence on foreign space weapon capabilities [1279]
• U.S. has Limited Non-Nuclear Options for Prompt Global Strikes against High-Value Targets [2785]
• U.S. has much to gain from Space Weaponization [2434]
• U.S. has no Effective Response to Breakout in Space Arms Control Regime [3313]
• U.S. has no Strategic Interests in Unilaterally Disarming its Space Weapon Efforts [2717]
• U.S. Has Opportunity to Extend and Secure Global Dominance by Pursuing Dominance in Outer Space [1403]
• U.S. has placed restrictions on space surveillance data because of security concerns [2223]
• U.S. has Rudimentary Capabilities now to Disable Satellites, Advanced Techniques Possible in Next 10 Years [2406]
• U.S. has Several Promximity Satellite Projects Currently [2809]
• U.S. Intelligence Satellites would be able to Detect Chinese Preparations for Space Strike [3190]
• U.S. interests best served by constraining development of ground-to-space strike weapons [1321]
• U.S. Interests Prevent it from Negotiating more Effectively with China on the ASAT Issue [3013]
• U.S. investing in building up space surveillance capability [2224]
• U.S. is Best Suited Morally and Technologically to Dominate Outer Space [1715]
• U.S. is Losing its Dominance in Space at Rapid Rate [3565]
• U.S. is not planning to weaponize outer space [2168]
• U.S. is Opposed to Space Arms Control Negotiations [1903]
• U.S. Knew about Chinese Anti-Satellite Test Preparations but had no Incentive to Protest [2913]
• U.S. Lacks the Means (i.e. Space Weapons) to Back Up its Space Deterrence Policy [3006]
• U.S. Long-Range Strike Capabilities Impose Significant Costs on Adversaries [2387]
• U.S. might have to pre-emptively strike China if it suspects China is preparing a military strike that could put U.S. space assets at risk [1288]
• U.S. Military Dependent on access to Commercial Systems [2539]
• U.S. Military Plans to Deploy Space Weapons in the Next 10 Years [1389]
• U.S. must be Prepared to Deny Adversaries the Use of Space Capabilities [1479]
• U.S. Must Consider the Political Implications of its Actions on the International Community [1659]
• U.S. must Decide between Sharing Space Surveillance Data or Dealing with Competing Systems [3578]
• U.S. must Fully Share Space Surveillance Data to Preclude Competitors [3580]
• U.S. Must Use Space Assets More Actively to Establish Presence [1425]
• U.S. National Space Policy should Focus on Best Means to Defend American Satellites rather than Current Flawed Focus on Preserving Operational Freedom